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
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

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



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

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Vietnam: Sorrow and Pity

It is finally over. The outcome had not really been in doubt for some years, and only a massive intervention by the U.S., if even that, could have changed it. Elementary humaneness therefore yields a kind of relief. Whatever sufferings may still await the Vietnamese people, we are grateful that organized warfare has come to an end.

The American role was as squalid in the last days as it had been throughout the whole intervention. Marines clubbing the fingers of South Vietnamese trying hysterically to get onto escaping planes and ships; the cheap stunt of airlifting Vietnamese orphans; the revelation that Nixon had indeed made a secret promise to Thieu, clearly without legal basis; the lugubrious posturings of Kissinger even though he must have known that the fall of Saigon had been rendered inevitable by the pact of Paris—all these brought to an ugly culmination a history of confusion, deceit, stupidity, crime.

One remembers all those American catchphrases, from "strategic hamlets" to "Vietnamization." One remembers the wretched puppets: Diem, Khanh, Ky, Thieu, obtuse military men and mandarin reactionaries, incapable of understanding the social ordeal of their country and unwilling to sympathize with the people experiencing it. One remembers the outpouring of American boastfulness and the repeated predictions of imminent victory, from the Westmorelands and the Rostows. With whatever verbal variations, American policy remained a mindless sort of anti-Communism linked with imperial arrogance, support of authoritarian puppets as little devoted to freedom as the Communists and far less skillful in mobilizing popular sentiment.

At no point was there any serious encouragement for the idea of a "third force"—the idea of democratic liberties in the cities and land to the peasants—perhaps in the circumstances all but unrealizable yet in principle the only one that might have spared Vietnam its ordeals of past and future. The American overlords found their spiritual partners in Vietnamese at least as politically retrograde as themselves. And then, most shameful of all, came the invasion of Cambodia, which made of that country, until then precariously avoiding full-scale involvement, a victim of blood.

American policy, writes the Asian expert Harold Isaacs, began

> in 1945 by acquiescing in and then actively aiding the return of the French to their former colony at the end of a war with Japan. The reasons for this were many: ignorance and indifference, Europe-centered myopia, a view of the world that assigned greater weight to recovery of French power than to the unwillingness of Vietnamese to remain under French rule, an inability to see that the renovation of all politics and all power systems in Asia after the defeat of Japan would not wait on American conceptions of timetables and priorities, or conform on naive demand to American images of the world. . . .

And also, one should add, a failure to understand that rescuing, or trying to rescue, French imperialism in Indochina could only result in strengthening the hold the Communists, under the able leadership of Ho Chi Minh, had already established over the Vietnamese nationalist movement. Indeed, once that hold had been consolidated and all internal Vietnamese rivals defeated, the political outcome of the struggle that would follow over the next few decades was largely sealed.

What followed is depressingly familiar: repeated American efforts to manufacture regimes in Saigon

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without popular support or political vision, regimes marked by bleak repressiveness, mandarin elitism, social incapacity, indifference to the masses, contempt for freedom. The Vietnamese people were confronted by a choice between two kinds of authoritarianism, the more modern in the North and the socially obsolete in the South, and it is hardly surprising that a good many chose the kind that had, at the least, made its mark in the anticolonial struggle and that spoke the language of revolt. Nor is it surprising that those who found themselves in the armies of Saigon often lacked the will to fight or the readiness to die—for what? for Ky and Thieu? Whatever else we may conclude about Vietnam, it seems safe to say that the Communist victory was decisively enabled by the otiose politics of the American intervention.

In the coming period it will nevertheless be important to study these last few decades in close and dispassionate detail, so as to determine whether the Vietnamese outcome was indeed foreclosed or whether other policies might have opened a small chink of freedom. On this matter we should do our best to avoid both the "wave of the future" apologists for Left authoritarianism and the easy formulas that fit too nicely with our own wishes and preconceptions.

MEANWHILE, there is no reason whatever to join those enraptured "leftists" and beguiled liberals who are hailing the Communist victory. The spread of this authoritarian system in whatever variant is not, for socialists and democrats, a cause for rejoicing. That its victory in Vietnam may have seemed inevitable after a certain point and indeed preferable to an endless continuation of a horrible war—these conclusions led many people to oppose further U.S. involvement. But to say this is by no means to share any of the illusions or succumb to any of the deceptions regarding the political meaning of a Communist victory.

In certain right-wing circles, ranging from the *National Review* of William Buckley to (painfully) the Social Democrats, U.S.A. led by Bayard Rustin, there has arisen an outcry that the result of the Vietnam War is to tarnish the "credibility" of the U.S. as a worldwide defender of freedom. The bloody shirt of "isolationism" is being waved; dark mutterings about further betrayals are heard. Let us be restrained: this kind of talk is utter balderdash. The idea that the U.S., still the strongest power in the world, could, even if it wished to, withdraw from the global power struggle is an absurdity. A greater absurdity still is the notion that Vietnam should be seen as the crucial test of the U.S. in world politics, a failed test that must lead democratic countries throughout the world, especially Israel, to turn elsewhere for help. And greatest absurdity of all is the unqualified, simple-minded identification of the U.S. in recent years with the cause of freedom. Would that it were so! All too often, in fact—in Greece, Chile, Portugal, Brazil—the U.S. has continued to align itself with dictatorial reaction, supporting dictators of the Right whose brutality and ineptitude usually paves the way for more stable dictatorships of the Left. Insofar as the claim of the U.S. to be a defender or ally of freedom has been tarnished, it is not the consequence of a "failure of nerve" or a "withdrawal into isolationism," as Daniel Moynihan has been publicly muttering; it is the consequence of reactionary foreign policies pursued by recent administrations, both Democrat and Republican—including the one that Moynihan served.

The true issue with regard to foreign policy is not, as Kissinger and his friends would have us suppose, the "credibility" of American commitment. The true issue is: toward what social and political ends will that commitment be exerted, in behalf of what kinds of governments and political leaders?

Nor is there any reason to take seriously President Ford's pious requests for an "end to recrimination." Quite the contrary, let there be some recriminations, especially at the ballot box, against those who drove us deeper and deeper into the Vietnam disaster.

It is necessary to proceed to a sustained and serious public discussion of what Vietnam signifies. Is the lesson to be learned that the U.S. ought to pursue a policy of strict noninterference in the "underdeveloped" countries? That the victory of Communism is "inevitable" in the Third World? That there might be a "third" or "middle" way between authoritarian Communism and exploitative capitalism? That efforts by the U.S. to encourage the values of liberalism in an illiberal world are inherently self-defeating, assuming, for a moment, that such efforts were seriously undertaken?

These are rough approximations of the questions to be asked. Serious people will now turn their minds to such matters, avoiding the chauvinist demagogy of the Buckleys and the ideological simplism of the authoritarian Left. In time we hope also to contribute to this discussion.

I.H. □

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Robert Lekachman

The Economy: Failure of Nerve

The strangest aspect of the current minidepression, by far the deepest since the 1937–38 episode, is the almost passive reaction of the unemployed, the principal victims, and the bewilderment of economic experts who a few years ago were certain that they could fine-tune the economy in both boom and recession. This mildness of affect among workers in such hard-hit industries as autos, construction, appliances, and apparel is presumably related to the suddenness and unexpectedness of the blue-collar crisis and to the availability of such income maintenance cushions as supplementary unemployment benefits (which in autos ran out in the spring of 1975), food stamps, and unemployment insurance (whose duration has been extended by Congress). But there is at least one additional explanation: workers seem to be as worried as the middle class about inflation and as convinced of the merits of dubious Phillips-curve trade-offs between inflation and unemployment as Alan Greenspan, Arthur Burns, and William Simon. Murray H. Finley, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' alert young president, has sought to counteract this sentiment among his members by commissioning a leaflet (by this writer) explaining the origins of our inflation and arguing that full employment and price stability can be reconciled, though not by current policies.

As matters now stand, the pollsters still report that inflation is regarded by the public as a problem more serious than unemployment. So long as this opinion holds, it will serve as a convenient excuse for presidential vetoes of spending legislation and Federal Reserve refusal to expand money and credit at rates high enough to reinforce the stimulative impact of tax reduction.

Among establishment economists, loss of confidence is pervasive. Less than a decade ago, in his 1966 Godkin lectures Walter Heller proudly told a Harvard audience that "Economics has come of age in the 1960s. Two presidents have recognized and drawn on modern economics as a source of national strength and presidential power." What a difference a few years and a few failures make! In April 1975, Soma Golden, well-informed economics specialist of the *New York Times,* reported:

> Most analysts today, regardless of their political affiliations, believe that 5.5 to 6 percent unemployment is probably the lowest that the Government can achieve without stirring up virulent inflation again. And even that job target is a long way from attainment—1979 at the earliest, according to most forecasters.

Some of the experts appear to have revived secular stagnation hypotheses in vogue during the late 1930s and forgotten during the long post-World War II boom. Others, just as though Keynes had never lived, have returned to the ancient British Treasury doctrine against which he inveighed. Secretary Simon, perhaps the Administration's most vigorous exponent of intellectual fallacy, has in the spirit of his English predecessors argued that a bigger federal deficit will simply crowd out private investors and substitute inefficient public for efficient private spending. It would seem to anyone not befuddled by too much learning that when factories are running at 65 percent of capacity and the economy is capable of producing $200 billion additional Gross National Product there is room for both business and federal rises in expenditure.

NO WONDER, I suppose, that the confidence of economists in their old magic has been shaken. The annual reports of the Council of Economic Advisers since 1969 have been embarrassingly inaccurate alike in forecast, analysis of current trends, and suggested policy responses. Government economists, like Henry Kissinger, often feel compelled to lie a little for their country's sake. But the horde of business and academic economists who assembled last September at Ford's Washington summit meeting did little better. Not a single Friedmanite, Keynesian, or eclectic (of course no radicals were invited) foresaw anything more ominous than mild recession late in 1974 or early in 1975.

To their credit, not all the mainstream economists have reconciled themselves to high unemployment into the 1980s. Paul Samuelson has openly described this minidepression as a Burns operation and advocated vigorous spending programs. Yale's James Tobin and Brookings' George Perry are other esteemed experts who are prepared to take unemployment seriously enough to do something about it. Among the majority, the failure of nerve relates to the inadequacy of conventional fiscal and monetary tools and reluctance to experiment with alternative policies. Many economists remain enamored of competitive markets, however notional competition actually is in an economy of monopolies, oligopolies, regulated industries, and miscellaneous legal and medical price-fixers. Loving free markets,

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economists embrace price controls and economic planning only in such emergencies as major wars.

As radical economists have been saying, orthodox theory may be passing through the phase when old paradigms break down under the cumulative weight of real world anomalies and acceptable new explanations are not yet available, to borrow Thomas Kuhn's useful model from his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Their morale shaken, economists have neglected to apply the common sense with which most of them were born. Particularly for economists it ought to be self-evident that contemporary inflation has little to do with either low unemployment or huge wage increases. By European or Japanese criteria, 1973's average unemployment of just a shade under 5 percent defined a recession not a boom. In that year most wage settlements were moderate and in 1974 and 1975 (at least until the middle of the latter year) they ran far below the escalation in the cost of living. Real wages have in consequence dropped more than 8 percent in the last two years!

The causes of inflation, little related to Phillips-curve trade-offs between inflation and unemployment, include OPEC quintupling of oil prices, two devaluations of the American dollar, Federal Reserve enlargement of the money supply during the 1972 presidential season, rising world demand for American food, and the tendency of dominant corporations to raise their prices in both recession and boom. The auto industry, which added an average $1,000 to 1975-model price tags, is planning another increase on 1976 models during one of the worst sales years in the industry's history.

None of this proves that determined attempts by Congress to move rapidly toward full employment will *not* be inflationary. The current fashion is to warn of worse inflation in 1976 and 1977 unless Congress restrains itself. However, the reason why the gloom may be justified is located in the pricing and profit policies of giant corporations and other price-fixers, not either in low unemployment or aggressive union policy. Most economists still resist the plain implication that permanent price and profit controls are essential if price stability and full employment are ever to be reconciled. I emphasize price rather than wage controls because, aside from some outside construction contracts, inflationary pressure at least since 1972 has come almost entirely from the price side. Equity suggests a combination of mandatory price controls and voluntary wage guidelines applied at the least to *Fortune's* 500 largest industrial firms and probably to its second team as well, the next 500.

Controls will facilitate an outright national commitment to full employment of the kind envisaged by the original 1945 Wagner-Murray Full Employment Bill and now embodied in the Humphrey-Hawkins-Reuss Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill (HR 50). HR 50 requires that the President submit to Congress each year a full-employment budget accompanied by the measures needed to achieve that target. It specifically imposes upon the government the creation of jobs for men and women who want them.

As HR 50 implies, consistent pursuit of full employment without inflation requires national economic planning that, despite its manifest success in France and Japan, continues to be stubbornly resisted by American economists entranced by free enterprise. Coordinated planning is needed to design a rational energy policy, restore full employment, and define a proper balance between public and private activity. In an era of declining long-run growth, a society will either plan the distribution of its GNP or allow the issue to be settled by a series of dog fights.

Some economists, businessmen, and labor leaders have drawn the appropriate moral. The Initiatives Committee for National Economic Planning—which has enlisted such economic stars as Wassily Leontieff, J. K. Galbraith, and Robert Heilbroner; Leonard Woodcock of the UAW; and such socially concerned businessmen as J. Irwin Miller of Cummins Engine and Robert Roosa of Brown Brothers Harriman—cooperatively wrote an economic planning bill that Senators Humphrey and Javits have sponsored in Congress. The Office of National Economic Planning, which is the central mechanism of the proposal, will be charged with preparing biennial plans and the President and Congress between them with adopting them and coordinating other legislation with the plans.

IT GOES without saying that, for radicals, planning in a conservative society is likely to be a mixed blessing. Business interests are as likely to be dominant in planning agencies as they now are in regulatory bodies and Congress. Radicals, nevertheless, ought to support planning for two excellent reasons. The first is that it is socially preferable for workers as well as capitalists to operate a high-employment economy even if its benefits continue to be unequally distributed. Major economic calamities in conservative societies are unlikely to produce political consequences pleasing to democratic socialists, a sufficient reason to avoid deep depression. A repeat

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with variations of the 1930s is much more likely to install George Wallace than Michael Harrington in the White House.

There is a second, less negative, advantage of planning. Rare and brief as they have been, there have been occasions when New Deals and Great Societies have been politically possible. Liberal presidents, realizing as Lyndon Johnson did, that Congress will not for long endorse presidential initiatives, tend to endorse ill-judged, inconsistent, and poorly administered programs. On the next occasion when a liberal Democrat wins the presidency, he or she will make better use of the available opportunities if planning mechanisms are in place and orderly congressional debate of public priorities has been institutionalized.

In the absence of coherent national policy, it is quite likely that for a change the fashionable forecasts will be validated by future events. This is to say that the alternatives to planned and controlled full employment are likely to be persistently high unemployment, racial and sexual retrogression, increased potential for urban violence, still more inequitable distribution of income and wealth, enormous wastage of human and material resources, and even more inflation than more rational policies would generate. □

Luther Carpenter

Getting the Unions into Social Planning

The time has come to bring trade unions into the formulation of economic policy. Democratic socialists have always believed that workers should participate in decision-making and have recognized the trade unions as the legitimate representatives of the workers. But there have been problems. Workers' participation clashed at points with liberal democratic theory, which emphasized political action; it also encountered the resistance of capital and the state. Now it has become urgent that unions take a hand in shaping the policies of the mixed economies. It is urgent for the economy as a whole, because of the failure of Keynesianism, the institutional instability of the system, and the impossibility of having policies on incomes, productivity, and inflation without the workers' consent. On the other hand, unions now need an institutional voice because the forces that affect jobs, wages, and the quality of work are becoming increasingly political and beyond the control of any individual union.

It is no use talking of trade-union participation in purely theoretical or moral terms. As Michel Crozier says in *The Stalled Society,* those who want the workers to participate must make it worth their while. Unions must obtain for their members the control over variables that still are beyond their control. A worker's job is at the mercy of the health of "his" industry and "his" company. An industry may decline for technological reasons, or for political reasons, such as the loss of governmental orders or of favored tax status. The worker's industry may come under fire for social costs incurred in production or in the uses of the product, and such social costs may range from pollution to the destruction of the upper atmosphere. Long-range structural changes in the economy are even more ominous. Growing energy costs may change the whole pattern of the location of industry.

The first response of many a union is to support "its" industry. Pan American workers take out advertisements asking for new protective legislation. The UAW defends the automobile industry, saying that the companies are working on a thin profit margin. Occasionally a union may expand its role within the industry, initiating industrial reorganization or technological change. During the last depression, garment workers encouraged amalgamations that strengthened firms, and in the 1950s the miners favored the modernization of their industry. But generally, when workers support their industry, they become its clients. The Automobile Workers ask the nation to buy more cars, even though that may run against their ultimate self-interest. Only a couple of years ago, Automobile Workers were so dissatisfied with their work as to demand "30 and out." Their needs might be better served by running down the industry to half its size and by providing alternate jobs. A smaller automobile industry would be more stable and might provide jobs for a longer time.

The paradox of workers desperately trying to save jobs they don't like is built into unionism, as long as it only represents workers in negotiations with their own industries. On the present basis, the Auto Workers have no alternative to plugging their prod-

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uct. But bringing unions into the formulation of national economic policy could help, if they got a direct voice on what kind of jobs were to be created and where they were to be located. Geographic location of jobs, though extremely important to workers, is something unions in the U.S. have found nearly impossible to affect. Recent European policies show how the location of jobs can be controlled. Both France and England had regional development plans in the 1960s.

The federal government has made polite noises about giving grants to hard-hit areas for public-service jobs. This idea would become far less trivial if union districts and locals were brought into the process and asked what sorts of jobs their unemployed members really wanted. Would they want public-service jobs? Or would they want another kind of factory work, such as converting automobile plants to manufacture buses or modular housing? Obviously, jobs would have to be planned for and created in fields where there was a real need to be met, but such planning should consider the workers' views. Unions indeed would be likely to take a practical point of view that would enable planning to focus on real needs. Workers would want viable industries rather than makeshift jobs that would be politically vulnerable. Many observers have commented that the Yugoslav factory committees invested in economically safe enterprises, not in untried, utopian ventures. Following the Yugoslav example, unions might ask for the option of investing their pension funds in especially promising ventures.

In the past, the creation of new industries has posed problems of jurisdiction and lack of resources for the unions.

These problems can deter unions from demanding a new role, or they can be resolved in a manner that gives unions reasons to participate. If a preponderance of the jobless in an area are organized in one single union, there is no real problem; this may be the case in the sections of Michigan that are dominated by the auto industry. If the unemployed workers are drawn from several unions, it may be possible to keep them in their respective unions and create a mixed local with its own stewards. The threat of struggles over membership could be reduced if unions used local trades councils to organize new plants, and if they were backed by a new "7A."

Unions have rarely wanted to use their dues to organize the unemployed, because they needed to build strike funds and serve their members. But if the unions were to receive public funds for organizing and advising the jobless, they could assist the unemployed and do a more complete job of finding out what jobs are desired. It would be to the unions' advantage to perform this task, for it would avert the danger of having outside their ranks large numbers of unemployed workers who might become scabs or be organized by nonunion forces. For the society as a whole, one benefit would be a clearer picture of the desires of new entrants into the labor force—another that trades councils might provide a way for dissatisfied workers to move from trade to trade.

THUS FAR, my argument is that unions need to escape dependence on their industries in order to create new jobs for their workers in a rapidly changing economy. They can do this by fastening on to governmental assistance and by developing their local and trades-council organization. If unions were only to act locally, and were only to reach for the funds that are now available, the results would be dangerous to the unions and limit them in their usefulness to the jobless. One of the dangers is that of regional rivalries within a union. A situation might arise in which regional unions combined with other interests to promote their regions. This kind of boosterism has rarely been useful and usually has centered on seducing companies by offering low taxes and submissive workers. But strengthening hard-hit regions and providing new employment in order to offset declining industries is not merely regional—it is a national policy that can give national unions more concrete goals for agitation, lobbying, and participation.

At this moment, American trade unions are pursuing Keynesian economic strategies. Before the recent tax rebates, George Meany held press conferences to argue that the federal government should run a larger deficit. He wanted that deficit to arise primarily out of tax relief, with a greater share going to poorer people. Meany's Keynesianism is certainly more humane than President Ford's, but it is still a long way from coping with unemployment. It is a trickle-down theory. A tax cut helps the least-hit areas and industries first: they will receive more money from tax refunds, because they paid the higher taxes, and demand for their products is likely to pick up first. We could expect these industries to reach full capacity ahead of the hard-hit industries, and to continue their price inflation while depression continues elsewhere. Increases in demand may never reach all the unemployed automobile workers— not to speak of jobless black teen-agers.

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At best, this Keynesianism would restore conditions existing before the depression; it does not seem likely to be able to create new industries to replace declining ones. For these reasons, tax rebates and Keynesian deficits cannot be labor's only economic strategy.

It is questionable whether these problems would be met by the ideas reportedly being discussed by the Initiative Committee for National Economic Planning, led by Leonard Woodcock and Wassily Leontief. The Office of Economic Planning they propose sounds essentially like an instrument for indicative planning. It could be a step in the right direction, but it needs some muscle if it is going to indicate that some industries must contract and replacement jobs must be created. It needs to plan investment, as Michael Harrington has been saying in this magazine. The first step toward planning investment could have been to take much of the money that would go out as tax rebates and investment credits and use it as publicly controlled investment. Even without canceling these concessions there is room for creating a federal investment fund; many Keynesians feel we need a bigger deficit.

Such investment should go to projects in hard-hit areas. At the very least, unions should be consulted to see that new investment fits the skills and desires of the jobless. Projects should not be limited to construction work and civic amenities, which properly speaking are not investment at all but should include the creation of industries likely to flourish and be socially useful. Two obvious sources of new industries are energy-related projects (new energy sources and less wasteful ways of performing existing tasks), and funding new patents. Such an investment policy would go hand-in-hand with the UAW's proposal for a national energy corporation. It would be a significant step ahead from Keynesianism, along lines that Woodcock and others have started to develop.

WHAT WOULD these proposals mean institutionally? Would they require an impossible reorganization on the part of unions, or would they impose tasks that unions would not want to take over, even as a way of controlling the insecurities that their members face? On a local or regional level, little new formal organization is required; but unions and trades councils would have to organize the unemployed and find out what kinds of jobs would meet their needs. Nationally, the institutional requirements are not as clear. How should unions relate to whatever agency takes on the planning of investment? Historically, American unions have rarely sought a formal voice within the machinery of government. They have preferred to restrict their activities to lobbying and to supporting candidates. But if the unions did not get a major voice within the planning apparatus, would jobs get to the unemployed? In England Harold Wilson's "social contract" shows us the weakness of an arrangement that rigidly separates governmental policy from the unions. It restricts the unions to their traditional role of defending wages and has yielded no new economic thinking. American unions would not even have the leverage that British unions possess as part of the Labour party.

The alternative is formal participation. There are some formidable objections. There are the practical problems to choosing worker representatives, especially with the UAW and the Teamsters outside the AFL–CIO. There is the issue of whether industrialists would also claim formal representation in the Office of Economic Planning. Representation on this level might well not seem to be participation at all, when seen from below. The quality of the consultation with the unemployed through their locals and districts would be all-important. Nor can a democratic socialist ignore the fear that formal participation would suck the unions deeper into our flawed system. Formal participation smacks of cooptation, even of corporatism. One can only say that we already have socialism for the rich, and soon we will have planning for the rich; we need planning for the workers and the unemployed, and we are unlikely to get it without trade-union participation. □

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William Kornblum

Insurgency in the Steel Union

"Freedom is a hard-won thing. You've got to work for it, fight for it, day and night for it, and every generation's got to win it again." The newest enactment of this political theme is unfolding in the United Steelworkers of America, where a young generation of leaders, up from the rank and file and gathered behind the banner of union democracy, has toppled an autocratic regional regime that had held power since 1937. And this may be only the beginning.

Freedom to vote for more than one candidate, freedom to vote without intimidation in a fair election, freedom to vote on the terms of the labor agreements, freedom to voice ideas that could take the union into new arenas of social action—these were the ideals that in November 1974 rallied almost 40,000 steelworkers in the Chicago region behind Ed Sadlowski, a steelworker and union organizer from South Chicago, who dared to challenge a union political machine that even the most astute labor analysts thought unbeatable.

Since his stunning upset in the Chicago-Gary-Joliet USWA District 31—with its 130,000 members the largest and most powerful political subdivision of the union—Ed Sadlowski has been raised from the obscurity of mill neighborhoods and union halls to the status of an insurgent labor hero. Joseph Rauh Jr., the veteran labor attorney whose intervention with the U.S. Department of Labor helped Sadlowski secure victory, calls him "a young Walter Reuther."

This insurgent victory in the vast Calumet Steelworkers' region stands with the Miller election in the United Mine Workers. Both are examples that other young union leaders will follow. But Sadlowski's victory in the Calumet District is still a far cry from the capture of international steel leadership. Before one projects this 36-year-old steelworker to the highest office in the United Steelworkers of America, as many outside the union are now doing, it is important to take a close look at the conditions that made this insurgency successful.

Sadlowski's prodigious political gifts have been apparent to rank-and-file Steelworkers since 1961 when he won his first election as grievance man at US Steel's South Works in Chicago. A third-generation steelworker from a family of independent socialists and street-wise political activists, Sadlowski is articulate, uncompromising with more cautious adversaries, and a brilliant campaign strategist. But he is also quick to play down the role of his own leadership.

> Our worst problem in organizing these campaigns is overcoming the mystique that the labor boss is some kind of God. People would say to us, "you can't go against Joe Germano [the previous incumbent] or his man. He's been there since the union was started. They won't let you even get on the ballot."
>
> So I get on the ballot. I win the first election but they steal it on the count. The Labor Department comes in and I win the rerun by two to one. Now all of a sudden I'm ballyhooed as the "new man of steel" in all the papers. This just leads to the same mythical bullshit over again. If I start believing this I'm in trouble.
>
> When I went out for this thing most steelworkers outside of South Chicago had never heard of me. The real game was in pounding the pavement in front of the plants, getting to know the members, finding tough campaigners who wouldn't fold under pressure, and in knowing the issues in every part of this industry.
>
> Don't forget that basic steel is only one branch of this union even if that's where all the romantic pictures are taken. The people in the can plants on Kedzie Avenue [in Chicago] or in the fabricating shops scattered all over couldn't care less about what you've done for the big mill workers. Like you take the women who work in so many of these little bucket shops: they want to know what you're going to do to get them a better share of the pie, or to help them from having their fingers chopped off in the machines, or to get some kind of better arrangement for child care.
>
> The guys in office tried to speak to these issues too but they'd lost touch with the membership. Their big statement on the woman's issue was an example. Almost 20 percent of the members are women, so they figured they'd get that vote by promising that they'd appoint a woman to the union staff. But here they've been in office for 36 years and now they're promising that one of the 60 staffers in the District will be a woman. In a way that sums it all up right there.

These comments, made during a recent discussion with Sadlowski in Chicago, only touch on some aspects of Steelworkers' politics—and the differences between the big mills and the smaller specialty shops to which he alludes are central.

IN THE GREAT basic steel-producing areas of the country, such as the lower basin of Lake Michigan or the Cleveland-Youngstown-Pittsburgh axis, steelmaking is a way of life; the mills are dominant institutions, shaping every facet of existence in the industrial neighborhoods that cluster in their shadows. Birth and death, time and money, songs and

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stories, all the comings and goings of people and machines, even the climate, the air and the water are tempered and stained by the making of steel. Certainly the national culture with its schools, television, and interstate highways brings mill people away from the world of steel more than was possible when the men worked a six-day week and a 12-hour day. But the national culture also leaves plenty of room for the ways of steelmaking people to persist. The interstate highways bypass South Chicago, Indiana Harbor, and Gary, in some ways leaving these mill towns more insular than they were in the 1940s. The most popular radio stations in the Calumet steel belt are, not WCFL, the Voice of Labor, CBS and NBC, but WJOB in Hammond, Indiana, and the black stations in Chicago Heights and Gary, stations that blend mass culture with ethnic themes and folksy news of bake sales and labor-union affairs.

In the Calumet District almost 20,000 workers make steel at the giant Inland plant and another 8,000 work in the neighboring Youngstown Steel mill. Since most of these workers will spend the greater part of their work lives inside the mill gates, the majority will choose to live in the communities close-by. The same is true in Gary, Indiana, where about 21,000 steelworkers rotate shifts around the clock in the two US Steel mills. In nearby South Chicago, on the Illinois side of District 31, about 8,000 are employed at US Steel's South Works, another 4,000 work at Republic Steel, where the 1937 Memorial Day Massacre occurred, and another 2,000 steelworkers are employed in the smaller mills that perform only such selected basic steel operations as the production of coke or ingots.

Union politics in these big mills usually alternates between something that one year may approximate classical Athenian democracy and another year may be more like a banana-republic junta. All elections, from grievance man to local president, are hotly contested, in campaigns that may last for two or three months and involve the active passions of hundreds of campaign workers in the mill shops. The candidates must be union "citizens," members who have demonstrated their responsibility to the affairs of the local by attending a minimum number of meetings. More powerful criteria of friendship, political ideology, or ethnicity and race lead to intense jockeying among aspiring candidates who seek to form a caucus that can dominate the local's politics, often for 10 or more years.

ONCE IN OFFICE a caucus does its best to remain there, and in some cases this may include flagrant subversion of the democratic process. The Sadlowski insurgents learned this the hard way when they lost their first district director's election in 1973 partly because the "loyalist" election committee at the big sheet-and-tin mill in Gary forged approximately 700 ballots for Sam Evett, the machine candidate. But even in locals like this one there will always be groups of insurgents who refuse to stop organizing. Indeed it was through investigation by undiscouraged insurgents in the Gary local that evidence of the massive fraud against Sadlowski was first revealed. And it was this evidence that led the slow-moving Department of Labor to conduct its own investigation, and eventually to require a second district director election, which Sadlowski won by 39,737 to 20,158.

"This politics gets into your blood," says Jim Balanoff, who works at Inland Steel and has led more insurgencies in his local than he cares to remember. "Sometimes it's all you can do to keep going but you know that if you quit it you're a dead man inside." People who feel this way—people like John Chico, the Chicano leader from South Works; Olla Kennedy and Bill Todd, union leaders and civil rights activists from Gary; Purcell Reed and Ted Smolerek, who stunned even Sadlowski by the strength of their local's antiwar resolution in the Illinois State AFL–CIO convention in 1967; and Ray O'Malley, from Chicago's West Side, the only union staff official to break ranks and join the insurgents—these and others like them form the nucleus of the insurgent organization in District 31. It will take additional hundreds of Steelworker activists recruited throughout this country and Canada before any insurgent movement can seriously challenge the present Steelworker administration. Even though I.W. Abel has reached retirement age and cannot be a candidate for the union's presidency in 1976, the candidate whom he chooses will have the support of a paid union staff numbering about 900.

In big steel the discontent with the Abel administration runs deep. This is particularly true in the Chicago-Gary District, where big-mill workers have never shown much enthusiasm for the union president. The younger workers tend to blame the Abel administration for the erosion of steelworkers' wages, which have slipped from first among industrial workers in the early 1960s to about 14th presently. They also resent the recent increase in their dues, which was rammed through the 1974 Steelworkers' convention at the same time that union executives' salaries were increased by over 25 percent. Many older workers in Calumet's big steel plants, particularly those with 15 or 20 years in the

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mills, have resented I.W. Abel since his 1964 election, often for the very reason that District 31 boss Joseph Germano swung their district for him and made his election possible. Abel's genuine appeal to the ideals of union democracy in 1964 never sold well in the big mills of Lake Michigan because they were being promoted by Germano, a director whose dictatorial rule often came into sharp conflict with the democratic traditions of the large locals.

Although he could never count on victory margins from the beginning for Abel or his other candidates, District 31 has remained Germano's fiefdom for 36 years. He could offset any losses in big steel by large margins in the smaller plants, particularly in the hundreds of factories on Chicago's West Side that are organized by the USWA. Here the situation was well expressed by a union staff representative who assessed Sadlowski's chances in 1972 as he campaigned against Germano's chosen successor:

> In the smaller plants it's uphill for Sadlowski. There are over 500 shops in the District and most of 'em don't have more than 300 members. This means you've got to run all over hell to these small "bucket shops." The small fabrication factories and specialty shops are like machine precincts. Lots of the workers are new, and in a lot of 'em the local union officials are afraid to take a leak without running to their staff man. The staff man runs the local for them and gets them to bring out the vote he wants. If Sadlowski can cut into this vote he may win.

The insurgents did cut into the union machine's traditional strength in 1973, and they did so against overwhelming odds because in many instances they had no knowledge of how even to locate the shops. The Germano forces were solidly aligned behind Sam Evett and refused to divulge the location of about 250 of the smaller factories. Nevertheless the insurgents campaigned endlessly at the plants they could find and in a two-month period distributed over 1.5 million pieces of campaign literature at the factory gates. In many cases, workers in the small shops had little knowledge of what the job of district director is. Many were newly hired women, rural blacks, white Southerners, Latins, and a massive educational campaign was required to bring these workers into the mainstream of Steelworker affairs. These efforts were successful beyond anyone's imagining. Sadlowski only lost the West Side by about 1,000 votes where the incumbents normally could count on a margin of at least 4,000 to offset losses in big steel. In consequence the machine forces had to pressure some of the bigger mills to somehow come up with more votes against Sadlowski. This led to the chain of events that is still shaking the union's international leadership.

Now a serious dues protest movement is accelerating throughout the union's rank and file. Initiated by Sadlowski and the insurgent forces in District 31, the movement has also appeared in California, and in Baltimore, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. It is also likely that insurgent candidates will run in more local union elections in the coming year than ever before and, following Sadlowski's example, the candidates will be less reluctant to invoke the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in questionable elections. This trend conflicts directly with recent efforts by I.W. Abel to force the repeal or the weakening of Landrum-Griffin and weakens the credibility of whomever Abel chooses to support in 1976. Obviously the Steelworker president will not choose Sadlowski, for he has indicated in frequent interviews that any union leader who opposes the "official family" of regional and international officials will not have his blessing.

THE INSURGENTS' VICTORY in District 31 is convincing evidence that the union's current leadership is extremely vulnerable to challenge grounded on the most basic CIO ideals of better wages, freedom of representation, and respect to the individual worker. Sadlowski has also shown that the obstacles of dispersion and diversity in the membership can be overcome through the time-worn techniques of street organization. Even Elmer Chatak, chief organizer in the union's Pittsburgh office, must agree, because as the campaign manager for Sadlowski's opponent in 1974 he watched in disbelief as the insurgent landslide developed. "I've never seen a better run district campaign than Ed's," he said, "But it was really the dues issue that made his margin this big."

Chatak's qualifying remark may be true, but a steamrolling dues protest is only one symptom of more deeply felt discontents in the union's membership. In District 31 the insurgents tapped those discontents and turned them into a positive program, a simple set of goals that, applied throughout the Steelworkers union, could be this new generation's contribution to the labor movement in steel. Does this mean Sadlowski will be a candidate for the Steelworker presidency in 1976? It is very difficult to get an answer from him on this question. The day after his final victory in District 31, while a crowd of well-wishers awaited him in his campaign office, he drove across the city to speak at a local union meeting in a small plant on Chicago's West Side. That election was over but the campaign to "open the union to the membership" had just begun. □

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Henry Judd

A Spontaneous Upsurge of Dissent in India

One man alone has taken it upon himself to reverse India's decline toward some form of authoritarian rule by Indira Gandhi, head of government, in the name of the Congress, India's ruling party. Known familiarly as J.P. to tens of millions of Indians, Jayaprakash Narayan,* now 72 years old, is a veteran revolutionary, socialist, and now practitioner of nonviolent Gandhianism. His struggle, which may well end with his martyrdom, is largely ignored throughout the world, but in India itself he has wrested political initiative away from Mrs. Gandhi. J.P. has opened a new and probably decisive chapter in his nation's long history, at least insofar as the future of its democracy is concerned.

What has increasingly come under question is Congress's right to rule the country, a rule that began with independence in 1947. The present challenge—more on the level of mass protest and emotional reaction than organized political struggle—has developed especially since the end of the two weeks' war with Pakistan over Bangladesh. In the words of a sensitive Indian political commentator, Ram Joshi, (*Asian Survey,* April 1975),

> The subsequent failure to live up to the promises and effectively implement the announced politices created a credibility problem. Side by side with this failure and partly related to it was the growing corruption at political and administrative levels, the use of big money in elections and the growing insensitivity on the part of the operators of the system to the mounting hardships of the people and their scant regard for the rules of the democratic game. These gave rise to a feeling of frustration and alienation on the part of the people. ... Elections to the state legislatures in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh (particularly the latter where the Congress secured 51 percent of the seats with less than 32 percent of the votes) further deepened popular suspicion about the fairness of elections. In the absence of other effective channels of articulation it burst open in the form of popular agitations.

It is not simply the failure of independent India to "feed the hungry and clothe the naked" that is responsible for the crisis, but the growing conviction that the structure and orientation of Indian society itself (its quasi-Westernized form of parliamentary rule, its pluralist party system, its form of government and constitution) have become open to question—hence, subject to change and drastic reorganization. That one man through strength of character and integrity has opened the floodgates is remarkable.

India today lives under the emergency rule proclaimed at the beginning of the Indo-Pakistani War, although that war came to an end in 14 days. Ominously enough, the recent constitutional changes in Bangladesh—which dissolved all but the ruling party of Sheik Mujib and made him into the nation's virtual dictator—did not evoke any criticism, protest, or expression of regret from Mrs. Gandhi or the Congress leadership. Of course, India is not Bangladesh, and the burial of democracy in India would be a far more difficult and complex task; but the trends are there. In the little over nine years that she has been prime minister, Indira Gandhi has ruled under emergency legislation for almost six years; since 1962, the country has known only a brief respite (1968–71) from the state of emergency. Further, what is exercising the Opposition at this moment is the danger that emergency rule will be used by the government to get Parliament to extend its life, without holding the general election scheduled for 1976—by virtue of the proviso to Article 83 (2) of the Constitution, which permits such an extension for a period of one year at a time. The closest parallel to the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution can be found in the famous Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of Germany's Third Republic.

Worse, there is no time limit to the continuation of the emergency, and no provision for judicial review in the courts. All four countries of the South Asian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) are now under emergency rule. The Indian state, even under the rule of a corrupt and incompetent party such as Congress, has steadily grown in concentration of power. A steady erosion of Indian democracy has taken place. Under Article 352—not yet invoked, but reserved for a major crisis—individual freedoms of the citizens can be suspended and a virtual dictatorship of the Central Executive established.

The Congress party today is comparable to the Institutional Revolutionary party of Mexico, the party that holds all the strings of power and has ruled Mexico since the Revolution. One joins Congress to advance one's career, academic, govern-

*For another comment on Jayaprakash Narayan and his nonviolent movement, see "Gandhian Revolt Against Indira Gandhi," by Umashanker Phadnis, in our Spring 1975 issue.

This article was written early in June, before the constitutional crisis.

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mental, or business. One joins Congress to seek a career in politics, in obtaining government contracts, or favors for relatives. Congress is one vast sink of corruption and cynicism. It is no secret from any one; the average Indian citizen is in despair over his government. This, in general terms, is the background against which the movement of Narayan began. Its leader does not desire political power for himself, he is not running for prime minister, he has no political party of his own, he covets nothing.

If we know what he does not want, then what *does* he want? In an introduction to a collection of his writings and speeches, *Towards Revolution,* Narayan offers this comment on his position:

> ... we were rather naive in our belief that State policies would, as a matter of course, follow the path we had blazed for them, for, after all, a democratic State had to resonate to impulses of voluntary mass action. That we were wrong in this assumption and that the State system was subservient to a variety of forces with their interests entrenched in keeping it a closed shop is glaringly apparent now. How prophetic Mahatma Gandhi was when he foresaw as far back as 1930 that if he survived the freedom struggle, he would have to fight many a non-violent battle as stubbornly as the one in which he was engaged against the British!
>
> The ideological framework which I have set out and the nature of the challenge as I perceive it should leave none in doubt about the central purpose of my intervention. ... Who is in power has not been of any great consequence to me. What has mattered to me is how that power is being exercised and for what purpose. With the people and for the people, or in spite of them and against them.
>
> It is maintained that these ends are sought to be secured through the institutional devices in parliamentary democracy. ... It has been argued that adult franchise would be so compelling a political factor that no party or group would dare exploit State power for its own ends.
>
> How doubtful these assumptions are in a society of gross inequalities, wherein the few who own the means of production control the State, has been borne out in the political situation in the country as it has emerged after the five general elections that have taken place. It is evident that correctives are necessary which would make it morally compelling that the preconditions of the democratic system obtain in practice.

J.P.'s PROGRAM, then, is on two levels: immediate proposals regarding the economic condition of the millions, and long-range, more controversial proposals regarding the structure of Indian society. In the now famous March 6, 1975 New Delhi demonstration in which 500,000 people marched in exemplary nonviolent procession, a "Charter of Demands" was presented to the Indian parliament. It consists of two pages of specific demands ranging from fresh elections in the states (an All-India General Election is scheduled for February 1976) to proposals for decentralization of central powers and the creation of a number of new states, to a series of economic demands constituting a "New Deal" for the unemployed, the unskilled worker, and the landless laborer. All this, of course, would be dependent on a massive reordering of developmental priorities to shift from emphasis on heavy industry toward the encouragement of agriculture and village economy by large-scale subsidies.

The long-range proposals for setting up self-sufficient village republics and the devolution of democratic functions down to the state, regional, and local level are matters demanding far more study and discussion than they have received up to this point. But the J.P. resistance movement has many characteristics of spontaneity about it that must be taken into account; this is a movement heavily obliged to improvise and develop its goals and program as it grows apace. This is a movement not yet two years old, which came out of a relatively minor agitation for student rights in an obscure provincial city of Bihar (Buddh-Gaya), and which is still largely dependent upon the skill, sophistication, and integrity of an elderly and ill man.

Further, many discredited and bypassed politicians of the older parties are trying to latch on to the movement. With one hand J.P. must ward off their attempts to narrowly "politicize" the movement, to tame it and discredit it. At the same time, he must count upon natural leaders from younger generations to step forward and assume their place.

The differences between J.P.'s situation and that of Mrs. Gandhi, his principal opponent, are clear. While the Prime Minister is counting upon the movement faltering because it cannot concretize its concepts and goals, nor fashion an instrument capable of achieving its ends, J.P. can afford some daring and risks; thus his recent bold appeal to the armed forces and the police to refuse to carry out orders they consider to be "immoral" and against the people. Mrs. Gandhi, in addition to being handicapped by her responsibility for the country's operation (although she, of course, has all the instruments of state power in her hands), has been forced to lean more heavily than ever before upon the CPI (Communist Party of India, the pro-Moscow, Stalinist-drenched movement). The CPI has become the leading political force in the assault upon J.P. and his movement. It has endeavored to create a lynch atmosphere in the country, which has led to three assaults upon J.P., including one beating by hoodlums. Speaking of the need "for a government of the Left and democratic forces," the CPI dreams

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of sharing power with the Congress, first in individual states, then at the center.

The mass of Indian people are neither "communist" nor basically sympathetic to the Soviet state; they want an Indian solution to their poverty problem, along democratic lines. In the struggle to reach such a solution, a great drama is unfolding step by step; at the moment the center of the stage is occupied by a frail but determined freedom fighter who articulates the voice of the people. □

Joseph Clark

For Portugal: "Democracy, Period"

The military rulers of Portugal have decked their regime in ideological trappings that recall bygone times. They have warned the newly legalized parties of Portugal that "bourgeois democracy" is suspect, while "socialist democracy" is the real McCoy. This makes even more memorable the comments of Socialist party leader Mario Soares after the stunning victory of the democratic Socialists and Popular Democrats in the Portuguese elections to the Constitutional Assembly.

When he was asked in a radio interview whether he favored "bourgeois" or "socialist" democracy, Soares replied: "There is democracy, period. It is of the people, for the people, and by the people, and it is not the dictatorship of the proletariat." After decades of fascist and authoritarian regimes the people of Portugal went to the polls in amazing numbers. Some 92 percent turned out. They rejected the urging of the military junta to cast blank ballots—only 7 percent did so. They rejected the Communists, who ran, by far, the best-financed and flashiest of campaigns, but garnered only 12.5 percent of the votes.

With a remarkable instinct for the real thing, the people voted for parties that stood for pluralism in politics, against dictatorship and for the simple but meaningful idea that if freedom was to prevail there had to be a freely chosen government, by the majority; they voted for parties that favored civil liberties. The Socialist party received 38 percent of the votes, the slightly left-of-center Popular Democrats, 26 percent. Though considered a party of the center, the latter laid claim to a moderate form of socialism and expressed opposition to all forms of despotism.

The shadow of times past that was cast in Portugal came with the limitations placed on the Constitutional Assembly even before the elections. The military rulers stepped back from the promise of a new regime to be established by the elected assembly and exacted a pledge from participating parties that they would agree to the continuation of the military regime for at least three more years. It was the Communists who feared elections of an assembly with real power to fashion a new constitution and government; they had sought to postpone the elctions until all necessary "legislation" had been secured by edicts of the military regime.

It was as though the melody lingered on, a melody heard in another clime, nearly 60 years ago when a revolution overthrew autocracy in Russia and the promise was made that through a constituent assembly the people would fashion their own government. The Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee, in that revolution, said that the Kerensky regime had to be overthrown because it refused to hold elections and convene a constituent assembly. And when the Bolsheviks issued the Peace Decree on November 8, 1917, they said it would have to be submitted to the Constituent Assembly "which will then decide what can and cannot be conceded." The Bolshevik land decree followed, "to be settled," they said, "by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly." And even the decree of the Congress of Soviets on setting up the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' government declared it would "govern the country until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly."

The elections were indeed held for that Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1917. Then 75 percent of the voters chose parties other than the Bolsheviks, and when they were rejected by the voters the Bolsheviks had little further use for the Constituent Assembly, that same body they had said must give legality to all their decrees. Early in 1917 Lenin had condemned the prattle about forcing the provisional government to convene the Constituent Assembly and said, "The Soviet is the only government that can convene the Assembly." But in his letter to the Central Committee on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power Lenin explained: "Seizure of power is the point of the uprising; its politi-

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cal tasks will be clarified after the seizure." Trotsky later put it quite clearly: "In the system of Soviet dictatorship not even a secondary place was found for democratic representation."

Just before dawn, on the first and only day the Russian Constituent Assembly was allowed to meet, a sailor, in command of the military guard where the Assembly was meeting, told the chairman that "the guard was tired" and besides he had instructions to close the meeting.

WHETHER the Portuguese Communists will be able to carry on in that tradition is still in question. Although the Armed Forces movement that is in power relies heavily on the Communists for guidance and ideology, it has, reportedly, been shaken by the decisive response of the voters. Public opinion in the rest of the world might also influence the situation if there is a strong indication of support for the democratic will of the long-suffering people of Portugal. The friendship and solidarity conveyed by British Labourites, German Social Democrats, and French Socialists during the election campaign helped the uphill efforts of the Socialists.

One lesson from Lenin is all the Portuguese Communists required: seizure of power is the whole point. Many socialists and liberals, opponents of such doctrines of totalitarian power, underestimate the tenacity with which Communists will pursue their true goal and how they will maneuver, as a small minority, to secure the social levers that give them power. Soon after the overthrow of the old regime in Portugal the Communists seized arbitrary and nonelective control of the trade unions, with the sanction of the military rulers. The Communists moved to secure commanding positions in the press and other media, in municipal government, and above all in the army and police.

Robert Kleiman of the *New York Times* reported how the enormous means at the disposal of the Portuguese Communists is paid for — at the rate of $10 million a month — by the Soviet Union. And he reported, quite casually, that KGB agents abound in Lisbon.

Even now, however, it is possible to say that one kind of intervention in Portuguese affairs could only influence events toward authoritarianism of either the Right or the Left—that would be CIA intervention. Soares himself has warned against such pressures from our country. The long love affair of the U.S. government with the fascist regime of Portugal (and Spain) is certainly a factor that makes such pressures counterproductive.

Still it is well for democratic socialists to understand how asymmetrical the situation will always be wherever Communists strive seriously for power. While we can and should prevail in efforts to compel the CIA to keep its hands off Portugal, there is *no* voice or movement in all the length and breadth of the Soviet land that can tell the KGB to keep its bloody hands off Portugal.

Democracies usually lose when they try to imitate Communist tactics, as in instances of CIA disruption, bribery, even assassinations. But the democracies might win with more effective efforts at solidarity with the democratic majority of Portugal. For example, the Soviets are anxious to maintain a facade of "détente," without its essence. The democracies should insist on having it the other way around. The Soviets want a European conference to sanctify their aggrandizement after World War II; they want trade and aid and they would very much like to computerize more of their economy (and military establishment) with Western aid. The Soviets should be told they get none of these emoluments of one-sided and empty "détente" as long as they continue their brazen efforts to put the party that got 12.5 percent of the vote into power in Portugal.

America, let us stress this, does have a democratic and revolutionary tradition. Tom Paine had gone on from service here to participation in the French Revolution. He tried to convey to the Jacobins a lesson of the American Revolution—that overthrowing the old regime was only the first step in a revolution; he urged a constitutional development, with guarantees of democracy and representative government as the true fulfillment of the revolution. For his courageous defense of democratic principles and his prescient warning about the dire results of punishment and terror he served two years in French "revolutionary" jails. Two centuries after the American revolutionaries overthrew the despotism of British rule it might be fitting to celebrate by giving support and solidarity to the embattled fighters for democratic socialism in Portugal. Nor is it amiss to recall the words of Paine when he finally made his way out of a French prison:

> An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. □

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Irving Howe

The Return of Terror

We had fed the heart on fantasies,
The heart's grown brutal from the fare
— Yeats

Bombing is back in fashion: an end to thought, a flick of the killer's arm. Add 20th-century technology to 19th-century postures and the result, as Abbie Hoffman used to say, is "Boom!"—to which his rapt audiences would chant in reply, "Boom, boom!"

Arafat, who sends terrorists to take children hostage, is cheered at the UN General Assembly, a body that has yet to bestir itself over the massacres of General Amin in Uganda. *Time* greets Arafat with an essay on how nations have been begotten in terrorism. *Liberation,* once a pacifist journal, features Hans Magnus Enzensberger with a lyrical potboiler, "The Roots of Terrorism," which ends with this paean to the terrorist: "One such dreamer, an anonymous one in the crowd, suffices to instill dread into all those who hold power on this earth."

And into many who do not.

Varieties of Terror

LIKE ALL important terms in our language, terrorism can encompass a wide range of conduct. There is the arbitrary terror of despots (the 19th-century Zulu king Shaka had his subjects murdered simply by pointing his finger). There is the systematic terror practiced by Stalin (whose methods were finally not much more enlightened than those of Shaka). In a society gripped by terror, the ruler seeks to create a state of fright through the sheer frequency and arbitrariness of his assaults. The victims need have done nothing "wrong"; it is even preferable, for the "perfection" of the terror, that they be innocent. Loyalty must not be supposed to insure security, and what seems the psychopathology of the tyrant becomes the policy of the state. About this variety of terror, however, I shall have nothing more to say.

The terrorism that has come back into fashion is that of insurgent conspiracies. One thinks, by way of historical precedent, of the terrorism used by revolutionary groups against despots (the *Narodnaya Volya,* or People's Will, of Russia in the 1880s) and against foreign overlords (the Bulgarian patriots against Turkish rulers in the early 20th century; some Poles and Frenchmen against occupying Nazi forces).

In a useful but badly composed book, *Violence in Politics,* Feliks Gross offers some distinctions among kinds of terror:

- **individual** — the killing of a person taken to be *crucially* representative of autocratic power. Some of the Russian terrorists made notable efforts to spare innocent bystanders or relatives of the victim. Ivan Kalayev, a Socialist Revolutionary (SR), postponed a 1905 attempt upon the Grand Duke Sergei because the family of

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this Russian prince was standing nearby and might have been hurt; Kalayev, though prepared to kill the Grand Duke, whom he held personally responsible for oppressive acts, refused on principle to endanger people whom he took to be innocent. He is also said to have refused to escape when he finally did shoot the Grand Duke, since, reports Gross, "he believed that the assassination was necessary, but nonetheless ... that it was a sin for which a man should suffer the penalty of his own life." A rare sense of scruple, among terrorists or anyone else.

- **dynastic assassination** — self-explanatory.

- **focused random** — the placing of explosives where significant agents of oppression are likely to gather, so that the victims, even if individually unknown, are judged to be more or less equally "appropriate." During the Second World War the Polish-Jewish underground planted explosives at the Café Cyganeria in Cracow, a meeting place for Nazi officers. (This example reveals characteristic difficulties: the underground may have reasoned that to destroy its enemies, who wore German uniforms, was an act of war and therefore, strictly speaking, not terrorism—yet what about the Polish waiters who worked in that café?)

- **random** — the placing of explosives where people gather: post offices, railroads, cafés, etc. Unburdened by the moral scruples of a Kalayev, the random terrorists choose to destroy whoever—innocent or guilty, adult or child—happens to be at the site where the bomb goes off. Algerian revolutionists left bombs in public places in Paris, apparently convinced that one Frenchman blown to bits was pretty much like any other, even if a few of the victims might be among those who had been agitating for Algerian independence. Bulgarian revolutionists used the same methods, apparently out of similar persuasions. More recently, the IRA has left bombs in London post offices, pubs, and stores.

All of these forms of terror (and further categories can of course be drawn) have certain features in common. Terror may be the weapon of lonely fanatics or a huddle of conspirators intent upon forcing history through their own self-sacrifice and other people's blood; but rarely is it the weapon of mass movements engaged in public politics. Perhaps the one element common to the various kinds of terror is the wish to create unmanageable fear through a use of violence that breaks down traditionally accepted distinctions between combatant and civilian. *Any* Englishman is judged to be an appropriate victim; *any* Israeli. Lacking the strength to engage in conventional, which is to say, limited war, the terrorists adopt the rationale of total war. And in all strategies of terror there is an inherent tendency to *go beyond* the limits previously accepted, formally or informally, by both rulers and ruled. It is just this "one step further" that makes terror momentarily effective and, to some people, exciting—at least until the victims can regroup behind new methods of defense.

Through the recklessness and will of a chosen few, governments are to be toppled and tyrants checked. Except perhaps—and even here we have reason to be skeptical—in the most self-disciplined kinds of action against precisely selected individual targets, the strategy of terror can succeed only through a steady abandonment of moral restraints. Regardless of the intentions the terrorists bring to their act, it tends, out of desperation and through repetition, to become increasingly unselective. Indeed, precisely the increasing unselectivity makes terrorism so frightening.

If we confine ourselves, for the moment, to the moral aspects of the question, two propositions seem as urgent as they are simple: what we object to, first of all, in terror is the killing, and the terrorizing, of innocent people; and the closer to random terror we get, the more reprehensible such actions become. In the late 19th century Marxists denounced the practice of terror on political grounds, to which we shall turn in a few moments; but the classical debates between them and the anarchists, it now seems, were almost innocent in character, since only seldom was anything in question but an effort to assassinate an individual whom everyone acknowledged to be a terrible despot. What has happened since then, as part of the general breakdown of moral norms in the 20th

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century, has been a turn among terrorists to increasingly indiscriminate methods—in part, no doubt, reflecting the fact that in modern warfare states have also turned to increasingly indiscriminate methods (we speak, not accidentally, of the *terror bombing* of cities during the Second World War). With the methods used by the IRA against English people, or the methods used by the PLO against Israeli civilians, even foreign travelers in Israel, we reach a kind of terrorism beyond civilized conception.

I believe that the traditional socialist arguments—explicitly political, though also sometimes bashfully moral—against individual terror still hold; yet it must be acknowledged that, as with all efforts to develop norms of conduct, there are bound to be exceptions. One can conceive of rare exceptions in which socialists, or other people devoted to liberty, might sanction or at least consider the use of terrorist methods.

It can be argued, for instance, that the horrors of modern totalitarianism stem not merely from its systemic traits but also from the diseased personalities of individual dictators. In such cases, tyrannicide—whether or not advisable—seems at least permissible. Responsible for the Holocaust was not just the Nazi regime but Hitler personally. Responsible for the Siberian slave camps was not merely the Communist regime but Stalin personally. The Nazi and Stalinist regimes owed their worst excesses not merely to their intrinsic natures but also to the will of the two men who headed them.

Insofar as that seems true, the assassination of a totalitarian despot could in principle be considered. Had the July 1944 plot against Hitler succeeded, it would probably have had desirable effects. Had Hitler or Stalin been destroyed in the mid-'30s, this would not have eliminated the systems they headed—we don't, in truth, know whether, or how, totalitarian regimes can be overthrown from within. But it seems likely that such an act of individual assassination would have prevented some of the mass killings that Hitler and Stalin were soon to initiate.

One wants to stress the distinctiveness of their rule. To have removed Stalin by a bullet would have meant to remove a tyrant who had developed a taste for blood that went far beyond the repressiveness of the social system he represented. But no one, I think, would want to say that about a Brezhnev. The Russian regime continues to be a dictatorship, though a less blatantly terroristic one; but to remove Brezhnev would mean—as the Marxists used to argue about removing one or another Czar—simply his replacement by another Soviet bureaucrat. Similarly, to assassinate one of the Chilean officers who now form the repressive junta would be to leave that regime largely intact: another officer would take over. Here the possible moral justification for tyrannicide is very much weaker than with regard to maniacal tyrants like Hitler and Stalin.

The question of effectiveness is something else again. Precisely in the totalitarian states where, for lack of any peaceable means of political expression, the use of terror may become morally justifiable, it is probably least available as a practical measure. That lonely figure with a gun or bomb, "the anonymous one in the crowd" whom Hans Magnus Enzensberger finds so attractive, would have a far greater chance to complete his mission successfully in a democratic country, or in a bumbling old-fashioned authoritarian one, than in a modern totalitarian state with its systematized repression, its enormous police apparatus, its readiness to punish large numbers of innocent people for the act of the terrorist.

The New Conditions

THERE IS a common opinion in the air that new circumstances enable terrorists to be more effective than they could be, say, a century ago. A bomb placed in an airplane can destroy several hundred people; a city might be rendered helpless by a few desperadoes; the concentration of modern technology enables a concentration of terror.

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No doubt, there is something to this view, but precisely how much it is hard to say. Very similar ideas can be found among the earlier, 19th-century terrorists, also impressed by the possibilities of combining technology and heroism. They seldom came anywhere near succeeding. In the peregrinations of the 19th-century anarchists, as well as the desperadoes, adventurers, and quasi-criminals who crept into their ranks, one can find a few instances of what Gross calls random terror, or focused or semi-focused random terror. But the more principled anarchists who resorted to the bomb usually did try to limit their attacks to individuals or groups taken to be *directly responsible* for social evils: Russian aristocrats, Turkish officers, etc. Individual recklessness, even irresponsibility, can certainly be found among 19th-century bomb-throwers, but rarely the kind of cold-blooded readiness to murder innocents — *any* Englishmen, *any* Israelis — which has characterized our own, more "advanced" times.

But let us agree, for the sake of the argu-

An Irish Voice against Terrorism

The following passages are taken from a speech delivered by Conor Cruise O'Brien *in public debate with Thomas Mac Giolla, president of Sinn Fein (Official), in Dublin a few years ago. The Sinn Fein is a political group supporting one wing of the Irish Republican Army. O'Brien, a well-known writer, is active in the Irish Labour party. His arguments against terrorism are close to those advanced in Irving Howe's article.* — Eds.

I speak here for a Party which accepts normal democratic process. That acceptance includes recognition of the legitimate authority of an elected government which one does not like, and which one seeks to replace by democratic process. We wish Mr. Jack Lynch were not Taoiseach, but we recognize that he is Taoiseach because the people of this State—living, breathing Irish people, making marks on pieces of paper—decided in 1969 that in terms of Dáil Deputies elected it was Mr. Lynch they wanted.

Mr. Mac Giolla, on the other hand, speaks for a movement which recognizes no validity in that transaction.

For that movement true, legitimate authority is derived only from the generations of the dead who died for Ireland, and is properly wielded in the present by the organization of men and women prepared to repeat the blood sacrifice.

To some people, and certainly to a significant minority in this country, that idea—of the authority of the dead and those who volunteer to die—will seem more noble than democracy. I would even agree. It is more noble. Being noble is what it is all about.

To belong to a military elite is noble—in the strictest, earliest meaning of the word—and the authority of a military elite is the real present-day meaning of this movement. The dead can only validate: real power is wielded by the living military elite. They decide who is to die and when, and they possess the prestige which the power to decide that confers....

Democracy, on the other hand, is not noble, and not compatible with the ideals of a military elite. Under democracy, civilians, not soldiers, have supreme power. And literally all sorts of people join in the choice of those civilians. The man who likes greyhound racing and reads the *Daily Mirror* has the same vote as a dedicated patriot who reads the *United Irishman*. People who value peace above national unification have votes. The military elite for which Mr. Mac Giolla speaks decides that these votes don't count. For us, who accept democracy, all the votes count, and the dead don't vote.

Now this division, between those who accept democracy and those who don't accept it, is fundamental. If people disagree about that, their verbal agreement on other political matters is utterly deceptive....

For us, socialism is not only something to be

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ment, that modern technology does give the terrorists certain advantages. They can strike almost anywhere, and with surprise. As a rule, unless dealing with a government already on the verge of collapse and quite without popular support, these advantages figure significantly only at the outset. For in most situations, the likely response—whether from a democratic regime, or a more or less authoritarian one—will be savage retaliation. What else can it be? Often, it is part of the terrorist expectation, even desire, to evoke such a response. Looking for "ultimate" confrontations, a stripping away of "democratic facades," they hope to provoke governments into a savagery that will demonstrate the truth of their contention that governments are ... savage. Soon enough, then, the initial advantage of the terrorists must lead to a mutual intensification of violence. As Walter Laqueur notes:

> Once the Brazilian ALN and other such groups opted for individual terror, the Rio government responded by indiscriminate counter-terror; terrorists and their sympathizers (and no doubt

striven for through democratic process; it is also itself an extension of democratic process, the placing of the essential resources and skills of a country—and eventually of the world—under public control, responsible to the people as a whole. Sinn Féin might agree with much of that, verbally. But they would not mean the same things we mean. By "the people" we mean something precise, measurable, even hum-drum.

Here and now, we mean all the men and women on the electoral register of this State. Sinn Féin may occasionally condescend to address itself to that electorate, but it recognizes nothing conclusive in its verdict. It does not recognize, for example, the right of the living people, through its elected parliament and government, to control the armed forces of the State, and to suppress private armies. It cannot recognize that right, because it is itself the political extension of a private army....

You may be as benevolent as you like in your ultimate intentions, the society to which you aspire may be just, socialist and democratic and altogether more admirable than the society in which we actually live.

But if you set out to bring the society you want into existence through denying the validity of democratic process in the society you actually have; if you set out to win it through a private army, withdrawn from democratic control; if you set out to win it by exploiting the latent forces of romantic nationalism and hatred of foreigners, and if you hope to control these forces by authoritarian methods in your republic within a Republic—if you set out in this way, then I say to you that the forces you hope to use and control will use and control you....

The I.R.A. is now waging sectarian civil war in Northern Ireland. Not us, you tell us—the Provisionals. Maybe so. What difference does it make? Have not the Provisionals as good a right to call themselves the I.R.A. as you have? Is not their right to take life just as good or as bad as yours? We deny that right to both of you, not just to them.

You tell us that you were in the majority, they in a minority at a certain meeting. Majority! Minority! How can *you* talk to us of majorities and minorities, those democratic concepts for which the whole history of your movement shows such a sovereign contempt?....

Once you reject democratic process, and set the example of the private army, there is nothing to prevent any determined group, which can get its hands on guns and bombs, from setting up as the true heirs of the national tradition. There is, indeed, a way of deciding between such forces. It is not the democratic way, for you are living—all of you—outside the democratic rules. It is the arbitrament of force, the ecology of the gun.

The closer your movement approaches to success, if it does approach success, the more it will be a movement dominated by the most efficient and ruthless gunmen. Whether they call themselves Provisionals or Officials does not matter very much. What does matter is that these will not be people who were drawn to your movement by socialist idealism....

Many people who dislike I.R.A. operations in the Twenty-six Counties approve its operations in the North. "They are defending our people." But who *are* "our people"? Do they include the Ulster Protestants, or don't they? If they do, it would be hard to convince Ulster Protestants that they are being defended by the I.R.A. In fact I.R.A. elements are using random terror methods against the Protestant population.

These are *Provisional* tactics, you will tell me. No doubt, but it doesn't matter much to Protestants who are killed or injured, or to their friends, which particular Catholic private army did which particular job. In fact the process whereby, after each new horror, each private army issues its solemn claim to the deed, or its repudiation, or even condemnation—this process has become nauseatingly familiar, as a kind of bureaucratic aftermath of murder.

CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN □

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quite a few innocent bystanders) simply disappeared without a trace. There were no trials and no death sentences. . . .

Even a democratic country like Israel will only tolerate terrorism up to a certain point. So long as incidents such as Ma'alot and Kiryat Shmoney remain relatively rare, the Israeli government will act within the limits of the law. But if these attacks were to become a frequent occurrence, public pressure for drastic and illegal counter-measures would become overwhelming.

The probable consequences must then be a magnification of the repressiveness of the ruling power in authoritarian countries or, in countries where there has been one or another degree of democracy, the destruction of democratic rights. Those 19th-century Russian terrorists who believed they had to use the pistol and the bomb because they had no other way of fighting autocracy were honestly persuaded that their goal was to establish a democratic regime. But there is a kind of terrorist in our own time who holds quite another, one might say, less "sentimental" view. Usually regarding himself as a man of "the Left," though he can also be found on "the Right," he is contemptuous of democracy, seeing it as a mere "sham," which lulls the people into complacence and must be destroyed or exposed if that complacence is to be brought to an end. He chooses to force a confrontation with the state in the aftermath of which the people, like it or not, will have to choose. Where socialists, Marxist and non-Marxist, expected that the struggles imposed on the people by an exploitative society would prod them into political awareness, the terrorists seek, in effect, to replace the consciousness of the people by their self-anointed will.

Toward this end, there has arisen a rationale among certain sorts of mindless "leftists" that the methods of terrorism are "merely" an extension of the repressiveness common to all societies. A teacher requiring students to do homework is intimidating them through the exertion of authority; in turn, a terrorist kidnapping governmental officials is intimidating them through the exertion of a counterauthority. Here, in an editorial note appearing before Enzensberger's article in *Liberation,* is a revealing because unsophisticated instance of this rationale:

> . . . when we speak of terror we are talking about an ongoing social condition and not simply a tactic used by radicals. Terrorism as it has been employed by the left cannot be considered in isolation from the context of *social* terror in which it takes place—whether in the overt form of violence legitimized by state authority, or in the more covert guise of the psychological bonds of fear and insecurity which dominate our lives.

The logic is dazzling. A tacit equation has been set up in which authority comes to be the same as domination, domination the same as force, force the same as violence, violence the same as terror; and since authority breeds insecurity, it follows—does it not?—that "essentially" insecurity is a mode of terror. If you refuse all distinctions, you need have no problems.

A related argument one occasionally hears is that in a society gone soft or slack, the terrorist act serves as a purifying shock. It shows that some people are serious enough to be ready to die and because they are, the indifferent masses may thereby be stirred into awareness. (But why is readiness to die necessarily proof of seriousness?)

Now it would be foolish to deny that the spectacle of self-sacrifice may elicit admiration. Young people, adventurers, semicriminals, all for radically different reasons stretching from pure idealism to mere malevolence, may be stirred to consciousness by acts of terror. But then again, they may be stirred to nothing more than further acts of terror. The problem today is that in a society where the channels of information require increasing quantities of sensation in order to hold attention, a terrorist wishing to become the conscience of society may soon find himself playing society's game. He must arrange events or stage pseudoevents that will yield a moment of notoriety; he must threaten and act upon his threats so as to seize his 50 seconds of the six o'clock news; he must keep raising the ante.

A solitary murder, criminal or political, has by now come to seem so much a part of our "normal" life, it can hardly excite much inter-

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est. To hold his "public," the terrorist must increasingly resort to acts that he had initially, one hopes, found repugnant. A dramatic kidnapping, like that of Patty Hearst, or a shoot-out with the police, like that of the SLA, can assure national coverage—for a little while. Yet there is both pathos and absurdity in all this. Consider the man who tried to assassinate Governor Wallace: he said, upon his arrest, that finally he would force the world to pay attention to him. Yes; and what *was* his name? Or who, for that matter, remembers the Symbionese Liberation Army as anything but a raggle-taggle of *lumpen* and desperadoes? A few months gone by, other guns have blazed. TV watchers seem able to take it all in, from direct shots of Vietnam warfare to "Gunsmoke." The event supposed to shatter national complacency becomes the sedative depressing national consciousness; the heroic act of terrorism, a gesture of mass culture.

All modern politics, to be sure, faces this problem, since any modern politics must seek publicity in behalf of its goals. But the notion that the task of mobilizing sentiment and clarifying thought among the people can be short-circuited through some electrical act of killing—this notion is undone precisely through those workings of the mass media that seem at first to lend it plausibility.

Does It "Work"?

IN COUNTRIES WITH highly developed and articulate class structures, terrorism has never succeeded, nor is it likely to succeed, in effecting any basic change of power—though it may, through an act of sudden blackmail, achieve a limited end, such as forcing the release of prisoners, etc. Both the dominant and subordinate classes in such societies, if they have enough freedom to maneuver and bargain, refuse the terrorist option. They have too much at stake, in both their limited collaboration and limited conflict. Wherever trade unions, political parties, all kinds of secondary organizations struggle over the division of the social product, the terrorist act is likely to seem, at best, a diversion and, at worst, a provocation.

Terrorism as a strategy for effecting social change has a potential for success only in countries with a weak socioeconomic infrastructure—and even there its record is not very impressive. But at least it is a possibility. All the contending classes are warped and undernourished; the struggle for the social product becomes especially acute because there is so little of it to go around; power rests in the hands of a small elite, usually military or bonapartist. In such countries—some of the Latin-American ones—acts of terror can sometimes upset whatever precarious relationship of forces has been established, since terror thrives on popular apathy and the absence, so to speak, of a thick social life. Because the masses are mute, the despotism of the old rulers may be replaced by the despotism of new ones; the despotism of colonels by the despotism of lieutenants; the despotism of gangsters without vocabulary by the despotism of gangsters who have picked up a few tags of modern ideology.

The case of the much-romanticized Tupamaros in Uruguay is somewhat different. Through bold acts of terrorism the Tupamaros helped to undermine a weak democratic regime, one of the very few in Latin America that had allowed civil liberties. Whereupon the Tupamaros, composed largely of middle-class students cut off from the people, were themselves assaulted and apparently smashed by the military junta that took over the country and destroyed its liberties. Whether this outcome proved that terrorism "works," the chuckleheads in Paris and New York who had celebrated the Tupamaros have yet to elaborate.

In still another kind of situation terrorism may prove to have some effectiveness: when it is employed by a resistance movement against an alien occupying power. The basis of the terrorists' strength is then simply the fact that they find support among their own people, or at least protection. Conditions of this sort prevailed in the occupied countries of Europe during the Second World War, though it seems hard to measure the extent to which acts of terror or sabotage seriously hampered the Nazi war machine.

The case of Algeria is also pertinent, though

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too complex for elaboration here. Insofar as I have been able to gain a picture of what happened in Algeria, it is something like this: In the early 1950s the strand of Algerian nationalism that would later be known as the FLN, and that did in fact become the basis for the independent Algerian regime, started to employ terroristic methods—not only or, at the outset, mainly against the French, but especially against competing groups of Algerians. The followers of Messali Hadj, a veteran leader of Algerian nationalism, were a special target of this FLN terrorism, and here it certainly "worked." Against the French it also demonstrated a certain effectiveness at first, but by the late 1950s the French had shown themselves to be good students and were proving adept at counterterror. A stalemate ensued. Whereupon the French, under de Gaulle's leadership, made a decision that the political and economic costs of trying to maintain their domination of Algeria would now be too high. Terrorism in Algeria can then be said to have worked to varying extents: a great deal against competing Algerian groups, and, to some degree difficult to measure, against the French. As far as one can distinguish terrorist from other methods (mass politics, guerrilla warfare, strikes, foreign pressures) in the Algerian struggle, they owed their relative success largely to the fact that the great mass of Algerians wished to see an end to French domination.

It would be a mistake to suppose that such conditions prevail today in Ireland. The IRA, so far as one can judge, lacks mass support in either portion of Ireland; its tactic of planting bombs in crowded English cities is both a sign of weakness and despicable. That it may provoke the English into throwing up their hands, deciding to withdraw from the "whole Irish mess," seems possible. But what can the consequence of that be except an enormous *increase* in bloodshed, a ghastly civil war between Irish Catholics and Protestants? If that is what the admirers of terrorism mean by saying that it "works," I am prepared to cede the point.

As for the PLO, its methods have "worked" largely insofar as it has been floated—as the richest terrorist movement in history—by Arab oil. Were it only a question of a conflict between Israel and the PLO, Arafat would long ago have been reduced to sipping coffee in a Damascus café. For despite a spectacularly brutal and unselective use of random terror, the PLO has at no point seriously threatened Israeli authority. What has "worked" has been not the murder of Israeli athletes in Munich or of Israeli children at Ma'alot, but the ability of the oil-producing countries to intimidate Western Europe.

In any case, even when such movements seem to "work," by frightening or wearying opponents into granting power or recognition, they fail in another and more fundamental way. While nowadays it seems obligatory for terrorists to proclaim some version of democratic ideology, the likelihood is that, because of their elitist structure and adventurist character, these movements will lead to new tyrannies if they take power. Who can be excited to libertarian sentiments by a terrorist movement motored by the oil of Feisal and tutored by the agents of Brezhnev?

The point bears stressing. When certain sorts of "leftists" say to socialists like ourselves—they may say it with uneasy admiration, sometimes genuine qualms—that terrorism "works," they assume the existence of some sort of common goal. But is there a common goal? I doubt it. Such people find acceptable, sometimes attractice, the prospect of left-authoritarian dictatorship; we believe that socialism is realizable only through democracy. The difference regarding methods reflects a much deeper difference regarding ends, just as the difference regarding ends dictates the difference regarding methods.

The Historical Background

NONE OF these problems, alas, is exactly a fresh one, nor are the arguments that swirl around them. Terrorism in its modern forms appears in the mid-19th century, during what might be called the primitive phase of radicalism; and now it flourishes during what might be called its decadent phase.

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Most of the *Narodnaya Volya* group, writes Franco Venturi in his great book *Roots of Revolution,*

> were well aware of the dangers of their position. It evoked a spectre that had horrified an entire generation of [Russian] Populists, the spectre of a revolution decreed from above, of reforming and revolutionary absolutism in Jacobin guise. The members of *Narodynaya Volya* itself called this "a despotic Utopia" and they always attacked it.

After Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, the Executive Committee of *Narodnaya Volya* sent a letter to the new Czar, Alexander III, promising that if public freedom were established, it would

> spontaneously suspend its own activity ... and devote [itself] to the fruitful work of civilization, culture, and the welfare of the people. A pacific struggle of ideas will take the place of the violence which is much more repugnant to us than to your servitors. ...

When an American president, James Garfield, was assassinated during that same year, *Narodnaya Volya* denounced this act:

> In a land where the citizens are free to express their ideas, and where the will of the people does not merely make the law but appoints the person who is to carry the law into effect, in such a country political assassination is the manifestation of a despotic tendency identical with that to whose destruction in Russia we have devoted ourselves.

But it was quite inevitable that the method that had been adopted with great reluctance, and out of a sense of desperation, should after a time come to seem attractive, worthy, even purifying in its own right. One Russian terrorist, repudiated by his comrades but a figure all too anticipatory of the future, developed a theory of "permanent terrorism"; Nicholas Morozov glorified the small group because it could close itself off from enemies and spies; "it replaces by a series of individual political assassinations, which always [!] hit their target, the massive revolutionary movements, where people often rise against each other because of misunderstanding"; and "every new appearance of tyranny in the future will be met by new groups of people from the better elements of society, and these groups will destroy oppression by consecutive political assassinations."

Morozov seems to have been a pure-spirited fanatic; far more sinister was the infamous Sergei Nechaev, immortalized in Dostoevsky's *The Possessed.* Nechaev systematized the deceit that conspiracy requires; turned the methods of terror against his own comrades; made amoralism into a creed; exposed as a proud subjective consciousness what was the objective potentiality in the conduct of the other terrorists. In the end, all of Nechaev's major collaborators had to break with him, so appalled were they by his methods.

With the rise of the modern nation-state and bourgeois democracy, terrorism was sharply repudiated by all wings of the socialist movement, and even some of the old terrorists had second thoughts. Andrea Costa, a comrade of the Italian anarchist leader Errico Malatesta, wrote in behalf of political organization:

> By means of a conspiracy, a change in the form of government can be obtained; a principle can be dispossessed or punctured and another put in its place, but it cannot achieve social revolution. ... To do this is a matter of widely diffusing the new principles in the masses ... so that the revolution occurs by itself from the bottom to the top and not vice versa. ... And this necessarily involves publicity, since it is impossible to reconcile the idea of such a vast propaganda within the necessarily restricted circle of a conspiracy.

Costa anticipated the more systematic rejection of terrorist methods by the 20th-century Marxists. In 1911 Trotsky put forward the essentials of the Marxist reply to the terrorists and, at least on the tactical-strategic level, what he wrote still makes sense:

> Only the conscious and organized working class can send a strong representation into the halls of parliament. ... However, in order to murder a prominent official you need not have the organized masses behind you. The recipe for explosives is accessible to all, and a Browning can be obtained anywhere.
>
> In the first case, there is a social struggle, whose methods and means flow necessarily from the nature of the prevailing social order; in the second, a purely mechanical reaction identical everywhere—in China as in France—very strik-

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ing in its outward form (murder, explosions, etc.) but absolutely harmless as far as the social system goes. . . .

Whether a terrorist attempt, even a "successful" one, throws the ruling class into confusion depends on the concrete political circumstances. In any case, the confusion can only be short-lived; the capitalist state does not base itself on governmental ministers and cannot be eliminated with them. . . .

But the disarray introduced into the ranks of the working masses themselves by a terrorist attempt is much deeper. If it is enough to arm oneself with a pistol in order to achieve one's goal, why the efforts of the class struggle? If a thimbleful of gunpowder and a little chunk of lead is enough to shoot the enemy in the neck, what need is there for a class organization? . . .

In our eyes, individual terror is inadmissible precisely because it *belittles the role of the masses in their own consciousness,* reconciles them to their powerlessness, and turns their eyes and their hopes toward a great avenger and liberator who some day will come and accomplish his mission.

Trotsky's argument was essentially strategic—how best to build a revolutionary party?—and even then, it did not keep him from later justifying, sometimes glorifying, mass terror during the first stages of Bolshevik rule. Now, for those of us who have lived through the decades of the totalitarian experience, it may be possible to reflect a little more deeply on the inherent moral, which is also to say, political features of terrorism.

The life of the terrorist is overwhelmed by loneliness, not merely because he cannot be certain whether to trust friend or comrade, but because he must cut himself off from all movements and communities in which choices might be weighed. Staking everything on the act, he blocks off all that comes before and all that comes after. Deciding whom to smite he replaces God (the Marxists would say, replaces the Party, which is perhaps the same thing). Choosing whom to punish, he replaces the justice, be it good or bad, of society. And since the conflicts of social class must be bent to his will, he replaces history too. The terrorist carries a moral burden that only saints or fanatics would undertake—worst of all, fanatics mistaking themselves for saints.

Greater still is his political isolation. The terrorist surrenders the possibility of sharing the experiences, or heeding the cautions, of a political movement. He discards responsibility to his people, his class, his generation. He cannot hold an open discussion on where to throw his next bomb and, although he may keep mumbling "power to the people," he denies in effect whatever power the people may have in controlling his behavior. In a hallucinatory transaction he "becomes" the people. His urge to fraternity dissolves into a total *hubris.**

Finally, the argument against terrorism is more than a matter of political expediency. In a society where a reasonable (which is necessarily to say, an imperfect) measure of freedom to speak and organize is available, we must regard it as utterly impermissible to resort to terrorist methods or to give the faintest encouragement to them. Such terrorism is wrong because it is inhumane; because it creates an atmosphere in which brute violence replaces democratic discussion; because even if the bomb throwers could win power through such methods they would no longer be, if ever they had been, the kind of people who could build a good society. And it is wrong because minorities in a democratic society, as long as their freedom to dissent is largely protected, do not have the right to impose their will upon the majority through violence.

BUT the most urgent question, so late in the day, is perhaps this: *what kind of people are you going to become if you resort systematically to such methods*? There is something utterly astonishing in the self-assurance or naiveté of a

*Reading an earlier version of these notes, an editor of *Dissent* remarked that there has appeared in the last few decades a new kind of terrorist or, perhaps more frequently, admirer of terrorism. This is the kind of "leftist" who is drawn to terrorism not because he thinks it likely to be politically effective but because he is fascinated by its "expressive" potentiality, as a way of registering his presence at a time when he may fear he is actually powerless. Terrorism becomes an *acte gratuit,* a way of stamping individuality upon an indifferent world—or at least the thought of terrorism can be vicariously justified in this way. This is an important point, but one that lies outside my present range.

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figure like Morozov who proposed to check future tyrannies by creating an endless chain of terrorists. Did he never ask himself whether this elite of killers might not itself become brutalized and corrupted? Or what might prevent it, if ever it did take power, from continuing to use precisely the methods to which it had become accustomed when struggling against power? The weight of 20th-century history makes all such questions seem painfully urgent, morally inescapable.

Terror flourishes on the bones of politics. It is still another sign of the central reality of this century: that the ethos of totalitarianism has seeped into almost every segment of our life. Terror is the delusion of those who have lost the capacity to distinguish between hope and death. □

Note: The literature on this subject, especially its historical aspects, is rich. Franco Venturi's *The Roots of Revolution*, a major historical work, offers rich material on the 19th-century Russian revolutionists. James Joll's *The Anarchists* is a very competent survey of anarchist politics, including its terrorist wing. The second volume of G. D. H. Cole's *History of Socialist Thought* should be consulted. Several of Trotsky's articles have been collected in a pamphlet, *Against Individual Terrorism*. Bakunin's remarkable letter to Nechaev appears in *Natalie Herzen: Daughter of a Revolutionary*, ed. Michael Confino. □

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A Discussion from Paris

French Communists: Change or Stagnation?

We reprint below, with permission, a discussion that appeared in a recent issue of Esprit, *the distinguished independent Left magazine published in Paris. The discussion focuses on the problem of Communist-Socialist relations in France, on whether the Communist party has begun significantly to change, and especially on the reasons for the recent series of attacks the French Communists have launched against the Socialists. For reasons of space we have had to condense the* Esprit *discussion, but the views of the participants remain in our translation substantially the same as in the original.*

The participants are: Jean-Marie Domenach, *director of* Esprit *and a major figure in the Catholic Left.* Jacques Ozouf, *historian and study director at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, specialist in electoral sociology.* Michel Winock, *specialist in contemporary history at the University of Paris.* Georges Lavau, *professor of political science at the National Foundation of Political Science of Paris.*

The Stymied Revolution

JEAN-MARIE DOMENACH: Has the French Communist party evolved and, if so, to what extent? A recent book by Harris and Sédouy, *Voyage à l'intérieur du Parti communiste,* offers us a picture of a Communist party made up of youthful members and one that appears to have become at least in part a new organization. The very fact that the French CP encouraged the writing of this work seems to indicate a new attitude. On what score can we take this new attitude seriously?

JACQUES OZOUF: Even Communist reviewers have commented favorably on this aspect of the book. Contrary to what has been widely said, however, it seems to me that what Harris and Sédouy have shown is how disparate French Communists are with respect to social origins, motives for joining the CP, and temperament. They have shown that there can be people in the Party who divorce, have a private life, devote themselves to activities other than militant action. That seems the one new thing in the book—and the one new thing in the Communist party.

Taking off from this idea, one could suppose that, as happens in ordinary life, people who have different temperaments, social origins, and motivations will also exhibit divergences in political judgment; and from this one might conclude that in the CP the same thing is happening in the same way. But whereas Harris's and Sédouy's book does bring out how dissimilar Party members are, when it takes up their political language, it reveals a totally unchanged conformism and monolithism. So, to me it appears that the "mixture" is a bit of window dressing.

MICHEL WINOCK: I agree with Jacques Ozouf. I think that what's changing in the CP is its appearance—toward an all-doors-wide-

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open image. However, the Party has not evolved in any fundamental sense because, to speak schematically, what makes a Communist party is the welding of orthodoxy and structure.

Unlike the Socialist party, which can change and grow because it has no orthodoxy and a structure that is flexible, the CP has a firmly established orthodoxy and a rigid structure. The two elements are inseparable. Its orthodoxy is the Marxist-Leninist vulgate; its structure is its democratic—allegedly democratic—centralism; and the cornerstone on which orthodoxy and structure rest is the reference to the Soviet Union. Not since the Party's origins has anything fundamental changed—its orthodoxy defines its structure, and this centralized structure is the tabernacle of orthodoxy. Whatever the evolution of the Party in relation to the Soviet Union, this reference remains constant.

We have almost daily proof. On December 4, 1974, *Le Monde* published a quite explicit statement by [CP leader] Paul Laurent: "When the Communist party envisages the conditions that more strongly favor achieving socialism through the success of 'the Common Program,'* it puts on the plus side of the scales the existence of a world-wide socialist system. We consider this essential, for it has provided the example of liberation from capitalist exploitation. ..." There we have the original Communist credo, and what is striking in Harris's and Sédouy's book is that again and again we find this reference—no matter who's speaking—to Soviet socialism. Not that is is offered as the model—the speaker takes care not to say that the same things will be done in France, where, naturally, conditions are not the same. But it is at least, as Laurent says, an *example*. This is very important, because it accounts for a number of tensions between the Communist party and the rest of the Left. Therefore, I believe that if the CP is changing, the change is not in its deepest nature, in its essence. Rather it is that conditions—both the national and the international political context—are making it not actually "change," ontologically speaking, but somewhat modify its political life.

GEORGES LAVAU: I most certainly appreciate the force of the arguments Ozouf and Winock have set forth, and yet I should like to offer another view. People have always been fascinated by how "different" in character the CP is from other social movements. They have fallen too often into the habit of thinking of the Party in terms of itself and not as an organization that necessarily has a network of relations with other groups that in a measure make the Party what it is.

This is my question: can a political party—even if it is different from the others—remain unchanged when its relations with French society, with other parties, and with the international political scene are being modified? One possible answer to my question is that the CP will, at some moment of its own choosing, make *adaptations*—adaptations only—but will itself remain fundamentally the same. This answer does not seem entirely satisfactory. One cannot totally dismiss the other hypothesis: despite its *wish not to be changed,* is the Communist party not affected—and herein may lie the cause of its problems today—by the modifications in its relations with other groups?

I raise this question because I think it can shed light on developments that, from the outside, may look like reversions to a rigid cold-war stance. Because the CP does want to preserve its identity and not just passively confront changes in relation to the political environment, it is obliged to stiffen its stance. Personally, I am inclined to think the CP has had to "absorb" such a quantity of modifications that no matter what its filtering and self-regulating capacities may be (or however "scientific" its theoretical tools), the Party has found itself face to face with a less stable situation. On the one hand, there have been "adaptations," which it more or less controls; on the other hand, there are conditions to which it must submit.

*The program of reforms on which the Communist and Socialist parties of France formed an electoral bloc.

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OZOUF: I believe the CP is suffering an identity crisis. What was it that for such a long time impelled many people to support the Party? First, of all the parties it was the farthest to the Left, and everyone knows what a sympathetic chord that strikes in this country. To be the farthest to the Left is a certificate of purity. Further, the CP appeared to be the most vigorous party, everywhere present, a party of serious, effective, devoted people. . . .

These reasons for supporting the CP are now weakened. Today there is a Left that stands farther Left than the CP. And even if this leftism is no longer as strong as it was, its appeal is still operative, mobilizing 3–4 percent of the voters—which is to say there are 3–4 percent fewer votes for the CP. This does, after all, constitute a threat.

A second reason for the decline in the CP's popularity is that the Socialist party is again a real presence in the nation—a concrete presence. And while its militancy is not like that of the CP, that militancy exists, whereas for some time it did not. Today, Socialist posters are to be seen on walls; of a Sunday morning, you find Socialist party supporters—young and not so young—on the sidewalks selling newspapers and handing out leaflets; when there is a strike, you meet Socialists at the corner of the Bon Marché, everywhere.

The CP tends to react to the new situation in three ways.

First, it seeks to demonstrate that it is indeed the toughest, the party most committed to labor demands—in a word, farthest to the Left. This is why it attacks more violently than before "compromises" made by the Socialist party in municipalities. One can notice the same thing even in parliamentary debates by studying the Communist "applause metering." On November 29, 1974, one whole page in *L'Humanité* was devoted to a report on the debate over voluntary abortion. When Jacques Soustelle tore apart the "terrorist" libelers who amalgamate Nazism and abortion, *L'Humanité* noted that he was applauded from many benches, "including the Socialist benches." As for Minister of Health Simone Veil, she was interrupted ten times by applause. *L'Humanité* underlined the fact that Communist deputies took no part in this, whereas the Socialists were very much a part of it, and at times acted as a claque for the Minister of Health. Is one no longer to have the right to applaud a law one is voting to support? Do reasonable and generous arguments cease being reasonable and generous because Jacques Soustelle or Simone Veil advances them? *L'Humanité* made no such claim, and for our purposes here the basic issues do not matter. What *L'Humanité* was latching on to was the *difference*. It was trying to establish the vulnerability of the Socialist party, always ready to veer with the wind when questions of reform are at issue; a party that can always be seduced or hoaxed, like the "child" it is. In comparison to the behavior of such frivolous, scatterbrained creatures, the "adult" comportment of steady, "responsible" Communists is all the more striking. . . .

The Party's second response is a determination to be everywhere in evidence, even more than before, and to stand apart from the rest of the Left. The developments following the presidential election campaign seem very important inasmuch as during the campaign the entire Left appeared to be *the party of François Mitterand* [the French Socialist leader]. Obviously, the Communists want no more of that.

The third response: the CP also wishes to refurbish its originality, based principally on its not being "a party like the others" and the only party backed by concrete socialist experience—that is, the socialism of the East European nations. This accounts for the new emphasis placed during recent months on the benefits of East European socialism—Hungarian "stability" or "the quality of life" in Poland or "the unprecedented harvest" in Czechoslovakia. . . .

WINOCK: As for the identity crisis, I think that the CP is affected by developments in the French and international political situation. One should take into account sociological changes among France's active population, and the more restricted role the working

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class—relatively, if not absolutely—plays in production. At the moment a more crucial factor is the international situation.

I will formulate the CP's identity crisis by saying that it is a party that is no longer either revolutionary or reformist—or that it is both these things at once, but is no longer very sure which. The CP remains profoundly revolutionary in its discourse and also in its brand of Leninist organization, yet finds itself in a situation—here in France and internationally—that prevents it from following a revolutionary strategy. It has long since adopted an alliance with the Socialist party, it has long since adopted an electoral strategy, and even if the CP no longer has the same precise ties with the Soviet Union that it had in the days of the Comintern, this is not to say that its policy can be at odds with the primary interests of détente or "peaceful coexistence." Obviously, the French CP must not pursue an autonomous policy that might throw a wrench into the wheels of the Soviet Union, which on the whole desires peace and needs trade with the West.

When Georges Marchais [head of the French CP] says that peaceful coexistence and détente are not the same as the social status quo, he has not committed himself to very much. No one wants the status quo, not even the Right, which governs us. It is hard to imagine a CP launching into any revolutionary action that in a country like France would risk disturbing an international equilibrium apparently so beneficial at the moment to the Russians. Consequently, I believe that the CP continues to be revolutionary in its intentions and in its forms of organization but is constrained to adopt a position that may be called reformist and does not fundamentally aim at initiating a process of revolution in France. The revolutionary thesis still identifies the Communist party; the reformist hypothesis permits it to have a political existence.

The Last Church?

LAVAU: Is that what leads you to say there is no change or growth in the CP?

WINOCK: I said that the CP remains fundamentally the same, but under the pressure of domestic and external forces it has been led to follow a political line that can vary. Since it is simultaneously a national and international political force, it belongs to two spheres. Clearly, it is ideal when the two spheres coincide—when its national and international interests coincide. The Party enjoyed such a heyday during the antifascist struggle, between 1934 and approximately 1945–46. (I say "approximately" because of the 1939–41 gap.) Then came the nadir of the Cold War, a period of opposition between the two spheres. And once again, since 1956 and especially 1960, a new golden age has seemed possible.

I believe that, depending on our domestic situation, the CP has two possible courses of action. When in France we have a Gaullist, nationalistic, government, which makes overtures to the East, it is almost in the interest of the Communist party to place itself in opposition. It exercises its tub-thumping functions—that is, the Party casts itself in the role of champion of the dissatisfied at home—and, at the same time, it lets the Gaullist nationalist policy, which it sees as a positive international policy, continue uncontested. But the moment de Gaulle was no longer in power, the moment Giscard d'Estaing, while only a candidate, appeared like a man who could challenge at least a part of that policy, the CP changed its position.

But from now on, what obliges it to change its position is the renascence of a Socialist party that takes the political union of the Left seriously, and so leads the CP to develop a policy of leftist unity. So, I agree, there is an evolution of line, yet the Party is nonetheless and profoundly its old self.

DOMENACH: Is it possible so sharply to differentiate Communists from the Communist party? In other words, if Communist membership is changing—and it must be changing, for more than half the members of its most recent congress were people who had joined since 1968—if the Communists are changing it is hard to suppose that the Party itself is not

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constrained to change. One cannot today prevent people—the Catholic Church knows this—from seeing films they want to see, or from reading books they want to read. Neither can one maintain within the Party the same rigidity in point of view as before. What's more, during the preparations for the Party's recent congress, it appears that genuine discussion took place in the cells. So, my first question is: at this point, can one distinguish individuals from the organization they vitalize? Second, if you are right and the Party is effectively resisting change, how do you account for this? I brought up the Catholic Church. Is there an essential difference between the Party and the Church? The Church has been constrained to evolve after a fashion because of the evolution in social customs. Can the Party withstand this same evolution? Can one imagine that in the midst of a liberalizing trend that has continued without interruption since '68, with norms and traditions giving way on all sides, the CP constitutes the refuge where men find certitude, discipline, confidence—that, if I may put it so, the Party has become the last of the churches? There is an enigma in all this.

OZOUF: I'm not sure there is. Because a person joins the Communist party to be assured of certain unchallengeable things, and these have not changed—the party of the working classes, socialist dominance in Eastern Europe, etc. There is a change in Party congresses, of course: half the delegates have been Party members only since 1968. But anyone familiar with the CP knows that this reflects a calculated choice; young members are sent to a congress because for them it is their High Mass, their *Te Deum*. And since the congress plays no truly effective role, there is no risk in sending young people. One no longer goes to the Catholic Church in search of certitude, but one does continue to join the Party for that reason—which explains why numerous leftists have joined since May 1968. ...

WINOCK: You were speaking of change, Jean-Marie, and the fact that our Communists are Frenchmen like the rest of us, that they are changing like the rest of us, and that by the same token the Party has to change. No doubt; but change how? It would be idiotic to deny there are changes, not only in the image the CP is offering of itself, but also in its position on certain issues. Take birth control. Anyone who remembers the Party's firmly stated opposition sees that today this policy no longer prevails.

I agree that the CP has a stronger appeal for French society than any other party, but to me the permanence of its essential nature is equally evident. And what is its essential nature? It has to do with its type of organization and with its orthodoxy, as I said before. And on that score, when I read the book by Harris and Sédouy I see that the kind of discussion, the internal relationships within the Party are not changing. ...

Truly democratic debate, as we understand the term, does not exist in the CP. The word is passed from the top down. As for orthodoxy, what strikes me is that every time Harris and Sédouy try to elicit a definition of socialism, they get one and the same answer, a lame, stammering, chewed-over magic formula: the collectivization of the means of production. And it is because the Soviet Union has achieved collectivization—or rather state ownership—of the means of production that it continues to be the great model.

Furthermore, when you consider the extraordinary social reforms in France since the '60s, it is striking that the Communist party has taken no part in them. The CP is impotent in matters of innovation. In all the fresh social critiques of education, medicine, social custom, etc., leadership has come from other quarters. Most often the CP tags along, always late and ill at ease, because for it the priority is, "socialize the means of production" and then everything will be in order.

That is why I believe the CP is not changing. Certainly there are always new arrivals, but what people often look for in the CP is, if not certitude, then at least a pole of resistance to chaos. Some people do not know where to turn in a society like ours, in which everything is collapsing—church, school, university,

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papa, mama, all the rest. The CP remains the church, the school, the family where one can find order and warmth. All sorts of comparisons have been made on this score, and they have not become dated. . . .

One Step Ahead of the Masses

LAVAU: I would like to go back to a remark by Michel Winock, because I believe he telescoped two things: the orthodoxy of the French CP, and the too limited nature of its social criticism. You said, Michel, that what strikes you about the CP is its orthodoxy. If one construes orthodoxy in the, let's say, banal sense of fidelity to a dogma, and if one considers it on the level of language—even a language as coded as that of the CP—I'll say that, of course, the orthodoxy of Communists is much more perceptible than that of any other group. However, in varying degrees, orthodoxy exists in the others too, for this is what characterizes every organization founded on a dogma, on articles of faith.

The second question is, in my opinion, more interesting. You reproached the CP with lagging behind in social criticism, at a time when we are living in a society subject to *radical* criticism from all sides, some of it by people without any "revolutionary commitment" whatever. According to your view, the CP confines itself to substituting for this critique a sort of summary, arbitrary recipe.

I agree. Still, one must recognize what the French CP's problem is. It claims to be the party of the working class and to provide political leadership to the working class; but that leadership, it asserts, is not external to the working class. Its practical problem is not to gambol on ahead of the masses (otherwise, there is no real class it can represent) and *at the same time* to offer a critique of prevailing ideas. For this task of criticizing the prevailing ideas of the ruling classes, the CP has equipped itself with (if such cant is allowable) ideological counterapparatuses that are exact reproductions of the ideological instruments employed by the dominant society. The CP has its music magazines, its art magazines, its associations of this and associations for that—all ideological counterapparatuses. One must determine the real significance of this response. Is it as cautious, as conservative, as limping-along as one is pleased to call it? Yes and no. ... The answer—and here again, a careful, detailed study is needed—depends in part on one's reference position. . . .

OZOUF: Like Winock, I am struck by the conscious determination to preserve orthodoxy. One example will suffice: when the Common Program was under discussion, there was much talk about party pluralism in a Socialist France. But in *Le défi démocratique*, Georges Marchais supplied a most orthodox solution to the question, giving as an example of party pluralism in a socialist regime—the "people's democracies"! In the section entitled "Party Pluralism," he explained that political, social, and historical conditions in Czarist Russia prevented there being a pluralistic system of parties in the U.S.S.R., and he went on to say that there can be no question now of asking the Soviets to adopt such a system; however, he said, pluralism is to be found in the other countries of Eastern Europe. Marchais cites as an example Romania, where, he says, five parties collaborate in governing a socialist society, and where the president of the Chamber of the People is a Christian Democrat. . . . In terms of a determination to maintain orthodoxy, such a statement seems to pass well beyond the believable.

LAVAU: His answer to you would be, "Don't ask us to stop being Communist."

DOMENACH: I was greatly struck by the fact that the French CP now makes use of public-relations tactics through all the mass media. This gives it new possibilities and fresh trimmings, of course, but has another consequence as well: amid the plethora of posters and the cacophony of speeches, statements like the one made by Marchais about pluralism in the "people's democracies" are offered side by side with various others that in fact belie them. Now 25 years ago this could not have happened, for the intellectual and political debate

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was so close that a statement could not quietly coexist with another that contradicted it. After the war, the Communist party was contesting step by step any and all contradictions of its own statements. Not only does it now scarcely fight anymore but also, up to a point, it practices the pluralism and tolerance that are the mark of our period.

I offer one example: last year, for the first time, the organizers of *L'Humanité*'s annual festival agreed to permit heretical works to appear. *The Gulag Archipelago* was sold at this festival. It turned out to be rather a nonevent, for of 300 copies a total of 17 were sold. All of which goes to prove that a statement can exist cheek by jowl with a counterstatement. By way of anecdotal interest, let me add that one of the people attending the festival walked up to the bookseller, who was a bearded fellow, shook his hand, and said, "M. Solzhenitsyn, you have real courage to have come here. I congratulate you." But did he belong to the Party?

The First Party of the Left

DOMENACH: You all seem to believe, with some nuances in opinion, that the French Communist party has not substantially changed. What conclusions do you draw from that with regard to the Union of the Left? Do you think that herein lies one cause of the problems the Union is currently encountering? If the French CP is not in the process of change, what are your hopes for the Left?

WINOCK: I believe that in its relations with the Socialist party over the last five years, the CP has scored a very important point. To have bound the SP to a tactical Union of the Left and, above all, to have induced it to sign the Common Program—to my way of thinking, this is its great victory. For although the CP made some concessions in relation to its own program, they were slight in comparison to those made by the SP. I mean, the Common Program, to which the CP refers constantly as to a doctrinal guarantee, defines *grosso modo* what I will term state socialism—a socialism from above, which completely satisfies the requirements of CP orthodoxy.

However, in the course of later developments, the CP has lost ground. The recent by-elections confirmed that, electorally speaking, the alliance is benefiting the SP, and obviously this troubles the CP. The present real or pseudo quarrel dates from two events—the Socialist congress and the assessment of the by-elections.

On the other hand, the Socialist party is perhaps in the process of developing or strengthening—in any event, is receptive to—a socialist current, which is utterly incompatible with CP orthodoxy and which on the Left is called *socialisme autogestionnaire* ("self-managing socialism"). But the arrival on the scene of various leaders of the CFDT [Catholic workers' union] threatens to put the Socialist party into an increasingly critical position vis-à-vis the Common Program and, therefore, vis-à-vis the CP.

Consequently, in order to defend its position, the CP has attacked the SP on the terrain where it is itself the stronger—that of militant dynamism. It is prepared to lose a few seats in elections; that is an unavoidable concession. But on the ground of ideology and militant dynamism, it is posing as the champion of a pure and tough socialism in contrast to the pluralistic and uncertain socialism of the SP.

OZOUF: Nonetheless, its loss of voting strength is more important in connection with the CP's "stiffening" position than you've just said, and perhaps more important to it than the problem of "self-managing socialism." The CP is intent on continuing to be "the major party in the opposition," to use its own words, and the parliamentary by-elections in September 1974 unquestionably played a determining role in its decision to trigger the current crisis. For as late as August 29, Georges Marchais, in so many words, said to reporters, "First, it's my pleasure to assure you that the Communist party is in wonderful shape, and I think I can tell you that this is true of the entire Left. Our party and the other

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groups are steadily gathering significant strength. Relations among us are excellent." But the September election setbacks came along to sour that idyll.

WINOCK: It's my impression that he accepts the fact that the SP will have a slight edge in elections.

OZOUF: I believe not. The CP has no wish to be—it will not be—a backup support for another party. This is basic. After the March 1973 elections, in which the CP heard the bullets whistling around its ears, Georges Marchais addressed the Central Committee and, on a note of astonishment, declared, "For the first time, the Union is profiting our partners and not us, profiting them more than us." His remarks, little noted at the time, reveal that the present quarrel is not really new but has simply been made explicit. I believe in the importance of the Communist decline in strength at the polls; it is a *constant* decline. People always speak of 5 million Communist votes, but since 1945 the French electorate has grown from 24 to 31 million people! In other words, those 5 million Communist voters amounted to something like 22 or 23 percent of all registered voters in 1945–46, whereas today they represent only 16 or 17 percent.

WINOCK: But if one goes back to the de Gaulle period—in other words, to a low-water mark for the Communists—by comparison there has been for some time a recovery of sorts.

OZOUF: This is no longer the case. If you go by the results of the 1973 parliamentary elections, by François Mitterand's total vote on May 19, by what the opinion polls show, and by the by-elections—not only parliamentary but also the municipal and canton elections—it is clear that within the Union of the Left, the CP is at this moment no longer the first-ranking party. Now the CP knows very well what "backup strength" means, since in speaking of party pluralism it gives the example of the "people's democracies." It—the CP—is the essential party: "the working class and *its* Communist party," as the phrase has always run. If one opens Marchais's *Le défi démocratique,* it is always just that—"the working class and *its* Communist party"—the decisive force around which the supporting forces agglomerate. The CP knows what "backup strength" means, and at the present juncture it thinks *that* is what it should be in France; ergo, it does not now want to come to power.

WINOCK: If the electoral spread [between SP and CP] were to widen, obviously the CP would be increasingly uneasy and unwilling to continue with the policy of a Common Program. Nonetheless, I believe that ideology is important, because until the last few years the Socialist party suffered from a dearth of ideas, it had no clear line to follow, and in these circumstances, the CP could impose its line. But what is worrying the CP now is the large influx of people who define socialism in a radically different way. . . .

I believe it is the Socialist party that holds the key to the Left's electoral success. The SP has steadily shown growing strength at the polls over the last two years. Through its position and its future gains, the Socialist party can win the additional 1 percent of the votes the Left needs to come to power. All that the CP can do is to create obstacles.

DOMENACH: I am extending your thought when I say that you hope, or you conceive of the possibility, that the CP will become not a backstop but a second element of strength in a pluriparty government as it exists in certain countries—Finland, for example. Then the French CP would be constrained, would be forced to change, and its evolution would depend on the growth of the SP?

OZOUF: In part yes, but one must also be mindful of the Communists' willingness or unwillingness to share in forming a government in which it would be the second-ranking partner and to do so during a period of crisis. The economic crisis may not have worsened recently, but it is far more "public" than during the presidential campaign. It is clear—Communist leaders have been saying as much for weeks—that the CP will not go into the

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government "to manage the crisis," to impose sacrifices on the workers, to advocate austerity, etc., since this crisis is the crisis of the capitalist system.

What seems to me contradictory in these Communist statements is the simultaneous summons to apply the Common Program. If the Communists are insisting that they will not enter the government to manage the crisis, it means they want to come to power only for the profound structural transformations that will mark the end of capitalism in France. Yet at the same time they are calling for the application of "the entire Common Program" of the Left, a program that never proposed total structural reforms. Since July 1972, since the signing of the Common Program, the Communists have emphasized that it involved only "democratic reforms." If one reviews Communist statements in 1972, 1973, and 1974—up until the end of summer—their purpose was to *reassure:* "To vote for the Common Program of the Left does not mean you will be led to socialism without knowing and wishing it." As late as July 10, André Vieuguet addressed the 97 federal secretaries of the Communist party and insistently reminded them that the Common Program involves only "democratic reforms, efficacious but limited." Nothing more.

So there does seem to be a contradiction between the two current Communist affirmations: they refuse to manage the crisis, and they call for the application of the Common Program as a way of emerging from it.

Alliance and Rivalry

LAVAU: The contradictions Ozouf has just stressed lead me to think that one must look a bit more systematically into the reasons for the brusque attack the CP has been waging daily against the SP since early October 1974.

A good method, I believe, would be to begin reading naively what the CP is saying. Let me take note of two things: on the one hand, the very clear message, which can be isolated and is expressed in a series of reproaches addressed to the SP; on the other hand, the context in which the CP places its attack.

The context is perhaps more interesting than the message. First, the French CP takes care to say that its criticisms aim "to raise the quality of the Union of the Left." Second, it is necessary to raise the quality of the Union and to clarify relations between the two parties, because, according to the CP, a new situation obtains on the French political scene. Here it is aiming explicitly at one of Giscard d'Estaing's strategies, which is to undo the bipolarization of political life. By cutting into the strength first of the Gaullist pole and then that of the Union of the Left, this strategy is to recreate a majority of the Center: to weaken the UDR [Gaullist party] and, at the same time, to detach the Socialists from the Communists. The French Communist party says clearly that it suspects the SP of not rejecting this strategy categorically. Is there any foundation for this suspicion?

It must be said that the charge is not entirely trumped up.

WINOCK: I think that here one has to do much more with a pretense on the CP's part than with a real fear. The SP as it is now must realize—and realize when it reads its own papers—that it owes its increased electoral and other strength to the choice it made in opting for the Left and for the alliance with the CP. When Mitterand keeps on saying there is no question of his forming a government without the Communists, I don't see why one shouldn't believe him. I find it hard to imagine a Socialist party ready to fall back into the rut of a centrist union. Everything that has been gained over the last years would come to nothing; all the renovating of "the old house" would for a long time be compromised. And where would the CP stand in all this? Given the Socialist party's lack of unity, the CP stands only to benefit, posing as a solidly organized party with its own clearly defined truth.

So—I think this quarrel is partly a pseudo-quarrel; that is to say, it is fed by the CP's resolve to retain the leadership of the Left. But

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it is also a genuine quarrel, arising from the competition—sometimes latent, today in the open—between two enemy brothers. There is a genuine conflict in depth and a pseudo-quarrel on the surface.

OZOUF: It seems to me all the more pseudo in that the CP has never found a Socialist ally as faithful as Mitterand. It's ten years or more since the 1965 presidential election, when Mitterand was already in the fiefdom of socialism, and during all this time—despite all the international difficulties, despite Prague, despite the Solzhenitsyn affair, despite the trials of Russian Jews—the CP found itself dealing with a Socialist leader who was faithful not only to an electoral but to a political alliance, indeed to an eventual governmental alliance. That had not happened for half a century; it never happened with Léon Blum. This is what makes for the impression—especially now, when the attack is aimed directly at Mitterand—that the quarrel is a pseudo-quarrel.

LAVAU: I believe you are right, and personally, as a member of the SP, I think the Communist party is exploiting pretexts. Which is not to say that its arguments are all bad; after all, Mitterand will not live forever, his authority can be threatened, and, last, his record is not one that rules out a shift in direction. . . .

I would like to return to the gist of the CP message, to the formulation of CP reproaches and accusations. One must read between the lines; one must decode and interpret.

Let's begin with the international political scene. Some people offer this hypothesis: Moscow's current analysis of the crisis in the capitalistic system is extremely pessimistic. Soviet leaders fear that the crisis may generate widespread popular revolts that would favor the accession of the Left to power where that is possible (in France and Italy) and that this would then entail a series of Chile-type developments, in that these leftist governments would be more or less pushed to put through a series of measures that would aggravate disorder and inflation and thereby increase tensions between these countries and Washington. Whence the fear—which may betray their memories of Soviet mistakes in the 1928–34 period—of a fascist reaction more or less supported by the United States. Everything one knows of the Soviet leadership's fear of a rebirth of fascism in Europe lends a measure of credibility to this hypothesis. The Soviets calculate that were the hypothesis to materialize, it would spell the end to peaceful coexistence.

OZOUF: There is also the inverse interpretation: the crisis in the capitalistic system is indeed real, it is serious, and the Soviets may think they can profit from it. To the extent that the crisis finds the United States, at least for the moment, in a position of weakness, with a mediocre president, one can make the opposite interpretation of the international scene: would this not be, perhaps, a propitious moment for advancing a few pawns here or there? Why not in Italy? In France?

WINOCK: I would judge the first hypothesis the more plausible because there is a difference between the 1930s and the present. Now there is the atomic bomb. That changes everything. The Soviets absolutely do not want to risk a world war, and that fact determines the whole of its international relations.

LAVAU: There is a less dramatic variant of the hypothesis I offered. Even if the Moscow leaders do not foresee the appearance of fascist governments, they can envisage other dangers. For example, if victory at the polls brought the Union of the Left to power in France, such pressures might be brought to bear on French Socialists by other social democratic parties (Schmidt on the one hand, Wilson on the other, etc.) that these pressures—combined with domestic problems—would lead the SP to break off its alliance with the CP and accept rightist or centrist or Atlantic-community-minded governments comparable to those that dominate Europe. Therefore, in the end, the status quo would be preferable to Moscow. On the one hand, a French CP in opposition, continuing an economic struggle that is relatively moderate; on the other hand, a

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Socialist party whose ties to the CP are sufficiently loose to make the Union of the Left no longer effective in mobilizing social action (and hence the SP could no longer profit from the same), but also an SP that, given its recent development, could revert to a centrist line only at the cost of splitting up into factions and of schisms. In sum, by both discouraging a victory for the Union of the Left and making this alliance virtually moribund, one would be winning all round: the French CP would gain, and Moscow would have upset nothing on the international chessboard. Without having to resort to any hypothetical "sign" from Brezhnev to the French CP, one could then explain the polemical attack against the SP as the outcome of a convergence of political analysis and self-interest. But over and beyond the influence of the international cadre, the French Communist party also has, I think, its own reasons for its present attitude.

Has the CP specific and serious reasons to be mistrustful? I may observe, to begin with, that since the end of 1971 the French Party has constantly alternated between periods of surliness and of euphoria. Before the Common Program was signed, there was a long period of criticism, in which the stern teacher chided the inattentive pupil or the dunce. After the signing of the Common Program and up until the end of September 1974, a long period of bliss (localized squabbles apart). Third phase: the CP opens fire on the SP with both barrels, finding it laden with every known vice. Never is there any serious argument saying why the Socialist party is naughty, then good, then abominable. . . .

What's more, when Socialists ally themselves with Communists, they, too, are exposed to some risks! And in any event, the entire history of the CP shows that when Communists are prepared to swallow insults, they can swallow much bigger ones. This sudden harshness, based on a quibble here, a quibble there, really justifies thinking that one is confronted by a series of pretexts or a tactic.

So I believe that the far more profound reason is anger, true anger (not caprice), provoked by the growth of the SP in voting strength and in militancy. The CP had not foreseen this and cannot accept it.

Since 1947 the Communists have been able to say, "We are the biggest party, and we are robbed by a voting method that deprives us of our representation." After the 1962 Gaullist success, they no longer rolled up the largest vote in terms of ballots cast, but at least they could say, "We are the biggest party on the Left." This image of electoral strength was—and still is—the CP's main window display; it was the argument that most affected the masses and that most effectively attracted the undecided. You will recall the relief of Georges Marchais after the first round of parliamentary elections in 1973. Whereas for several days the opinion polls were putting the SP ahead of the CP, the results showed also that, by a few decimals, the CP's percentage was higher. Marchais's first words on TV were, "We are still the first party of the Left." That relief said a lot. Addressing his comrades later, he said bitterly that, this time, the Union was advantaging the Party's allies more than the Party itself. The presidential campaign in May 1974 can only have aggravated this concern. That campaign showed that there is a Socialist militancy. Today the presence of the SP is no longer negligible even in the forefront of social struggle. These new militants in the SP are highly visible, they make themselves heard. Even if some of them are "middle-class," the phenomenon is utterly new, and the CP is not unaware of its significance, even if it pretends to be. . . .

This rivalry may seem minor but it is important, especially for the future. All analyses indicate that the SP can attract votes that never have gone and never will go to the CP. For the CP, this poses the whole problem of its *image* and, basically, of its leftist *legitimacy* in a new climate of opinion. And at least in the long run there'll be the question of its title as "the party of the working class." Of course, in the socio-economic area, it is nowhere near to being supplanted by the SP as *the* party of the working class, but it must see that the time is not far off when it will no longer be able to claim it is the *only* party of the working class.

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The Alliance and Communist Orthodoxy

DOMENACH: One last question: in the light of all that you have said, how do you foresee the future and what do you hope for?

WINOCK: Personally, I don't think the CP and the SP can cohabit for very long unless both remain in the opposition. It is quite possible that together they could form a government, remain in power for a while, even do something useful. But I do not think that together they can build socialism in France because there are too many deep-rooted divergences about the nature of socialism. As Alain Touraine wrote in his most recent book, "*The Communist party is not only attached to an outmoded image of society but it is also and for all time at a loss in the absence of absolute power.*" This is why we have everything to fear from the ideological and political hegemony of the CP.

I do believe that the alliance between the CP and the SP is extremely productive. First of all, thanks to the alliance—and this must be said—the SP has seized a hair of the beast that bit it; it has been rejuvenated and, most especially, has retrieved electoral support. I hope that, starting from this base support, it will enlarge its constituency and become the great party it stopped being in 1914. If the society we aspire to build cannot emerge fully formed from a great Socialist party, I nonetheless believe that its birth presupposes the existence in France of a great socialist power capable of governing.

I hope that the alliance will produce a weakening of the Communist party sufficiently gradual for the Communists themselves to accept it, but a weakening that also makes possible the existence of a great Socialist party, something that the entire movement toward social progress in France needs. But I do realize how precarious the alliance is between the two parties. After all, I can't see the Communist party's saying to us one fine day, "OK, comrades, I give up being what I am. I'm throwing into the kitty my state socialism and my indefensible friendship for the U.S.S.R. I agree to being just one of the working-class parties. I give up democratic centralism, etc. etc."

And since this suicidal hypothesis is excluded, the historical responsibility of the Socialist party is all the greater, and its task all the more arduous: it must move forward *with* the Communist party, and *in spite of* the Communist party it must take responsibility for the socialist aspirations of our country.

OZOUF: I believe that if the Left does not win the next parliamentary elections, there will be no problem. It is possible for the two parties to cohabit in opposition, with more or less friction; that alliance can last. On the other hand, if the Left wins the next parliamentary elections, it is possible that the CP and the SP would have to manage the crisis—which is to say, produce a sort of "revival" of the Popular Front. It would be necessary to manage the crisis on the basis of a more or less modified leftist Common Program.

To advance further toward socialism, the CP would have to change and, in particular, renounce what for the moment is one of its dogmas—i.e., renounce its claim to being *the* party of the working class, and therefore give up one of the three general conditions stipulated by Georges Marchais in August 1973, in his *Le défi démocratique* as an essential on the road toward socialism. The first condition was the collective ownership of the means of production; the second was that the exercise of political power be in the hands of the working class; the third was "the functioning of a party capable of playing the role of avant-garde for the working class and of gathering around it the working peasantry, the intellectuals, the middle class"—in a word, the Communist party. If the Party does not renounce this last condition, the possibility of there being a common path toward socialism is absolutely excluded.

There remains a possibility of leftist victory not in the parliamentary but in the presidential elections. The moment the head of the Socialist party became president of the Republic—a position that in the present system carries great weight—conditions could change. That is why

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the Socialist party must find for the next presidential elections a "good" candidate.

LAVAU: Ask the Communist party to change? You can always ask, but what good does it do! I believe that the CP recognizes what's what only long after the fact and only when it has to. For it to change, it's got to be put in a situation where, *volens nolens,* it changes.

As for what behooves us Socialists, the essential thing is that the Socialist party itself continue to evolve, grow stronger, and root itself especially in the popular, the working, world. This seems to me no less necessary were it to remain in the opposition or, after the elections, to take power.

And at the end of this road, in its turn, perhaps the Communist party will change. . . .

Translated by ADRIENNE FOULKE □

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Joseph R. Starobin

The Identity Crisis of West European Communists

If a mechanical materialism, a vulgar Marxism, were really operating one might say that France, after 20 years of visible modernization, would by now have produced a very different Communist party. It is overwhelming to arrive for the first time at Roissy, the new airport now named Charles de Gaulle, a Gallic fantasy in conception and construction by contrast with which Orly is simply another Idlewild. It is striking, too, to take the new highways to the area alongside the Bois de Boulogne where highrise office buildings overshadow, not without sacrilege, the Arc de Triomphe.

Most everything about Paris bespeaks this change—in levels of production, in small amenities, in the mores so picturesque in the past but so backward. The ticket-takers in the metro, good CGT [union] members who did nothing all day but clip your *billets,* have at last been replaced by electronic gadgets. Reservations for a fast train to Brussels are now made by computer in a few minutes during the lunch hour, and that meal no longer is preceded by the ceremony whereby the grandmother prepared the repast, and the youngsters scooted downstairs for each egg, each head of lettuce, and each bottle of *vin ordinaire.*

The Red Belt around Paris has not been able to withstand the plethora of construction and suburbanization that has given France new problems, new gripes. The daughter of a one-time Communist senator and mayor of Ivry complains that she and her neighbors were promised "green space" in the new housing project but the greenery did not materialize; she also reports robbery in broad daylight of precious heirlooms. Incidentally, she and her husband (he works in the government manpower office) go off every weekend to their cabin in the Jura. People whom one wants to see are noticeably away on weekends; on skiing trips, or visits to Morocco, Greece, Israel. One old friend whose late husband was a Communist Central Committee member tells me, half-defiant, half-abashed, that she considers herself "a Communist sympathizer" now, yet our talk is not of politics. It is about the little place in Brittany she is remodeling, and she shows me the pictures as proudly as the snapshots of her grandson.

It is not only the middle classes for whom France functions better. Despite the strikingly French inequalities of salary and living standards, the outlook and way of life for the workers has changed. The pensioners, the shopkeepers, as well as most of the upper classes, voted for Giscard d'Estaing in May 1974. But the very poor did not support Mitterand; Mitterand received the vote of the beneficiaries of the consumer society, the industrial workers, civil servants, professionals and modern farmers. The CP paper *L'Humanité* (which seems so alien in its strident beating of old drums) carries advertisements for battery-driven grass clippers, electric lawnmowers, and do-it-yourself kits. . . .

But none of this change that has given

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France a new level of industrial power has basically altered the Communist party. More exactly, despite an influx of new, young members, many of them *gauchistes* in 1968, and despite the new strategic objectives that led to the *Union de la Gauche* with the renovated Socialists and Radicals, the Communists appear to suffer from a split personality; they suffer from a profound cultural and political lag. One of my friends in the leadership of the Socialist party, an economist-financier (himself a one-time Resistance leader and one-time Communist) spoke of the CP's dilemma as an "identity crisis." In view of the many years of preparing the *Union de Gauche* and the CP's acceptance of a pluralism of parties in the transition to socialism, one might have expected from it a certain serenity in the face of the transformation of the discredited SFIO into a modern Socialist party.

From May 19 until September 1974, the CP was preparing its extraordinary congress, widely expected to ratify the policy of General Secretary Georges Marchais and promising a renewal of cadres and methods. As for the Socialists, they had the winds in their sails. Quite suddenly, the CP decided to find fault with its ally. Friends of Mitterand were accused of playing with the idea of a "third force" in collaboration with Giscard. At one stroke, the Communists called into question the modesty of their election behavior and their credibility as a loyal partner. On the heels of a brilliant campaign—which was a victory for the Left despite the loss to Giscard by 300,000 votes—the Communists now have turned on the Socialists. And so the question arises if that would not be precisely their tactic on the morrow of a majority triumph.

The ghost of Prague, 1948, which so much energy had been spent exorcising, now rose again. Fortunately the Socialists have retained their *sang froid;* they refused a tit for tat, a political Donnybrook. Mitterand has gained stature, even among Communist voters as the polls show: the SP continues to gain support, even though it is far from becoming a decisive force in the working class. An impressive array of public figures, as well as civil servants and upper-echelon cadres, are striving to make of the party not just an electoral force but also an "activist" movement on a day-to-day basis. A much closer bond has been forged with the CFDT, the second trade union center, with its strong Catholic base. With the vote of nearly one-fourth of the electorate, larger for the first time than the CP's, the Socialists now have the strength to gain relative independence from the Communists.

If the procedures for the upcoming municipal and legislative election are changed to pure proportional representation (instead of the present system whereby all parties look for alliances in the second round), the leverage this system has given the CP will necessarily weaken. I am not going along here with cynics who claim that Mitterand needed to involve himself with the CP only to rebuild a Socialist party electorally, or that he and his successors will abandon the game once Communist bargaining power declines. There are reasons—not the least of which is the Communist strength in the labor movement and the power and agility of the Right—that a long-term alliance with the CP be maintained. But the *blocage* that a one-vote-out-of-four situation gave the French CP—not strong enough to gain anything by itself but strong enough to block a genuine Left—is over. Perhaps this is one key to the CP identity crisis.

But the problem of France—and here both the Socialists and the Communists have a long intellectual path to travel—is that a modern industrial society cannot be governed by a 51 percent majority. In countries where important elements of the Right do not give up the threat of civil war when the ballots go against them, a much deeper and wider consensus will be required for the Left to govern and accomplish the structural change it promises. There was a glimmering of this in the futile Communist appeal last autumn for an "union du peuple Français"—an outstretched hand to the Gaullists discomfited by Giscard—but only a glimmer. The "identity crisis" among the Communists reveals how uncertain if not unreliable they still are about transitions to socialism that must be wholly different in spirit and fact from the Leninist hallucinations. None of which is meant to suggest that further evolution is not

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possible. But it will take a great deal of doing, and the context will have to be all-European.

II

I would have preferred to have driven down through northern Spain and through the length of Portugal to Lisbon. There were unspoken reasons that perhaps only those of my own generation will understand. I had hoped to cross the Pyrenees somewhat as the men of the Abraham Lincoln battalion had to do or the refugees from the Vernet camp of Vichy France. I kept thinking of one old friend, who fought in Spain and then volunteered in the Second World War, became a navigator and was shot down over Belgium; the story goes that he made his way on foot through France and into Spain again, and then through Portugal with Spanish and Yiddish as his *salvo conducto*. I also wanted to linger in the Basque country, the Asturias, stronghold of the defiant miners. But it didn't work out that way. The plane trip, one and three-quarter hours, is a distorting experience; it eliminates too much history. Lisbon is a surprise, with its magnificent heights over an enormous port, a city on the scale of San Francisco, or better yet, Rio de Janeiro. The city in its insides is surprisingly traditional—the old seamen's area, the magnificent castle rising up from irregular and winding lanes, the heavy-hipped buildings with their iron filigree surrounding the Rossio, the main square, in contrast to the modernity of the huge Lisnave shipyards, their brontosaurian cranes against the immense crucifix on the summit of the opposite shore. Lisbon is the heart of a country whose modernity was clearly arrested. One still feels here the impulse of the oceans that beckoned Magellan and seemed destined to make a power of Portugal before the rise of the Dutch, the panoply of the Spaniards, the victorious guile of the Britons. One feels the Moorish influence even far to the north, in the castles overlooking the lush contours of a green, undeveloped landscape, the ever-present red tiles, the brick and crumbling mortar of the villages.

Yet, in this past year of liberation from the tenacious if decrepit Salazar dictatorship, there is a sense of a certain superficiality. So much of the year's experience seems to have been expressed in *graffiti* that literally deface every wall of every main building. Each political movement, perhaps 18 in all, seems to have engaged in an alphabetic competition. Each party and movement seems to have striven for a novel combination of initials—there are the familiar PCP, the PSP and then the PPD, but also bizarre formations with ML after their letters, and something called the LUAR, whose activists specialized, it seems, in marking up every railroad overpass and the walls of remote villages. One wonders how many members of the League of the Union for Revolutionary Action there really are. This theater of the walls is enhanced by posters that suggest International Women's Day was a Chinese invention from Tang dynasty times, that Romania has the last word in ballet, that Hungary is the source of the very best tractor—all of which competes with *Last Tango in Paris*. This political effervescence also contrasts with the normality of everyday functions—banks are open, as are the fashionable hotels, the street excavations, and the shops—although some of these bear announcements that the employees are occupying them because the boss would not settle with the union.

I could not help feeling that much in Lisbon is on the surface. On a remote level, almost occult, one knows there is a presiding political power but it is almost invisible and the masses are watching, as though politics were a spectator sport. Somewhere in palaces and barracks there is a group of colonels, those army officers who overthrew the Caetano regime, then ousted the bemonocled Spinola—an amorphous band, said to be very radical, proposing their own "institutionalization," divulging in general terms an economic program that smacks of what the Councils of Resistance put forward in Italy, France, Belgium, and Norway in 1945. But these army men are remote. They are part of that double migration so typical of Portugal over the past decade: one wing consisted of the 2 million Portuguese who streamed into the factories of Western Europe

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and Canada, acquiring skills and political experience and sustaining the economy by remittances from abroad; the other wing, drawn from the same humble strata, learned their politics in faraway Mozambique, Angola, and in Guinea-Bissau, fighting the inevitably losing battles. It was far away from the homeland that these younger army cadres learned their left-wing ideas from their opponents, acquiring an "instant Marxism" somewhat in the style of many Latin-American army men from Cuba to Peru.

This circumstance is critical to an understanding of the Portuguese dilemma today. Despite isolated instances of selfless heroism there was no general resistance to the Salazar dictatorship. Everything that happened came from outside, had been brought from the external migration. The great mass of Portuguese thus have until now been audience, not actors.

Within this framework it is not surprising that all political structures are formed by the arrival of exiles from abroad. What the army men have sought in these 15 months is an "instant politics." They wanted to give organizational muscle, political sinews, and to cartilage their experiment with unexpected power. Within this concept, I think, lies the peculiar role of the Portuguese Communist movement.

The strength of the Communists, as the balloting of April 25 showed, does not come from a prolonged experience in leading working people in action. It is unlike the French or Italian or Dutch strength stemming from the anti-Nazi war. The Communists had a tightly knit, clandestine movement, a small cadre that, to be sure, had its roster of men and women who defied the police and its tortures. Those who escaped Portugal took refuge in Eastern Europe. Stronger than their rivals the Socialists, who had a certain quasi-legality and hence political experience "near the surface," the Communists nevertheless were able to entrench themselves in the trade unions, the media, and the embryonic governmental structure. Many army men expected the Communists to supply the political base that was lacking. Perhaps they expected too much, or got more than was expected.

Portugal thus faces post-Liberation problems not too dissimilar from what antifascist Europe faced in 1945, for after all the changeover in Portugal is part of the delayed antifascist revolution in Western Europe. Pierre Mendès-France, who was invited to make recommendations for economic reform, has emphasized the similarity with the problems of France in 1945; he has stressed above all agrarian reform, measures of nationalization, programs of austerity to overcome the gap between failing productivity on the land, the need for imports of food, the weakening of foreign exchange. Yet the political structure in which all these essentially democratic and *dirigiste* measures must operate (everybody talks of socialism much too promiscuously, for the problem is essentially *democratic mobilization* and a modicum of planning) does not as yet correspond with the urgency of reconstruction. Much of the politics is still melodrama. It is far from the *involvement* that is required.

I left Lisbon the evening before the March 11 countercoup, and perhaps that was just as well since what happened was more readily comprehended from Barcelona and Rome. It was noticeable that hardly any people took part; they stood by and watched, as army helicopters landed on barracks where plots were alleged of which no one knew the facts, and Spinola made his exit easily, much as the villain in a play. Until political life ceases to be an import or an implant and until *experience* does its work, this quality will remain and favor the totalitarian element whether among the political forces or the army men themselves.

It was Mendès-France who also observed, on French TV, that the "melodramatic aspects" in Portuguese life should not be overstated. He has a deeper appreciation of the factors involved than does so much of what we have heard from Henry Kissinger and our own TV reportage. Will the army officers, now having "institutionalized" their power for three to five years, remain a cohesive group? Will they succeed in their policy of remaining within NATO, negotiating with the United States over the Azores while aligning with Algeria and the African world generally? Will they become disenchanted with the political

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structure whose electoral contours are now revealed but have a long way to go before becoming genuine structures? Will pressures of events abroad have their impact: the coming upheaval in Spain, the tutelage of the European Social Democrats over Manuel Soares and the Socialist party, the influence of the Spanish and Italian Communists who are in conflict with Soviet policy? All these vital questions remain.

One further word on the Portuguese Communists. Their real influence, so exaggerated over the past year, has now been shown by the low vote of some 12 percent. But their dilemma goes deeper. Much has been made of their leader Cunhal's attachment to Soviet policy, in the Czechoslovak events, for example. But little attention has been paid to the sense in which the Portuguese Communists reflect a primitive contact with their own reality. Cunhal was among the few exiles in Prague to uphold Soviet policy—by contrast, the Spanish leader Dolores Ibarruri told the Kremlin leaders face to face of their great disservice to the West European Communists by crushing the Czechoslovak experiment. One must ask what motivated Cunhal? Earlier this year, in talking with Jean Daniel, the perceptive editor of *Le Nouvel Observateur,* Cunhal explained that his support for Moscow in 1968 stemmed from the conviction that the integrity of the Soviet-led bloc was at stake, that Soviet security was endangered. This is the classic view among Communists, the notion that the bloc is the pivot of policy. One might call it not merely a vestige of the Cold War but the Comintern view; Cunhal is clearly the last of the men of the Comintern in whose ranks he was evidently formed.

By contrast the Spanish Communists, like the Italians and many other of the lesser European parties, take Soviet power for granted but deny that in the Czechoslovak case it was endangered. To them the issue is how to elaborate an autonomous, West European Communist perspective taking advantage of the end of the Cold War. Theirs is a post-Comintern view following from the premise that the problem of communism is how to depart from the Soviet model, which is for them unworkable. Cunhal could have voiced the classical view, not necessarily because he proposes to or can realize the Soviet model for his country, but because the view itself is the consequence of so minimal an experience with Portugal's own reality. It is the outlook of a man with a dozen years of solitary confinement behind him and almost a dozen years in that most confining and restrictive of circumstances—exile in the East.

I would suggest it is just possible that this orthodoxy cannot last even though its roots are tenacious, as the example of the French Communists testifies. For the reality of Portugal's position in the West—as well as the experience yet to be undergone in modernizing and democratizing the country, together with the impact of what will be Communist strength in Italy and Spain—may make this orthodoxy transitional. Watching Cunhal in Lisbon, I was reminded of that strange, tragic apparatchik Matyas Rakosi of Hungary, whom I first came to know in his prime, in 1948, when he seemed to be attuned to the national characteristics of his homeland; I remember him strolling at the head of a parade in honor of the Lajos Kossuth anniversary. Thousands cheered. Less than ten years later, he was utterly discredited, even among the Russians with whom he spent his solitary last years. He too had spent some 17 years in a dungeon alongside the Danube, a terrible cell that appalls the visitor for its mercilessness. His basic flaw was exactly his apparent forte within the Communist world—he had been shaped by his Comintern service. Who knows what happens to a man after such a trauma? Who knows what the hallucinations of solitary confinement, endurable only by the hallucinations of service to a great ideal, do to a man's sense of reality?

Portugal is in a different part of Europe; who knows what may yet become of Cunhal? For all this suggests the grip of the Soviet hallucination on the Portuguese Communists, détente does not give Moscow any durable remote control on the shores of the Atlantic. To needle the West is one thing; to attempt via Portugal to change the fundamental relationship of forces is quite another matter.

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III

If I turn to the Spanish Communists as a major element in the new constellation of Western Europe—and they may soon rival in importance their friends, the Italian Communists—it is, first, because Moscow has been at loggerheads with the Spanish CP for many years, probably more so or more openly than with any other nonruling party. The Russians openly instigated a splinter movement, headed by the one-time hero Enrique Lister, in the hopes of rallying Spanish Communists against Santiago Carrillo and La Pasionaria. The latter, as noted earlier, was a severe critic of the Kremlin during the 1968 tragedy in Czechoslovakia. The Spanish Communists were probably the only Western party to have been invited to Peking. While finding a very great deal of importance in China, they have pursued a path for Spain that is independent of both Moscow and Peking.

The CP perspective for post-Franco Spain stems from the realization that the country has changed basically in the third of a century since the Civil War. History has foiled Franco. Whereas he wanted not only to extirpate every variety of Marxism and set the workers' movement back half a century, he wanted also a return to a precapitalist Spain, a return to Ferdinand and Isabella. But in the past 20 years the change in Spain to modernization, to industrialization, to urban development and a profound differentiation of social forces has been (relative to Spain's past) as striking as anything in Western Europe. All the social forces on whom Franco relied—the church, the army, the post-Republic civil service—are in upheaval. The working-class movement has found unique and irresistible forms, like the "comisiones obreras," to advance its interests. Of course, neither the Communists nor the Socialists have been eliminated, although what their precise weight will be, in a country where the Civil War was such a trauma and 30 years of a dictatorship has intervened, remains to be seen.

In Barcelona I talked with an old friend now in the publishing world (it is amazing to find such a large variety of left-oriented books in the shops, including a wide sampling of literature from abroad) who summed up the present mood as "waiting for the other shoe to drop." Franco, who seemed to be on the verge of disappearance a year ago, is clearly resisting both time and change. One feels expectancy in Spain and a sense of preparedness by all the political forces. That the Spanish Right will attempt to inhibit the momentum of change is obvious. But what is significant about the Communists is that they have opted for a democratic junta. This was announced in the week of Franco's first hospitalization, in the summer of 1974, and therefore gained a special resonance. The junta's program, which prominent figures from Communists to monarchists have endorsed, projects a national union rather than anything that smacks of civil war or upheaval. It emphasizes democratic restoration rather than anything that suggests socialism. Its spirit envisages a Spain that takes a fuller part in the life of Western Europe, including membership in the European Community. It leaves the larger options to a prolonged period of transition in which the various forces within Spain, once the husk of dictatorship is thrown off, have a chance to express themselves.

None of this in itself necessarily tells us all we would like to know about the Spanish Communists. A movement so long inured to quasi-legality, exile, and dispersion, even if "never far from the surface" as the Spanish Communists proudly repeat, is bound to have been deeply imbued by most of the negative aspects of "democratic centralism." Many of the CP cadres endured long imprisonment and torture. One meets the older ones in the Solidarity Committee that functions quite openly in Paris and is impressed with their toughness, even fanaticism—all understandable. In France, incidentally, President Giscard is evidently sensitive to all his options; he goes hunting on weekends with Franco's designated successor, Prince Juan de Borbón, while the French police have been told not to hamper the Spanish Communists and the movements of their leader, Santiago Carrillo.

Yet it is persuasive to read Carrillo's book

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Demain l'Espagne in which he responds very openly with autobiographical reflections, rather rare in Communist leaders, to interrogations of Régis Debray (now an adviser to Mitterand) and the hard-headed political scientist Max Gallo. The fact that Carrillo allowed his book to appear last autumn, during a Moscow visit to patch up relations with the Russians, says a great deal.

In a long, friendly discussion I was equally impressed with Manuel Azcarate, perhaps the chief ideological leader of the Spanish CP, whose report of September 1973 to his party's central committee aroused a denunciation in *Partinyaya Zhizn* for February 1974. Azcarate has since made a detailed rebuttal to the Soviet critique, and the Spanish Communists have published, in brochure form, their own original view of the way forward for the West European Left, alongside of the Soviet critique, together with Azcarate's rebuttal. "We have distributed this to all our members," he said, giving me a copy. "We wonder whether our Soviet comrades will do the same for their audience," he added.

The attitude of a Communist movement toward its own dissidents is surely one measure whereby one judges the degree of change from the Byzantinism of the Leninist dispensation. I found it interesting that the Spanish leaders with whom I talked were not terribly wrought up against General Lister (whom the Russians had placed at the head of their factional adventure); they spoke of him more in sorrow than in anger. Half a dozen years ago, a grouping on the "Left," headed by Fernando Claudin, had separated from the Spanish CP; I had met Claudin several times in Paris—a gentle and bewildered soul, viewing things much in the manner of the *Manifesto* group in Rome. Claudin is not satisfied with the way Carrillo treats him in *Demain l'Espagne,* but Carrillo and his friends seem now to be making every effort to reinclude the Claudin group in the CP and in post-Franco politics. Such tolerance is not too customary among "Bolsheviks."

How it will all go in Spain and how the CP will behave will be determined by events we can only await to see—when the other shoe drops.

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

IV

But in the largest sense Spains's future is linked with that of Italy. It is here that the Communists have been most autonomous for a generation, very ambitious in their projections of an independent West European development, and most innovative in facing the problems of a departure from their own heritage, notably with their concept of the "compremesso storico"—the historic compromise.

Ten years ago Giorgio Amendola, the leader of Italy's CP, shocked a great many in his own circles by suggesting that the experience of both social democracy and the Leninism in Europe had been shown as inadequate; he wanted something new, some synthesis of both, some departure from both. Although he subsequently recoiled a bit from the boldness of this insight, the Italian Communists in fact have not behaved like a party committed to the Leninist view of politics and power. Palmiro Togliatti's last testament, written in Yalta in 1965, was published by his successor, Luigi Longo, despite the dismay of the Russians. At all the international conferences, the Italian CP has taken pains not to join in Moscow's attempt to excommunicate the Chinese—both unwilling to grant Moscow the hegemony that had done so much damage for generations, or to accept any succession to such hegemony by China. By not breaking with Moscow, the Italian Communists remain a powerful thorn for the Russians. The Italian CP has gone to great pains to distinguish its outlook from that

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of Moscow—on the 1968 events in Prague, on cultural matters, on the conception of a new Europe that would be neither anti-American nor anti-Soviet.

The CP leadership in the main Italian trade union center, the CGIL, withdrew from the World Federation of Trade Unions to pursue a course of cooperation with European labor movements of every orientation. The Communists have long cultivated ties with the German and Scandinavian Social Democracy and sought them with the British Labourites, all the while urging some independence, some imagination, some real politics on the Communist parties of those countries. They are now developing the gambit of holding separate conferences, as in Brussels early in 1974, while participating in the all-European Communist conferences—on strictly defined terms—with the Russians and their cohorts. The Italians announce publicly, as did Longo at the XIVth Congress in Rome at the end of March, their financial support for the Spanish. Nor do they conceal their chagrin at the vacillations, the *bêtises* of the French Communists whom the Italian CP leaders have tried hard to steer away from the sterilities of an ill-concealed Stalinism.

Domestically, of course, the record has been probed for two decades or more. The Italian Communists are credible as a governing force in wide areas of north-central Italy, as partners with the Socialists in both municipalities and regions. Their control or Bologna since the war is more than a showpiece operation, as their opponents concede. Their vote in localities approaches a majority they have over two decades slowly but steadily wrested from the Christian Democrats. What I find important is their attitude toward their own history, which is far more open, critical, and historical than that of any other Communist movement. The editing of the Angelo Tasca papers, for example, under the party's aegis is as though the American Communists were prepared to establish, by detached criticism, what Jay Lovestone and Bertram Wolfe or, for that matter, James Cannon and Max Shachtman signified in the late '20s.

In launching the "compromesso storico," Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian CP's young general secretary, has attempted to take the experience of Chile out of the realm of the primitive explanation that sees the CIA as the heart of the matter. In Berlinguer's view, even if the Italian Communists were to continue to increase their vote as steadily as they have, and even if they were to reconstitute their tacit alliance with the Socialists into a formal pact, Italy could not be governed without a wide support among Christian Democratic voters and leaders. More exactly, the threat of a fascist revival, of ultimate civil war (a threat that has haunted the Communists since Togliatti's return in 1943) would remain. What the Italian Communists appear to want is a consensus that would preclude or greatly minimize the threat of civil war.

But they also have in mind the governance of Italy under the difficult circumstance of a still very backward South, of the huge internal migration and unequal development, of a critical weakness in the face of the world economic recession, of a swollen bureaucracy that needs to be lanced—in sum, Italy's modernization. This too the Communists feel could not be done by them alone or with a 51 percent control. It requires national union. In Italy that means a willingness of the Christian Democrats to govern with them. And this in turn requires a credibility in the eyes of a very wide spectrum of political forces (in so sophisticated a civilization).

Another equally important question is whether the historic compromise would in fact be accepted by that considerable rank and file of the Italian CP that remains largely unreconstructed, quite totalitarian in its habits of thought, essentially part of what Gunnar Myrdal meant when he once spoke of the Italian Communists as a vast Tammany Hall. However benign the image, it has its sinister implications.

It is not easy to gauge, upon visiting Italy this time, how the Communists are faring with their new strategic orientation. Important Catholic Democrats are known to favor a new departure. The CD General Secretary Amintore

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Fanfani is hard pressed to keep his divided minions in line; the entire Catholic youth leadership, for example, was recently ousted. Ugo La Malfa, the Republican leader, is known to be impressed by the sincerity, the modernity, the imagination of Berlinguer. At the Communist congress—to which, incidentally, all the Western embassies and many non-Communists from abroad were invited, and many attended—all the Italian political parties sent delegations. The Republic's president welcomed the event, and the withdrawal of the Christian Democratic delegation on the second day (when the Portuguese Christian Democrats were banned from participating in the April 25 elections) caused a sour reaction. After all, the Italian CP had made it plain that it did not approve of the behavior of the Portuguese CP. And the one delegate who more or less abstained from the Congress and did a lot of sight-seeing was from among the Portuguese Communists...

It is granted by rigorous but not unsympathetic observers (for example, Claire Sterling in the *Atlantic Monthly*) that the Communists are an able, serious, and constructive stratum of Italy's political elite and cannot indefinitely be kept from participation on the national level. But she, like others, wonders how the Communists would fare with their own rank and file and with the militancy that stems from the Catholic youth and the working people newly entered into the industrial society. She also wonders how these leaders would behave if the West European autonomy they envisage found itself threatened by a Soviet overreach, by what is implied in Moscow's ventures in the Arab world, and in the western Mediterranean via Portugal. Whose sea would the Mediterranean become if tomorrow certain things happened in Yugoslavia after Tito's passing that brought Soviet fishing bases to the Yugoslav ports—for example, to Rijeka, which was once Italy's Fiume?

The Communist leaders, in private discussion, either face such questions frankly, or consider them alarmist. Preparations for the Party's congress were enlivened by an extraordinary free-wheeling among Communist leaders. One of them wrote a rather sensational series, entitled "Secrets of the Italian CP," for the mass circulation *Il Mondo;* others replied in equally popular media, denouncing the *Mondo* series. Special editions of Berlinguer's collected speeches and writings, especially the important Central Committee report of December 1974, circulated widely. I bought my set on the Via Veneto. Everybody was talking of the "compromesso storico." A satirical booklet in which Berlinguer is a Machiavellian hero has been a best-seller.

When pressed in private, it is clear that the Communist leaders are aware of all the questions regarding both their domestic and foreign policy that would arise if they joined in national power. What emerges, however, is the ambitious reach of their perspective. They have in mind an ultimate new configuration embracing the entire Mediterranean world, including Yugoslavia, working in concert with West Germany and Scandinvaia to create in effect an autonomous European bloc. They have in mind dealing with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to make the most of the East's desperate requirements for high technology instead of letting the fruits go to the United States. They have in mind a new role for Western Europe in relation to the Arab world and Africa.

The irony of history is that the Italian Communists want to recreate the Europe that was dispersed, defeated, and helpless between the two world wars, its leadership shattered by the Nazi adventure and the emergence of both Soviet and American power. In another sense, what they are trying to recreate is the interna-

In Our Fall Issue:

Peter Jenkins

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA

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tional labor-left solidarity that went smash with World War I and the rise of the Leninist aberration. Thus the party that contributed (uneasily at times) to the Third International is thinking that perhaps the Second-and-a-half International might have been the wiser outcome of the crisis following the First World War.

What this implies, of course, although it is not spelled out, is an effective independence from Moscow, all the while remaining in that orbit of the international movement in which, the Italians believe, they can influence, moderate, and perhaps ultimately affect the course of Soviet policy as well.

Years ago, Ignazio Silone (himself not a novice in the matter) envisaged that the "final conflict" would come between the Communists and the ex-Communists. The Italian CP does not like this apocalyptic view. No final conflicts are envisaged. But without question a struggle of tendencies will take place among the Communists themselves, between opposing conceptions stemming from the same ideological matrix but now outmoded by differing interests. The experience of both Yugoslavia and China suggests how explosive this could be.

Too late—this vision? A mirage at best. Perhaps. Yet this is the stuff that goes into the West European Communist drama. □

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Dan Hofstadter

Memories of the Resistance

The French Return to the Years of War

The city of Paris recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of its liberation from German occupation. It was the occasion for many commemorations of various kinds, some of them—like the Frenchwoman Béate Klarsfeld's kidnapping of an alleged Nazi war criminal—of a purely impromptu nature. But a people may commemorate both its living and its dead past, and the wave of fascination with the occupation that has swept over France in the past few years has shown that the melancholy years of 1940–44 are very much a part of France's living and therefore controversial history. Although the frenzied denunciations and counterdenunciations that followed the Liberation subsided with time, doubts and resentments about the Occupation still nag the French people.

Readers of France's biggest daily, *France-Soir*—itself a product of the Resistance—recently discovered a new column on an inside page. Called "My Liberation," it dealt with liberation in the most literal sense. The paper had asked its readers to send in stories of their personal experience of release from bondage in 1944, and they replied with heartrending accounts. On August 7 and 10, for example, an elderly Parisian widow told how she and her four-year-old son had been liberated from a prison hospital by the French Forces of the Interior. In another issue a man related how the F.F.I. had rescued him 12 hours before his impending execution.

The war story is of course a popular literary genre, but when French people reminisce about the war it is rarely to trot out anecdotes of regimental camaraderie. Even the Resistance, the sole heroic chapter of the Occupation, was in reality such a long and terrible martyrdom that those who experienced it seem never to mention it without a hint of sorrow. Yet the outpouring of dreadful memories in *France-Soir* was no isolated event. In recent years the reexamination (and, one is tempted to say, the reliving) of the Resistance and the Collaboration has become a pervasive phenomenon, one that bears witness to an increased capacity for self-criticism by the chosen people of the god of wit. The trauma of the Occupation has come to be regarded as the central event in modern French history (somewhat like the Civil War in the United States).

There are many reasons why the Resistance is still so controversial in France. Despite an enormous amount of literature on the subject, it remains inherently obscure. Very few of the early resisters lived to tell how the various movements came into being. Moreover, the military doctrine of cellular organization and *cloisonnement*—advanced both by Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's envoy to metropolitan France, and by such major movements as the National Front and Combat—resulted in a multitude of partial, fractured, and frequently conflicting views. Resistance groups "working" the same territory were often ignorant of each other's very existence, and after the war, whether through vainglory or for political reasons, they often begrudged each other the laurels that each felt to be exclusively its own.

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When the Resistance splintered after the Liberation into numerous ideologically opposed factions, so much political bias crept into personal testimonials of resistance that it became impossible fully to credit most of them. Moreover, the French have a weakness for the trenchant phrase, however ill-founded or ill-advised, and many an ex-resister, and more than one impostor, has come to fancy himself a sovereign authority on the Resistance. Yet those with the firmest opinions are often animated, as one French intellectual has put it, by "a secret shame for having remained unaware of [the Resistance], deliberately ignored it, or even fought it." For documentation there remain, of course, the enemy's archives, particularly those discovered in the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin after the war. Yet the very survival of the Resistance is proof of how imperfect was Gestapo and Abwehr intelligence.

The Resistance was, of course, an adventure, and it attracted not only adventurous men but also adventurers. Even today one sometimes hears the allegation that the partisans were for the most part no more than gangsters or opportunists. If this canard has been all but silenced by the gradual enfeeblement of the French Right, and by the Left's fondness for seeing the Resistance as a sort of paradigmatic "national liberation front," it has been replaced by a new thesis that the Resistance was basically unimportant. Recently, scholars such as Robert Paxton, Stanley Hoffman, and Richard Griffiths have focused on Marshal Pétain's extraordinary popularity; and Frenchmen seem less reluctant nowadays to remember that only four months before de Gaulle's Te Deum in Notre-Dame Pétain himself was acclaimed by rapt crowds in the streets of Paris. (De Gaulle is reported to have laughingly told his provisional cabinet that during his tour of battle-torn Normandy a tearful woman had tossed him a posy with the cry, "Long live the Marshal!" "Force of habit, I expect," quipped the General.) Many younger French people, ignoring the complexity of the Pétain phenomenon, have concluded that the resisters, however heroic, were an insignificant lot when compared with the overwhelming majority of complaisant or pusillanimous Frenchmen. In turn, members of the older generation, which tends to be loyal to "the legend of the Resistance," suggest that what really distresses their children is the sheer difficulty of following in the wake of giants.

The renewed candor about the Occupation—of which the best example remains Marcel Ophuls's film *The Sorrow and the Pity* (1972)—has been accompanied by an upsurge of interest among those too young to have experienced it as adults. Just as postwar France became overnight a nation of former partisans, so the older generation now finds itself accused by its children of having been merely a pack of moral hibernators. *The Sorrow and the Pity* has been followed by three more movies dealing rather disabusedly with the occupation: *Les Violons du Bal,* directed by Michel Drach, *Les Guichets du Louvre,* based on a novel by Michel Boussinot and directed by Michel Mitrani, and Louis Malle's *Lacombe Lucien.*

Michel Mitrani's *Les Guichets du Louvre (Black Thursday)* is probably the first French movie to deal explicitly with the ill-famed "Black Thursday" of July 16, 1942, in which 13,000 Jews were rounded up by the Paris police and collaborationist stormtroopers and marched off to the Vélodrome d'Hiver, where they were detained in inhuman conditions before being deported to the Nazi death camps. *Lacombe Lucien* tells the story of a dull young rustic who leaves his village in southwest France to join the Gestapo in a larger town. Though at first pleased with the freedom his new role gives him to gratify his baser instincts, his affection for a Jewish girl eventually leads him to try to rescue her family from impending deportation. Actually, one suspects that this film's appeal comes largely from the current vogue for nostalgia. The Django Reinhard guitar numbers, the bottles of Suze, the outspread issues of Robert Brasillach's collaborationist newspaper, *Je Suis Partout,* these and other details all convey an absorbing period feeling—for those who wish to be absorbed by that miserable period. But what makes the

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movie something of a landmark is that it presents the Collaboration in the role of protagonist. The Resistance always remains off-camera, no more than a moving target for young Lucien's automatic weapons. The trouble is, all Malle's *collabos* seem to be villains and moral dwarves. Lucien's own moral imbecility is positively exotic: he is the kind of insolent brute who endangers himself as much as his enemies. A conscientious collaborator might have held more dramatic interest: a self-righteous fascist, for example, or an anti-Semite "on principle"—one of the Robert Brasillachs, Jean Luchaires, or Pierre Pucheus of the Collaboration. For the testimonials of the major collaborators, given during the great postwar purge trials, reveal them to have been not scoundrels but traitors of probity. Malle has trivialized a movement whose leaders, even when facing the firing squad, remained stoically convinced of their own righteousness. That many of them were not truly men of conscience, but merely morally vain men, does not detract from their seriousness.

A very different view of the Collaboration has been offered by a young woman called Marie Chaix. She is the 32-year-old daughter of a leader in Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Français (P.P.F.), an important faction in the ultra-fascist opposition to Pétain. Against what seem to be impossible emotional odds, she has written the story of a collaborationist family's painful adjustment to postwar France. In her book *Les Lauriers du Lac de Constance*, which appeared in the summer of 1974, she intertwines her father's prison journals and her own bittersweet memories of a protected girlhood in Suresnes. Her account of her father's treason seems rather forced, a potpourri of apology and resentment, but her treatment of the ordeals of her family, and the emotional avarice of her grandfather—a spry, Balzacian provincial who toys with his own funeral arrangements but cannot face his doomed son—creates a sense of the Collaboration much more tangible and genuinely tragic than Malle's.

The increased interest in the Collaboration has helped foster a new and more negative image of occupied France, an image likely to rankle former resisters. Many of them remember all too well the years after the Liberation when genuine partisans were often indiscriminately lumped with the bandits, opportunists, and "September resisters" who jumped on the bandwagon of victory well after the liberation of Paris in August 1944. They also remember their bitterness when the fruits of victory were—as they see it—snatched from them by the old politicians of the Third Republic. They believe that the far-reaching renewal of French institutions that they prepared during the war was stunted, through no fault of their own, by the peculiar exigencies of the Cold War and the struggle between de Gaulle and the Communists. They often speak of the "reverse mythification" (i.e., a belittling) of the French Resistance.

Two French TV producers recently put together a passionate televised defense for the often slighted masses of French people who did actively oppose the Nazi occupier. Using the impressionistic, souvenir-album technique of Dominique Lapère's and Larry Collins's best-seller, *Is Paris Burning?*, Jean-Jacques Bloch and Claude Robrini assembled a videotape chronicle of the spontaneous Paris insurrection of 1944. It was called *Paris, Levé, Debout* and was broadcast in August for the uprising's 30th anniversary. In the course of his background research, Bloch ran into an ex-resister called Madeleine Riffaut who eventually became the "star" of his broadcast. French TV-viewers were to see this woman, whose hands still bear the stigmata of her tortures, standing by the Solférino bridge and recounting how, at the age of 19, she had shot down a German officer on the very same spot. Later, in a little café by the Place de la République, she told with tears in her eyes of the death of a young comrade during the insurrection's final hours. "We couldn't believe it," she said. "We went out into the street and all Paris was celebrating. But he was dead. We sat down on a bench and wept." Bloch and Robrini were able to interview many others beside Madeleine Riffaut: all in all, they used only about 15 minutes of old newsreel footage. Parisians from many walks of life told how they had risen against the oppressor. "The

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most important thing," said Bloch, himself an ex-resister, "was that they should not be betrayed."

Another reason why the Resistance stays permanently controversial is the number of ex-resisters who have risen to prominence in politics, letters, labor, and many other fields.

The roster of French public figures has long read like a sort of Who's Who of the Resistance. Most reading Frenchmen know what Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Jacques Duclos, or even Françoise Giroud, the new Secretary of State for the Feminine Condition, were doing during the Occupation (though fewer, perhaps, are aware that François Mitterand, the champion of the unified Left, was decorated by Vichy during its so-called Double-Game Phase for resistance activity among the French POWs). Yet, though a Resistance record hardly elicits veneration from the skeptical French, the public demands more and more to know just what important politicians were doing during the war.

Georges Marchais, top man in the French Communist party, is a case in point. The question, "What did you do in the war, Daddy?" has always somewhat unnerved him, because during the war Georges Marchais worked in Germany manufacturing war materiel. Now, however, he has apparently felt the need to come clean: in an interview published in *L'Express*, Marchais himself broached the topic. That he has finally consented to tell his story is evidence not only of a renewed frankness but also of the dangers of too much secrecy in the present climate of national introspection. For Marchais has been much reproached for his undistinguished behavior during the war (at which time, however, he was not yet a Communist), and this could become a sore spot now that the Socialists are cutting heavily into the Communist vote. In any case, Marchais's apologia was a bit lame. A skilled metalworker at the outbreak of the war, he did not attempt to evade deportation to Germany, he argued, because he himself had known no resisters and because "if a referendum had been organized in 1940, or even in 1941, Pétain would have won by 90 percent"—a rather "as-mediocre-as-thou" way of putting it. Though no one, I think, questions Marchais's honesty on this point, many find it odd that a man of apparently dubious patriotism now heads a party that once called itself "the party of the 75,000 firing-squad victims."

The French Communist party is also a major butt of what is perhaps the most intriguing document on the Occupation to have appeared in recent years, the memoirs of Henri Frenay. Henri Frenay was a founder and virtual leader of Combat, the major non-Communist resistance movement in the Vichy zone. His lengthy book *La Nuit Finira* (Paris: Laffont, 1973) is an eyewitness chronicle of a resistance movement told by its own leader. Many ex-resisters have written about various partisan groups—the most famous accounts are probably those of Pierre Guillain de Bénouville and Marie-Madeleine Fourcade—but Frenay is the first chief of a comprehensive front to provide a detailed story of its birth and development. Though not skittish about making enemies, Frenay quit the French political scene in disgust upon the formation of the 1945 Constituent Assembly and has always been loath to engage in retrospective backbiting. It was, in his own words, "the profanation of my secret garden," the cumulative misrepresentation of events that he had personally experienced, which finally loosened his tongue. What is extraordinary, given the lapse of 30 years, is the freshness of his invective, not only against his Communist rivals but also against such figures as Emmanuel d'Astier, François Mitterand, Jean Moulin, and, most of all, de Gaulle himself. His feelings seem to have kept miraculously unspoiled since the wartime years, as if preserved by some secret balm.

A 36-year-old general-staff officer during the 1940 campaign, Frenay eluded capture in the Vosges and slipped across the line of demarcation into the "free" (Vichy) zone. By midsummer he was back in his family home on the Riviera. Though attached to his simple, self-sacrificing mother, he soon found himself unable to share her trust in Pétain. One sleepless night he composed a manifesto against defeatism: already, in his heart of hearts, he

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had opted for resistance. He relates how his mother anxiously knocked on his door and asked why he was still awake. Confessing that he concealed from her his fateful decision, Frenay adds with a charm and candor all his own: "It was my first clandestine act."

This theme of an uneasy rupture with family ways reappears often in the book. Captain Henri Frenay was a child of the French Right. He was reared in a Lyonnaise military family; poor, patriotic, Catholic, republican but perhaps barely so, and above all paternalistic. In 1940 his cast of mind was still essentially military, a product of the Saint-Cyr drillground and École de Guerre study-groups. It was, in fact, this military cast of mind with which he was most often to be reproached in the Resistance—especially by the labor-oriented group, Libération—for Frenay always remained a believer in the value of strict *encadrement,* of elites.

Not surprisingly, Frenay continued for a while to work for the army's Deuxième Bureau (intelligence) in Vichy, but his gradual disillusionment with Pétain led him to resign his commission in February 1941. His resistance activity, which at that time consisted exclusively in clandestine recruitment, intelligence, and propaganda, was already well under way. He moved back to his Lyons birthplace but continued to conceal his activities from his family. By now his mother found it impossible to credit his tale that he was involved in top-secret army intelligence work. In a poignant incident, Mme. Frenay, herself an army officer's widow, comes all the way to Lyons to ask her son if he has pledged allegiance to the Marshal. This time he has not the courage to tell her a lie: "I tried to steer our conversation into the realm of principles," he writes,

> such as the impossibility for a citizen and a Christian to pledge allegiance to a man. But she refused to let me go on. . . .
>
> "My child, [she said] you've been lying to me. You're going to hurt our country, and you're going to make a good job of it too, just as you make a good job of everything you do. And I suppose you think that I'm going to shut up about it. Well you're wrong! I love you dearly, as you know—my children are my whole life. But above and beyond maternal love there is my homeland. I'm going to the police to denounce you, to stop you from doing evil and to protect you from yourself."

Of course Frenay's mother never did denounce him, but this sad anecdote shows how deeply earnest is his apparently jocular remark about his "first clandestine act." For here was a man who was breaking with his family's deepest-rooted traditions to embark upon what his own mother regarded as a political crime. But note the grounds on which Frenay defends his refusal to take the required oath to Pétain: it is impossible, he says, for "a citizen and a Christian to pledge allegiance to a man." Just this refusal later becomes the book's principal theme. In effect, the second half of the book sets forth a long attack on de Gaulle, and in it the author comes close to those who have seen Gaullism's major anomaly as the insistence that Frenchmen "view things through the eyes of one who refused to view them through anyone else's."

Although he was imbued with a healthy respect for conservative values, Frenay's sympathies had gone to the Left well before the war. Despite the French army's classic apolitical role, by 1938 the young army intellectual was already lecturing hundreds of reserve officers in Toulouse and the Haute-Garonne area on the evils of Nazism:

> [For Nazism] the heretics are the democrats, the rationalists, the humanists, the liberals. Gentlemen, they are us.

The word "liberal" hardly recurs again in the entire book, but in fact it describes Frenay's politics better than many of the now quaint labels that he and his friends devised for themselves. It also succinctly characterizes the tenor of his objections to de Gaulle.

By the summer of 1942 it had become imperative for Frenay to see the General in London. Partly because of his own desire to represent the Resistance to Free France, and partly because of his rivals' reluctance to see him back on metropolitan soil, Frenay was to spend much of his time from late 1942 on in

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England. Eventually he joined de Gaulle's provisional government in Algiers, all the while in constant touch with the domestic leadership of the movement he had founded, now known as Combat.

Frenay's many interviews with de Gaulle form the dramatic core of his memoirs, a composite portrait of that foremost practitioner of the "French authoritarian style." Though bitterly critical of de Gaulle's claim to have sown the seeds of the Resistance with his famous June 18 Appeal, of which Frenay and his friends, not to mention the Communists, remained unaware until long after June 1940, Frenay does not conceal his frank admiration for the great man. De Gaulle is never long absent from his narrative. Yet an enormous gap separates the first Frenay-deGaulle discussions from the last, and in that gap lies all the pathos of the gradual dissolution of the Resistance as a political force. One is astounded to learn that de Gaulle actually upbraided Frenay in the Savoy Hotel in November 1942 with the words, "France must choose between you and me!" For in June 1945 it was the very same Frenay—by then Minister of Prisoners—whom the General was to chide in the Matignon, saying, "Frenay, you are a child."

Between these two sentences lay a long succession of exchanges and altercations. Frenay first met de Gaulle (excluding some brief prewar contact) in September 1942, and he was quick to note the older man's personal style: his grave demeanor, his eschewal of all decorations save his own Cross of Lorraine, his odd manner of address that assumed he had always known a new interlocutor, his dangling cigarette, his teetotaling, and his long unresponsive yet signifying silences that fell across his conversation like a zone of shadow. Above all, he was always a step ahead: "The French have still not understood?" he would ask Frenay, or affirm, with that sovereign use of the third person whereby he institutionalized himself: "France must rally to de Gaulle if she wishes to remain France." And so often there was the feigned indifference of his ceiling-fixed stare, or the sullen pouting of his chin, that exact expression of a certain Gallic mood. "I felt in him no warmth," writes Frenay, "but everything I said had been listened to, and had registered." His pettish resentment of the English for allegedly pulling the teeth of the French Empire, and for offending a dignity that he identified with his own, was immediately apparent: "This, I shall not tolerate," he announced to Frenay one day (speaking of the ouster of France from the Levant), as if he were in a position to be "tolerant," and as if the *majesté lésée* were all his own.

As for the haunting reproval in the Savoy Hotel, Frenay confesses that he still does not know what to make of it, but at one point he refers to it parenthetically as "a Richelieu's reflex." In effect, it was de Gaulle's response to what he saw as Frenay's raw baiting contumacy in attacking his pet project, the creation of the National Council of the Resistance (C.N.R.). When Frenay voiced his fears that this body would exhume the Third Republic and provoke the hostility of the entire metropolitan Resistance, thereby creating a deadlock, de Gaulle replied: "Then I shall give orders." "Here," says Frenay, "was the heart of the problem: the relationship between de Gaulle and the Resistance," and he goes on to describe how he bluntly told de Gaulle that the Resistance would reserve the right to disobey his orders if it saw fit. The reply, "Then France must choose between you and me," is clearly not to be taken literally, but it surely revealed the General's instinctive calculations. Having lost his aplomb, he was momentarily not "de Gaulle" but just "me."

"Any reader of the General's *Memoirs*," writes Frenay,

> would naturally conclude that it was he who inspired, organized, and directed the Resistance. Thus it may seem absurd or shocking of me to insist that he never even understood it.
>
> Such, however, is the simple truth. . . .
>
> As the events of 1940 receded into the past, the Resistance grew apace and also became conscious of its own strength. Of this London was not unaware. I believe that de Gaulle feared the advent and the possible dissidence of a Resis-

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> tance claiming to represent France and with the great prestige of having pursued the struggle on national soil. ... What else can explain, if not the fear of a potential rival—a Richelieu's reflex—his constant desire to place his own men, whose destiny depended on his good graces alone, over the Resistance?

This is Frenay's chief argument. It amounts to a frontal attack on the central myth in which Gaullism founds its authority.

Frenay's misgivings about die-hard Gaullism first arose while he worked alongside the B.C.R.A. (Free French) in London. During this period of exile it was his thankless task to beseech the Free French and the British for arms, money, and better communication lines. Early in his London phase he scribbled a personal note above a memorandum to de Gaulle saying that he intended to play "the bull in the china shop of Free France," and indeed it was not long before the warm-blooded young staff officer's impatience at the captious and undemonstrative General had turned to exasperation and even anger. It was an anger backed by the muscle of Frenay's cohorts and by his willful readiness to seek help elsewhere (from the Americans, for instance), but it was always tempered by his admiration for the savior from Colombey. When de Gaulle, with a faint tic of the eyelid, would sulkily end an interview without answering Frenay's questions, or shake his head at him with the words, "Let's stick together, let's stick together!" ("To *me,* he said this!" fumes Frenay, who had done as much as anyone to rally the Resistance to Gaullism), the younger man felt the disappointment of a patriot who expects a touch of sympathy for his and his comrades' efforts.

Eventually, in Algiers, Frenay received the portfolio of Prisoners, Deportees, and Refugees (" the ministry of suffering," he calls it), and felt the representation of the Resistance slip largely out of his hands and into those of the Communists, whose desertion of the French cause after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact he had never fully forgiven. The failure of the Communists to join the "companions of the first hour," and their claim in 1944 to have represented the entire Resistance—when the early non-Communist resisters had been all but decimated—forms the subject of one of Frenay's more vitriolic passages.

In the spring of 1945 Frenay found himself once again at odds with the General, this time over the latter's project for France to participate in the dismemberment of the Reich. By then Frenay was a convinced "European," a man without rancor against the Germans and alarmed by the possibility of a new edition of Versailles. One day he entreated de Gaulle to refrain from occupying the Rhineland. The General answered:

> Frenay, you are a child. Haven't you understood yet that policy, especially foreign policy, is not made with noble sentiments? Do you think that Roosevelt, Churchill, or Stalin indulge in noble sentiments? Of course not. They bitterly defend the interests of their nations. Such is their duty. *My* duty is to defend the interests of France, which, as far as Germany is concerned, begin with our presence on the east bank of the Rhine.

To this Frenay appends, "I was not convinced."

From Frenay the potential rival to Frenay the "child." And here we are suddenly reminded of Frenay the wayward son confronted by his mother in Lyons. For at the heart of the Frenay-de Gaulle drama lay the conflict between the junior officer appealing for an almost paternal support for his youthful ideals, and the older general, the prophet of the armored column, with his overriding concern for French sovereignty. One suspects that it was precisely Frenay's conception of himself as a faithful son of his country—"a citizen and a Christian"—which led him to pursue his guerrilla war on national soil. The conservative notion of duty and the revolutionary ideal of brotherhood were both essential ingredients in his acceptance of the adversary role. Hardly ever do we find him using the word "sovereignty" unless to qualify some gesture of de Gaulle's. It was, on the other hand, the moody General who came to embody the goal of national sovereignty, often to the virtual exclusion of any other. Frenay hints that de Gaulle's inability to conceive of any *popular* movement arising on national soil was closely related to his own willingness to leave that

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soil. This inability was, perhaps, an essential part of his paternalism, of the fact that he saw himself not as a rebel but as a father of his country. So jealously was he absorbed in the preservation of juridical and military independence that he was just plain uninterested in domestic revolution. Not surprisingly, this was the man who called the Paris May of 1968 a "bed-wetting." On a deeper level, Frenay was already perceiving what he and so many others were later to pinpoint as the most dangerous flaw in orthodox Gaullism: the tendency for the outward forms of sovereignty to mask an actual deliverance into servitude, and for the assertion of national independence to disguise the persistence of social unfreedom.

Frenay's book is only one of the more salient and controversial treatments of the Occupation to have appeared in France in the last few years. Hardly a week goes by without some new light being thrown on the great trauma. Though we can be certain that this ongoing reexamination very much concerns political people and intellectuals, it is harder to judge just how much it affects the French in general. Eventually, one supposes, they are bound to sense the waning attraction of the old myths about the war.

All of these myths have been devalued, including the myth that de Gaulle was the author of the Resistance. Even the Resistance itself is now viewed by many with a touch of (perhaps unjustified) cynicism. On the other hand, the collaborationist Right—despite its trivialization in Malle's *Lacombe Lucien*—is once again being taken for what it really was: a perfectly earnest if terribly misguided political current. (That, of course, is one of the implicit themes of Marie Chaix's book.) In a sense, the Right is now so dead that its seriousness can be comfortably granted.

As for the Communists, their stories too are losing credibility. Since May 1968 Stalinism has been at an almost total discount among younger French socialists of all persuasions, and the significance of Thorez's 1939 treason is not lost on them.

Many of the historical myths of both the Gaullists and the Left, then, are being discarded. But in a way those myths are merely the crutches of a convalescent nation. When and if the nation fully heals, they will probably all be thrown away. Gaullism itself is after all essentially a strategy of convalescence, a compound of much-needed modernization and delusive grandeur. As the medicine takes effect, the palliative is being laid aside. □

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Milovan Djilas

From a Prison Diary

No one is as stupid as a democrat turned imperialist or a revolutionary turned reactionary. When that happens the concepts get all mixed up. Just as it happens to each individual when his ideas come into conflict with the real trends of development, so also it happens to each movement. Desires, traditions and ideas either give in to developments or they are crushed by them.

For dogmatic—and not only dogmatic—reasons, we Communists proclaimed that the normal human concepts and ethical values are petty bourgeois. In this way we are creating two mutually irreconcilable worlds.

The more dogmatism—the less freedom.

The more talk about the ultimate ideal—the less freedom.

When reality is masked behind a revolutionary past and an ultimate goal, every policy that fails to take into account its weaknesses vis-à-vis the past and its illusions about the future must express itself as tyranny over society. . . .

In the contemporary world—at least in the world in which I live—as a rule, ambition governs men.

I have never known a man who was totally free of ambition. That includes myself, although I controlled myself with skill and with determination.

The worst of all is that ambition—even the most innocent and most justified ambition—warps one's understanding of men and of relations among men.

Friendship is relative. In bureaucracy and in state capitalism, since all categories of conduct are overturned (that is, all categories of the normal, inherited morality of common man), friendship is meaningless. Moreover, a bureaucrat is even commended and thanked if he manages to rid himself with ease of a past friendship, naturally with the good excuse that it is all for the sake of the "revolution."

What the term Marxism means today has no more connection with the real Marx and his theory than does the contemporary church with the Bible. Even if "Marxism" is a logical extension of Marxian thought, it should be rejected as reactionary since by its ideological monopolism it stifles the freedom of the human spirit. In that "Marxism" there is nothing new, nor is it capable of creating anything new. It is nothing else but petty politics and politicking, which defends *naked power* and authoritarianism, covering itself clumsily with ideas and ideals, some of which could even be real.

Diary of Thoughts, 1953–1954 (unpublished)

January 30, 1958

The cold weather continues. Hoarfrost on the arbor vitae makes them even more beautiful. Not even the sun, which breaks through and clears up the fog during the day, succeeds in melting the snow on the paths and the hoarfrost. Every evening around six they turn on the heat for about fifteen minutes. Not much help in that, except one can go to bed a little more comfortably.

My day looks like this: 5:30—rising (in the

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summer, an hour later); 6:30—emptying the chamberpot; 10:30—walk (an hour and a half; up to now the walk has usually been at 8:30 and lasted only an hour); 1:30—dinner; 3:30—an hour's walk; 7:00—p.m.—supper; bedtime, by regulation, is at 9:00 (the bell rings 15 minutes before that). I now go to bed around suppertime because I am cold. I seldom take supper, and sometimes not even breakfast (chicory coffee). During the day, I lie dressed underneath three blankets and read with gloves on my hands. [...]

February 9, 1958

I have grown quite accustomed to life in a cell, and sometimes I even feel good. Is that the human power of adaptation? Or is it something changing in me? [...] Sometimes I feel freer than ever before in my life—my thought is free, my conscience at peace.

It is thawing fast. It's a nice day—scrubbing time! I have neglected my room during the winter. [...]

February 13, 1958

In everyday political reality humanism shows itself to be unrealistic and unreal. But it is a reality of the greatest spirits—an irresistible and unquenchable yearning of man for ever greater humaneness. Choosing between Erasmus and Luther, I would always choose Luther, but wish to be like Erasmus. Striving for the good in the battle against evil, man does not dare renounce evil methods. When among wolves, one must have sharper and stronger teeth. And evil is all that which is used by others to strengthen their might and mastery.

February 14, 1958

I add the following to the above: coercion and evil generally win over humanism and good, but the latter always regenerate themselves and are born anew. They are creators of the great and the beautiful, even when defeated. They change history. They are what is noble in man, trampled and tragic, but indestructible, pure, and brilliant.

February 17, 1958

One should always be opposed to any monolithic party ideology in socialist parties. Monolithic ideology brings with it centralism and the rule of one small group of doctrinaire men. Men should be united by realizable, accessible ideals, and not by some abstract formula of impossible ideals. [...]

Marriage is a very great sacrament and can represent for many people one of the greatest moral bonds and obligations. Even people who are not good can become so in marriage; marriage can be the strength that bends their characters toward the good. Because marriage is—regardless of its different forms through history—one of those enduring and eternal characteristics of human life. Therefore, one should honor it, and not interfere in it. This applies to both individuals and the state. The state should secure marriage as much as possible by noninterference. [...]

March 1, 1958

It is absolutely untrue that in jail, and especially in a cell, oné's senses become sharper. It only seems so to a condemned man, and also to myself. There is so little to which one can react, so that when something is observed—something unusual, out of the ordinary—it stands out sharply and appears as if one's senses are especially acute. [...]

March 17, 1958

My son, Aleksa, Stefica told me, is always dreaming up ways to set me free. And in that connection he asked me yesterday, "Which is stronger, tanks or airplanes?" When I answered him, he said, "You know I have tanks, and I could liberate you." In imagination he has probably accomplished that already. In his wonderfully innocent world there is already a grain of evil—father is in jail—there are struggles to free him. [...]

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March 23, 1958

As I think back—I have been cold all my life. In primary school I was poorly dressed. In high school, the same. And I lived far from the school. At the University—not a single winter did I live in a room with heat (except for the last winter, when I slept on the cement floor in a steam-heated kitchen). In my first jail term, I was cold. When it was over, I was still cold. Then came the war; and again it was cold. During the winter after the war we did not heat our first villa. In the second villa (Nincić), it was warm. But I spent the winters of '50 and '51 in the city and it was cold there again. When I returned to the villa, there was electric heat, but it was expensive. I didn't use it. Instead, we made a fire only in the bedroom. We were thrown out of the villa into the cold again—at Palmotićeva 8. The heat was not strong enough to allow one to sit for a long time, and we had a fire only in the afternoon. Often I stayed up working until two or three in the morning! And now, this place ... I have grown accustomed to cold; it doesn't bother me any more. But I often think that if I save myself from jail and ever have some money, I will spend the rest of my life being warm. Because of that recurring wish, I make a note of this. [...]

April 24, 1958

Contemporary men admire power. I do not know how much or in what way this admiration is expressed in the West, since I do not know the philosophies of those men, but I believe that it exists in some form there also. It exists within all men, or within almost all men, no matter how educated and intelligent they are.

I cannot explain this to myself. Such reasons as fear, material dependence, flattery and blind worship are insufficient. Of course, for those reasons power is admired by many persons. But it seems to me that there is a special and deeper reason: human communities cannot thrive without power; it is "inherent" that no human community can survive without power such as corresponds to the external or internal circumstances and to the nature of the community itself. Of course, a primitive tribe has no governmental power in the form of police or courts, but it has spiritual power administered by priests. The latter punish only those violations against blood relatives or against the tribe as a whole. The modern state is characterized by force, which is its typical and perhaps its basic characteristic. But it has another characteristic: the expression of the consensus of the community. These two elements—force and consensus (the latter as inevitable as life within the community) go hand in hand.

And the moment something is inevitable it receives a higher meaning in the eyes of men, especially if it is supported by power. The worship of power is only one expression, a distorted one at that, of the inevitability of power within human communities and human life.

And power—both its specific form and the institutions that exercise it—acquires even sooner the mythological form.

Finally let me end this discourse about myths. They contain within themselves at first something real and rational (as an attempt to explain something). Their roots are to be found in some need—material, social, or spiritual. But the moment they separate themselves from that need, the moment they perfect themselves as a form, the moment men forget their origins—the myths disappear. Man's life is full of myths and men are barely aware of them. The past lasts through myths, within them. Because the spiritual world still goes on. Because, because, because ...

April 29, 1958

Yesterday they gave me my new prison number: 1732. Up to now I have been number 6880. I bought scallions and radishes. I took much pleasure in the green leaves of the young scallions. They reminded me of my birthplace. There in Podbisće scallions grew in the summer. I was sent to cut their leaves. Many handfuls were put on the table and we all grabbed at them.

This anger and excitement because of insults

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against me [at the party Congress] diminished yesterday. I felt quite pleasant, despite the cold and rainy weather. Yes, changes in the weather affect one's disposition—any steady weather pattern maintains also my steady disposition, as a rule. But one's good mood often is the result of reasons other than weather.

I see, after all, that isolation has already made me painfully sensitive. How far will this sensitiveness go? What kind of person will I be after three, or five, or seven years?

I observed one characteristic within myself which has developed spontaneously: I am careful not to step on any insect or worm I find along my path. In my room I gather them onto a piece of tin and empty them into the wastebasket. Only the spider is permitted to roam at will. But outside I do not step upon anything, except unintentionally. That is not because of any philosophy. I just feel respect toward life, toward every living thing, as if each form were one of the stages culminating in human life and from which the latter has sprung up. It sometimes seems to me that the differences between myself and the benevolent ladybug whom I meet along the path are really minimal. Even the ladybug in its own way "thinks" and struggles in the world and lasts as long as it is allowed to. Life is neither beautiful nor ugly, neither happy nor sad. [...]

May 22, 1958

I was told that all foreign books are forbidden to me. They kept the review of *Land Without Justice* from the New York *Times*. I wrote immediately in angry protest. Obviously some pettiness—a "tightening" up. For what purpose? Still, this made me a little angry—and throws me off in my spiritual life and my work.

I lost all interest in ants, bees and bugs. And maybe I did not. During my walks, I stroll a little and then lie down to sun myself if there is sun, and then I think about what I am writing. That is so precious to me that nothing else enters my mind.

I planted an apricot, and it has sprouted. It progresses poorly. If someone does not pull it out, I hope to nurse it and make it grow. The arbor vitae and the pepper are not sprouting. [...]

June 4, 1958

They confiscated the letter from Milka [his sister]. Disgusting. I can bear more pain than they can impose on me. A little war of nerves. I am writing a protest—like Yugoslavia protesting to the U.S.S.R. [...]

June 15, 1958

In order to prevent me from sunning myself they changed my walk back to 7:30 in the morning instead of 9:30. Must not react!

Yesterday *Politika* announced the shooting of Imre Nagy and other comrades. I am very sorry for him. I often thought that a similar fate awaited me. I always felt that he and I were alike in many respects. Except that I wrote. Perhaps he would have done the same, had he had the chance, although he was not a writer. I had just finished *The New Class* when the Hungarian Revolution took place. Nagy died an honest death. And that means a lot. Even more than if he had remained alive. I believe that he will remain a great man in the history of Hungary, although he was not able to accomplish much of anything. He proved that in Communism there are democratic and socialist men, although they are mostly utopians, who end up like us. His views remained unknown, but his practice did not, and it guided him. It would have been better if some things had been clearer to him. Perhaps he would not have been caught. His cause, however, did not suffer from his death. His cause does not exist, because it was not formulated. But he does, and he chose Hungary at the decisive moment. His cause: Hungary and freedom.

From here, upon hearing the news of his death, I pay him my respects, which any honest man owes to martyrs.

His death is also the symptom of the resistance to change in the East. And a symptom of the international sharpening of tensions. [...]

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August 21, 1958

The beauty of life is in its variety, that is, in continual happening. Because of that, jails are boring to people—prison takes away that concreteness, that experience of change. Man without happening is crippled; without any changes, he is dead. Because of that suspension of events, isolation did not seem so long to me. It was a gradual and mild dying. And now it is the same, but in less measure, for I am not alone. I can't say what is better, because isolation, in some ways, has advantages. More precisely, one should ask which condition is worse. [...]

Without exception criminals endure jail with difficulty. Much worse than the Communists before the war. [...] But we Communists hid and learned better to suffer. Apparently, conscience is the chief reason why some bear up with greater difficulty than others. Not only conscience, but also belief in some ideal not exclusively one's own. That is conscience, and yet it is not—if by conscience one means to understand the sum of knowledge or the totality of particular national formulations, of human, class, and individual roles. It is more correct to speak of faith. Faith makes up for the lack of change, that is, for the absence of possibilities for concrete living.

December 3, 1958

Although it cannot be considered a thankful task, whenever I talk with some of the convicts I try to persuade them not to steal or kill in the future. [...] Among most of them, resolution to avoid crime increases with the fear of punishment, that is, with disgust at prison life, which is void of any pleasures and family responsibilities. I should remark that in each of them there is some resistance, something that prevents them from seeing their crimes and violations as their own humiliation. Most believe—and for them it is a very important belief—that their sentences are too stiff. That is the form their social resistance takes. [...]

From this I draw two conclusions: the entire system of re-education (not necessarily measured by political results) that tries to make convicts over into "socialist citizens" is wrong, because it does not lead toward real understanding of mistakes, but toward giving up under pressure. It leads only to shallow and uncertain results. Religions go deeper into these questions, and one should draw some lessons from religions. I myself do not know what should be done, but it is clear to me that one cannot become a good person until he tames something within himself—and is it even possible?—to tame the evil part of one's own being? In any case, the present system is not good.

It seems to me that one should create better conditions for improvement, hold ethical lectures and similar activities; leave everything else to itself. [...]

February 4, 1959

It is cold but I am working normally in the morning—happy to see that I have ideas to write about, particularly in this place, in fact, quite a few ideas. [...]

March 3, 1959 (in the afternoon)

This morning while looking at the draft of "The Legend of Czar Dukljan" and reading *Ann Vickers* by Sinclair Lewis, I formed an opinion of how one should set up jails. [...]

Jails should be totally abolished, that is, such as they are at present, since criminals are people spiritually disturbed in a specific manner.

Criminals [...] are people who are ethically sick. I cannot see why we don't recognize that they are sick people, just like other kinds of patients. Not a single convict whom I have come into contact with gave me the impression that I was talking to an abnormal, disturbed person, but only to a man who was in some way unwilling to give up some sin. In fact, there come terrible moments of intoxication with some kinds of crime. The effect is similar to that of narcotics, but deeper, because it embraces the entire person and makes the criminal submit to it.

If this proposition is correct—and it is—then

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jails that do not rehabilitate anybody are an absurdity, as irrational as beatings during interrogations. They are today, in essence, revengeful, and even those who would want to be the least cruel are bad.

In some manner society must protect itself from criminals. That means that people susceptible to crime must be separated—but in such a way as not to be denied a single human right. They should come under the care of psychologists and psychiatrists, and not under the care of jailers and political supervisors.

This would, of course, cause a change in the judiciary and in the judges, since, during the trial and the interrogation, psychologists would participate. The accused would be classified according to the required type of treatment, and the essential task would be not to determine how long they must spend in isolation (not our present form of isolation), but to ask when they are going to be cured.

In order to begin the introduction of such a system it is not necessary to change the entire society. Such a total change is impossible. The essential thing is to understand properly the problem of offenders and their crimes, and to introduce a greater degree of democracy than exists in any country, especially in relation to political offenders, who are, in fact, not offenders but opponents of the ruling ideas and system. It is essential to understand that no single idea in a system is absolutely good and should have absolute sway. Therefore, those in power cannot treat their opponents as absolutely evil. [...]

All these and similar reasonings led me only more fully to become conscious of how deep an injustice was done to me when I was thrown into jail simply because I could not prevent myself from stating my views. Those who did this to me probably believed that they were humane—they made some fine distinction between execution and a sentence of nine years in jail, not to mention their humiliating me and slandering me in the dirtiest way without any chance for me to defend myself. [...]

But let's drop this musing about myself.

The sun will shine further, and, as always, time will put everything in perspective. When we are no longer among the living, it will be all the same how we lived, but—a lesson for the living. [...]

March 24, 1959

Last night I dreamed a sentence word by word: "Evil is when someone is the chief cook in his country but is not also the chief taster of what he cooks." [...]

I must say that I do not believe in classless society, even though capitalism has heard the last bell toll for itself. Each future society will be a class one. Marx's mistake was that he equated the collapse of capitalism with the collapse of classes. That was a small mistake in comparison with impressive visions and wise proofs predicting the collapse of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. In order to destroy one world, Marx had for sure to promise an ideal, utopian vision; otherwise, he would not believe himself, and, even less, would others believe him. A product of his time, a great scientist, he was also a great utopian. To establish the goal of a classless society was to make a logical mistake: to take for a hypothesis something that should be proven only by experience (*partitio principii*). The goal of socialism—of course, a democratic one—can be only a society of mixed economy (governmental, co-operative and private), of nonviolent struggle between free classes, if we are already talking in "class" language. In short, an unperfect or, better yet, a normal society.

One must not nurture illusions about the things people fight over, since ideas are mostly banners, around which rally interests and drives; they remain almost invisible to those who struggle for their fulfillment. And the chief theme of that struggle centers on *the way of life* already existing, or, for others, on that which should be achieved and which seems possible. Of course, no society is completely harmonious, since each specific way of life represents and is guided by some class, authority, or group of classes. The way of life is not only material, but also spiritual, psychological, etc.—in short, life in all its complex puzzlement. Men therefore fight not only for material

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interests—money or position—but for other things that make the essence of their life. [...]

December 28, 1959

I am conscious that in a specific way I am reenacting from the beginning the same drama that was experienced by all Communist heretics, especially under Stalin. It seems to me that those who decide about my fate are not conscious of that, and in order to "work me over" and "break me down" they in fact go from mistake to mistake. [...] They kept me in solitary confinement for 20 months. [...] I must admit now that spying and provocation by the convicts has ceased. In the final analysis, those above me could only take revenge, while I will emerge from this experience strengthened and purer than I was. I will suffer: that is correct. But I will not go crazy or kill myself, or die. It seems to me that it was part of my fate to suffer—in order to affirm myself. [...]

December 17, 1960 (morning)

When I went to bed last night I was seized by terrible nerve attacks. I don't think the pain was more intense than in the attacks I had in November of last year. Everything was throbbing—chest, head, stomach, and with such a force that it seemed to me that the back part of my skull would explode. But the psychic fears were not so great—perhaps because of my recognition from experience that this condition will pass. After long agonizing and pondering, I finally took some meprobamate and gradually calmed down. This morning I got up drowsy, but also quite calm—it is always so after a dream. [...]

August 30, 1963

One thought: dogmatists are the greatest tragedy of humanity, but unfortunately they most frequently move humanity also. [...]

December 2, 1963

A thought: each theory that tends toward the absolute inevitably acquires the form of religion. Truth about human destiny can only be complex like that destiny itself. (It is beginning to get cold—another winter in an unheated cell.) [...]

August 8, 1964

Today half of my sentence (six and a half years) has been completed. A bittersweet day. I didn't have anything to celebrate it with save that I divided a piece of chocolate with my cellmate. But this is not important. [...]

November 23, 1966

Two days ago I sent to the authorities a petition to give me some way of heating my cell. Today the Assistant Superintendent called me to his office and gave his permission to install an electric heater. Good. At least this winter I will not have trouble about it—after so many years. [...]

March 14, 1967

Aleksa's birthday—at last I am celebrating it at my home. [...]

"Jail Diary" (unpublished) □

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N. Gordon Levin, Jr.

Noam Chomsky and Israel

Noam Chomsky has won considerable attention and respect, especially in segments of the American left, for his views on the Middle East. His views have also provoked much opposition. Chomsky has now published *Peace in the Middle East?,** a collection of his essays on the Arab-Israeli conflict, written between 1969 and early 1974. The book is at once a critical analysis of post-1967 Israeli expansion, a challenge to the legitimacy of the pre-1967 state of Israel, and a radical-left attack on the nation-state system in both the Middle East and the whole world. Chomsky's mood swings from a pained confidence in Israeli military predominance for the forseeable future to an emphasis on the self-delusion in Israel's defense doctrine. Yet the book does have a consistent message: that the separate Jewish and Palestinian Arab nationalisms should be transcended in a new context of socialist-binationalism in all of old Palestine west of the Jordan River.

I understand the concept of political binationalism to mean the creation of a state constitution that reflects the existence, within its polity, of two culturally and ethnically distinct people, each with equal constitutional rights, as a collective people, to participate in defining or vetoing the policies of the state. Talk of establishing such a binational polity in Palestine surfaced at various moments during the British Mandate years but with no successful results. Palestinian nationalism demanded an Arab state in all of Palestine west of the Jordan, in which Jewish immigration would be subject to the will of the Arab majority and in which the existing Jewish population would become tolerated members of a minority with no legal national or collective rights. For their part, the Zionists remained ambivalent as to whether binationalism or partition would be the best means—assuming an inevitable erosion of the British commitment to Zionism—of preserving and numerically expanding the Jewish community in Palestine.

Paradoxically, the historical moment when Jews and Arabs perhaps came closest to binationalism in Palestine may have been the fall of 1947 when the UN voted to sanction the partition of Palestine west of the Jordan between a Jewish state (600,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs) and a Palestinian Arab state (1.2 million Arabs and few if any Jews). The projected Jewish state would have had a population almost evenly divided between Jews and Arabs and would have been binational *de facto,* and almost inevitably *de jure* as well, since its constitutional structure would have had to meet the reality of two peoples existing within the same state.

Whatever potential for social and political binationalism may have existed within the proposed Jewish state in 1947 disappeared with the bitter war of 1948–49. The leaders of the Palestinian Arab community and the elites of the surrounding Arab states all rejected the 1947 partition plan outright and determined to put the issue of Jewish statehood to the test of war. The Arabs suffered military defeat and by the time an armistice was established in 1949 the Israelis had gained control of a national territory far larger than that which had been granted them under partition. Moreover, during this war approximately 600,000 Palestinian

**Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood,* by Noam Chomsky. New York: Pantheon Books, late fall 1974.

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Arabs fled or were expelled from the territory that became Israel in 1949.

The demographic basis for real binationalism in the Jewish state was destroyed by the results of the war. An Israeli state had emerged in which the remaining Palestinian Arab minority had shrunk to 140,000. Relative to the Jewish population of the new Israel, a population soon to be more than doubled by immigration, the Palestinian Arab remnant was too small to constitute effectively a rival national entity able to impose a binational solution on the victorious Jews. Instead, Israel was established as a Jewish state and the Israeli Arabs, as they came to be called, had to content themselves with legal citizenship as individuals in a state whose essential character was to be determined by its large Jewish majority. Paradoxically, it could be argued that this solution left Israel simultaneously both more universalistic and more particularistic than the projected Jewish partition state could have been. Israel was more universalistic because the 140,000 Palestinian Arabs remaining within its borders were given citizenship as individuals within a polity defined formally, if not always in practice, as inclusive for all citizens regardless of ethnicity; but Israel in 1949 was also more particularistic than the Jewish partition state would have been because in fact its large Jewish majority was able to define the context of Israeli citizenship according to Zionist values and institutions.

BY CHOOSING WAR over partition in late 1947 the Palestinian Arab leadership had lost an opportunity, never to be regained, to impose a dual Arab-Jewish character on the small Jewish state. In 1947 the Palestinian Arabs chose war over *de facto* binationalism, at a time when it was temporarily in the objective interests of both Jews and Arabs, even if for different reasons, to have tried to make a variant of binationalism work in the projected Jewish state. The Zionist leadership in late 1947 was bound by moral considerations, by world opinion, and by diplomatic self-interest to have tried to make *de facto* binationalism work within the Jewish state. But armed Palestinian Arab intransigence led to a total war involving civilians on both sides. In this Hobbesian context the incentives for Zionists to respect binationalism were largely removed, and among the Israelis in general the moral restraints upon the passions of exclusivism and hatred for the Arabs were weakened.

Put another way, the bitter war of 1948–49, fought as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, produced an exaggerated expression of the best and the worst in Zionism. Courageous sacrifice for and selfless idealism among fellow Jews combined inevitably with aggression and cruelty toward the Palestinian Arab enemy. Israel's war for independence and survival exhibited the connection, evident historically since the days of the Second *Aliyah,** between Zionist exclusivism toward the Palestinian Arabs and Zionist inclusivism and democratic-socialist solidarity for fellow Jews. After the war, Arab refugees were not allowed to return to the area that had become Israel. Israel's motives combined fears for the security of the new state, a desire to utilize abandoned Arab land and property for the expected tide of Jewish immigration, and a hope of realizing a relatively homogeneous Jewish nation where Jews could live with confidence in a democratic framework. On this foundation, then, of particularism and violence on both sides there were created in Palestine between 1947 and 1949 not binationalism but two nationally defined states: a Jewish state called Israel with a small Arab minority and an exclusively Arab state called Jordan, a Palestinian Arab and Hashemite-Bedouin fusion.

An equilibrium between these two states lasted until it was unfortunately shattered, perhaps forever, by the June War of 1967. June 1967 found Israeli forces in control of all Palestine west of the Jordan and the 1 million or more Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under Israeli military authority. Ironically, after June 1967 the demographic picture for all of Palestine west of the Jordan has come to look on a larger scale almost exactly as it would have looked in the

*Second *Aliyah:* Second wave of Zionist immigration, mostly from Czarist Russia, 1904–14.

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fall of 1947 in the projected Jewish partition state that is roughly 60 percent Jewish and 40 percent Palestinian Arab.

One of the unpleasant consequences of victory for Israel in 1967 has been the painful necessity for Zionism to confront again the question only apparently resolved by the Palestine refugee exodus of 1948–49: how should two culturally different, traditionally hostile, and numerically balanced peoples coexist under the same political sovereignty? This is the situation Chomsky probably has in mind when he says at one point in *Peace in the Middle East?* that "It seems to me that the situation of today is more like that of 1947 than of any intervening period."

Broadly speaking, two answers—"Greater Israel" and "Little Israel"—have emerged in Israeli politics since 1967 to resolve the interrelated moral, strategic, and socioeconomic dilemmas created by this return to a situation of roughly equal numbers of Jews and Palestinian Arabs coexisting under the same sovereignty. For its part, official Israeli policy has tended toward immobility between the claims of "Greater Israel" and "Little Israel."

The "Greater Israel" perspective is held by a coalition advocating permanent annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel. In the "Greater Israel" thinking of the Israeli right and center-right, traditional national and religious claims to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are combined with pragmatic conceptions of national security and with technocratic notions of expansionist economic integration. The legal status of the 1 million Palestinian Arabs who came newly under Israeli authority in 1967, and who are presumably to be absorbed into "Greater Israel," is often left ambiguous by Israeli annexationists. Some variant of a second class or a colonial binationalist status for these Arabs seems probable in a "Greater Israel."

The "Little Israel" response to the post–1967 situation of *de facto* binationalism is provided by a coalition of Israeli left and center-left political elements, including such diverse figures as Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and Abba Eban. These "Little Israel" elements seek to protect Israeli security with minor border changes and demilitarized zones; and—most significantly for purposes of any consideration of Chomsky's position on binationalism—advocates of "Little Israel" seek to bring the Jewish-Arab demographic situation as close as possible to what it had been in pre–1967 Israel by returning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to some moderate Arab authority. Israeli doves do not want a colonial binationalist "Greater Israel." They want instead to recover the more ethnically homogeneous and morally cohesive "Little Israel" of pre–1967. "Little Israel" believes that the program of "Greater Israel" will not protect a Jewish Israel but will tragically destroy the essential Zionist ethnic and political solidarity of Israel in the process of "protecting" it by annexation.

II

At the heart of *Peace in the Middle East?* is Chomsky's effort to present a radical and universalistic answer to the post–1967 political-demographic dilemmas confronting Jews and Arabs in Palestine west of the Jordan. Chomsky's answer is a vision of socialist binationalism, a concept he sees as challenging simultaneously the values and programs of "Greater Israel," "Little Israel," and the PLO. Chomsky writes:

> It seems to me not impossible that after the experience of building and living in New Montenegros and Lithuanias, Jews and Arabs may turn to a better way, one which has always been a possibility. It will be based on the fundamental principle, already cited, "that whatever the number of the two peoples may be, no people shall dominate the other or be subject to the government of the other." Each people will have the right to participate in self-governing national institutions. Any individual will be free to live where he wants, to be free from religious control, to define himself as a Jew, an Arab, or something else, and to live accordingly. People will be united by bonds other than their identification as Jews or Arabs (or lack of any such identification). This society, in the former Palestine, should permit all Palestinians the right of return, along with Jews who wish to find their place in this national homeland. All oppressive or discriminatory structures should be dis-

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> mantled, and discriminatory practices should be condemned rather than reinforced. The society will not be a Jewish state or an Arab state, but rather a democratic multinational society. . . .

Chomsky agrees with "Greater Israel" that for Israel there is no retreat possible from the post–1967 reality of two people in the same polity west of the Jordan, but he insists that the resulting binational relationship be equalitarian-socialist and not colonial. Chomsky agrees with "Little Israel" that an indefinite continuation of military rule over 1 million Palestinian Arabs is politically and morally corrosive, but he insists that the remedy be in the direction of more universalistic equality among Jew and Arab rather than in a return to a more exclusive "Little Israel." Chomsky agrees with the PLO that Israeli statehood should end, but he insists that the succeeding socialist binationalist state should protect the individual and communal rights of Israelis. In theory, then, Chomsky challenges all variants of exclusivistic particularism in the Arab-Israeli conflict by proposing a fusion of the universal and the particular for both sides in Palestine. He asks that all previous national states and identities in Palestine be superseded by a new socialist universalistic framework protecting the particular culture of Jews and Arabs in the very act of transcending both.

In response let me begin at the most practical level. We must ask, do any significant political elements exist on either side of the Arab-Israeli divide that are prepared to permit their basic nationalism to be transcended by socialist binationalism? This question is important since unlike the Lithuanians and the Montenegrans, for whose nationalism Chomsky has such disdain, the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs both retain real freedom of choice on the question of national independence. Chomsky clearly has his doubts about the potential for radical universalism in the PLO, and he finds it necessary to ask the PLO to renounce all hopes for a violent triumph over Israel involving "the destruction by force of a unified society, its people, and its institutions—a consequence intolerable to civilized opinion on the left or elsewhere." Given the strong historical connection between Arab nationalism and Arab radicalism in Palestine and elsewhere, Chomsky's concern is well taken. Whatever else they may be, the men of al-Fatah are not universalists.

Turning to Israel one finds in agreement with Chomsky's goals only a small group on the far left without political influence. The overwhelming majority of Israel's doves on the left and center-left remain Jewish nationalists. Their case against the security arguments and religious-national claims of "Greater Israel" is not based on Chomsky's universalism but on the very Zionist exclusivism that he rejects. Unlike Chomsky, Israel's doves are committed to Jewish statehood, to "Little Israel" but definitely to an Israel. "Little Israel" advocates know as well that if they hope to influence Israeli politics and policy, they must be able convincingly to argue that the security, the moral cohesion, and the Jewish character of Israel are best assured by a policy of enlightened self-interest on the territories, a policy that would trade occupied land for the best security arrangements possible.

At one point Chomsky quotes from an advocate of "Little Israel":

> Professor Yehoshua Arieli, at the convention of the Movement for Peace and Security in February 1972, warned that current trends would lead to increased dependence on the United States, the consolidation of a "vested interest" of war profiteers, reliance on Arabs for unskilled manual labor, the deterioration of the democratic structure of the country: "If the status quo continues, the internal situation is likely to veer sharply toward nonhomogeneity, nonidentification with the goals of the Jewish State [meaning internal democracy, social justice, and the fundamental values of independent Jewish labor], a lower intellectual level, internal disunity, and fragmentation.

Note that at the core of Arieli's opposition to "Greater Israel" is his desire to preserve the relatively exclusive Jewish character and the Zionist ethos of pre–1967 Israel. For Arieli and other Israeli doves such as Jacob Talmon and Yitzhak Ben-Aharon there is a direct connection between the protection of civil rights, social democracy, Zionist cohesion in Israel, and the recovery of the demographic situation

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of 1949–67, which, as we have seen, meant a large Jewish majority in "Little Israel." Rejecting Chomsky's view that socialist values mandate a binationalist transcending of exclusivism, Israel's doves argue, explicitly or implicitly, that socialist values are more likely to be realized if a secure Jewish majority is freed from the morally corrupting task of ruling as an occupier over 1 million Palestinian Arabs, and can then return to the traditional Zionist aim of making the socioeconomic reality of "Little Israel" more just for Jewish majority and Arab minority alike. Israel's doves say that, given the violent history of Jewish-Arab conflict in the Middle East, the highest attainable level of Zionist universalism is most likely to be achieved, to be accepted as a moral obligation by Zionism, in a state accepted as legitimate and defined permanently by Zionist values and institutions.

CHOMSKY'S APPROACH to "Little Israel" is ambivalent. On the one hand, he seems to say that Israeli doves are moral men, doing the best they can in a difficult situation, but that their cause is politically hopeless:

> Left-liberal Israeli commentators have pointed out that the consequences of maintaining the present borders are "becoming either a binational state or another Rhodesia." Rejecting these prospects, many have called for withdrawal from the occupied territories and a clear policy of support for United Nations Resolution 242. One may sympathize with them and respect their motives, but in fact, their program is unrealistic. Unless great power pressure is employed—an unlikely as well as ugly prospect—the argument against withdrawal will always be persuasive within Israel. The Arabs, it will be urged, cannot be trusted; security can only be guaranteed through force; we can rely only on ourselves; genocide awaits if we relax our guard.

Several issues are raised by this passage, not the least of which is how Chomsky expects Israelis to trust their fate to a framework of socialist binationalism if the security arguments of the "Greater Israel" advocates are as impregnable as he claims them to be. But beyond this we may ask if Chomsky is simply being disinterestedly pessimistic about the political potential of "Little Israel." Other statements by Chomsky reveal that he harbors a fundamental moral disdain for Israel's doves and that his negative assessment of their political prospects is at least as wishful as it is objective.

Basically, Chomsky believes that a successful return to "Little Israel" would reinforce Israeli exclusivism and would be unjust to the Palestinian Arabs who would continue to be denied a return as refugees to land and property lost in 1948–49 and who would be consigned either to Hussein's Jordan or to a reactionary, xenophobic Palestinian statelet. For these reasons, Chomsky has no real interest in seeing Talmon, Arieli, and Ben Aharon succeed with their anti-annexationist policy. Indeed, Chomsky explicitly rejects just such an American and "Little Israel" course:

> While a settlement along the lines of the Rogers Plan and the United Nations resolution might bring stability, I believe that it will perpetuate conditions that have prevented the realization of the just hopes and the highest ideals expressed within each of the warring societies. In a Jewish state, "*klein aber mein,*" there can be no full recognition of basic human rights, and at best, only limited progress toward a just society. Such limitations are inherent in the concept of a Jewish state that also contains non-Jewish citizens. A Palestinian counterpart, founded on bitterness, frustration and despair and dominated by its neighbors, will be a mirror-image, perhaps even a distorted image.

Chomsky's opposition to a "Little Israel" solution is entirely clear, though one would also wish to ask if there are not many nations in the world whose essential right to exist Chomsky has never questioned, and whose records on basic human rights are far inferior to that of Israel?

But the real depth of Chomsky's moral animus to "Little Israel" is revealed in another passage:

> To a Colonel Qaddafi, it seems entirely obvious that the European Jews should return to Europe. There are, after all, many European states, and there is no reason why the people of Palestine, who committed no crime, should be dispossessed by European settlers of the Mosaic persuasion.

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> These should return to the states where hundreds of millions of Europeans already live, leaving the 3 million Palestinians and the "Arab Jews" in their own little slice of territory. To his precise counterparts in the American Jewish community, it seems equally obvious that the Arabs should stay in the Arab countries. There are, after all, many Arab states, and there is no reason why Israeli Jews should be denied their rights by Arabs who happen to regard themselves as Palestinians. The latter should be absorbed into the homeland of more than 100 million Arabs, leaving to the Jews and the Israeli Arabs in their midst the little slice of territory that is all they ask. It is a measure of the bias and irrationality of American opinion that Qaddafi is regarded as a fanatic, whereas his counterparts are considered moderates. It seems to me a plain fact that neither view can be adopted by people with any compassion or sense of justice.

First, I would want to ask how, in an era when all Arab leaders constantly inform us of the unity of a pan-Arab national identity, it is legitimate to equate a possible new Israeli exile to an alien Europe with the existing Palestinian exile either to another part of Palestine or to a neighboring Arab country? Also, I would ask why Chomsky believes that it would be preferable for Arab refugees to return after 27 years to Israeli Haifa and Beersheba rather than for the refugees to be resettled by Arab oil billions among their own people in just the manner that Israel has absorbed over 1 million immigrant Jews, many from Arab countries? What real human interests besides a satisfaction of Arab honor would be served now by a massive Palestinian Arab return to Israel proper?

But this is not the heart of the matter. For Chomsky makes it clear that he believes anyone who advocates a return to "Little Israel" and the *status quo ante* 1967 has "no compassion or sense of justice." This judgment must include the overwhelming majority of Israel's doves who believe exactly what Chomsky attributes to American Jews. It would follow then that Israel's doves, who oppose any large-scale refugee return to pre–1967 Israel, are the Israeli equivalents of Qaddafi. But if "Little Israel" advocates are the Israeli equivalents of Qaddafi, who are the Arab equivalents of Begin, Sharon, and the proponents of "Greater Israel"? I hope it is evident by this time that Chomsky's views isolate him totally from any meaningful political contact with viable Israeli left and center-left opinion.

Yet perhaps Zionist history is more receptive to Chomsky's binational socialist vision than are the contemporary political realities of Israel? Chomsky takes heart from the fact that Ben-Gurion and other Zionist leaders were occasionally recorded in favor of binationalism during the British Mandate period. Chomsky quotes Ben-Gurion speaking at an internal party discussion in 1930:

> The regime in Palestine must at all times assure both the Jews and the Arabs the possibility of unhampered development and full national independence, so as to rule out any domination by Arabs of Jews, or by Jews of Arabs. The regime must foster the rapprochement, accord, and cooperation of the Jewish people and the Arabs in Palestine ... which will be ... a federal state, comprising an alliance of cantons (autonomous districts), some with Jews in the majority, and some with Arabs; national autonomy of each people, with exclusive authority in matters of education, culture, and language; matters of religion: under the control of autonomous religious congregations, organized as free statutory bodies; the highest body in the state: the federal council, consisting of two houses—(a) one representing nationalities in which Jews and Arabs will have equal representation, and (b) one in which representatives of the cantons will participate in proportion to their respective populations. Any federal law and any change in the federal constitution can be enacted only with the agreement of both houses.

Chomsky argues that Ben-Gurion was sincere when he made this statement and I agree, but I do not accept Chomsky's interpretation that the primary motivation behind Ben-Gurion's binationalism in 1930 was his radical and class-based opposition to the Revisionist Zionist program of making the Arabs second-class citizens in a Jewish Palestine. It is true that Ben-Gurion did, to his credit, oppose Revisionist extremism; and it seems probable that the polity of the projected Jewish partition state of 1947 would have looked something like the binational framework that Ben-Gurion described in 1930. But the real concern of

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Ben-Gurion in the early and mid–1930s was that Great Britain might create a unified Palestine in which Jewish society and immigration would become subject to the will of a Palestinian Arab majority. Binationalism for Ben-Gurion in 1930 was first of all a defense of the institutional independence of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, a Palestine in which the Arab majority was hostile to the Zionist presence and in which the British commitment to Zionism was becoming increasingly ambiguous. Ben-Gurion himself moved from binationalism to partition when the latter position became a real option.

The point is not that Ben-Gurion was hypocritical in 1930. The point rather is that since the primary intent of Ben-Gurion's binationalism was the protection of the greatest degree of Jewish independence available at that time, his 1930 binationalism cannot be used legitimately by Chomsky today as historical precedent for a return to binationalism at a time when it would mean a significant renunciation of Jewish sovereignty. The fact is that the historical essence of mainstream Zionism has been the quest for Jewish social, cultural, and national rebirth on the land in Palestine. There is simply no precedent in Zionist history for a voluntary retreat from whatever level of Jewish self-determination and exclusivism had been attained in Palestine.

III

I have been arguing that the historical evidence suggests the impracticality of binational socialism for all of Palestine. I have emphasized the gap between Chomsky and the great majority of "Little Israel" advocates on the Israeli left and center-left. But the discussion ought not to rest here since Chomsky is, in all fairness, under no illusions as to the possibility of effecting his program immediately. He is really engaged in utopian thinking, in an effort to challenge all existing assumptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict with a transcendent program. Moreover, even if it can be shown, as I believe it can, that Chomsky's radical universalism is not even-handedly applied but seeks to exact disproportionate sacrifices from Israel, his serious approach obligates us to ask not simply whether his socialist binational vision will work but whether it ought to work.

Considering Chomsky's views has brought me closer not to him but to Israel's particularistic doves who argue that Israel must withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in return for security guarantees, because indefinite occupation means that Israel ceases to be even a formally universalistic democratic polity, and that Israel almost inevitably faces morally destructive future cycles of Palestinian Arab rebellion and Zionist repression. The "Greater Israel" perspective is as distasteful as Chomsky says it is, but where his response is to seek for a more inclusive or universalistic solution, my response is to say with the advocates of "Little Israel" that just as 1 million Palestinian Arabs should not be noncitizens in a "Greater Israel" so neither should they be included with all Israelis in a socialist binational "Greater Palestine." Such a solution would destroy forever the valuable Zionist political consensus and social cohesion of "Little Israel."

The essence of Zionism is Jewish solidarity, uniqueness, and self-assertion. The Zionist response to anti-Semitism has not been a demand for universalistic liberalism or socialism but rather the call for Jews to recreate a Jewish national existence in Palestine. Indeed, early Zionism often internalized the particularistic criticism of Jews made by anti-Semites, that Jews were rootless cosmopolitans, and it projected onto Palestine the vision of a transformed Jew, a worker-pioneer close to his own soil. Zionist socialism eschewed Trotsky's socialist universalism and sought instead to create a new socialist society among Jews in Palestine as an example to other nations. Thus was born that Zionist fusion of Jewish equalitarianism and exclusivism that characterized the nature of the Zionist approach to the Palestinian Arabs from the beginning and had its fullest expression both in the concept of *Avoda Ivrit* (Hebrew Labor) and in the closed Jewish moral solidarity of the kibbutz.

Just as the Zionist socialists of the Second *Aliyah* believed that their equalitarian values of exclusive Jewish labor were morally superior to a traditionally colonialist Palestine in which

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Jewish settlers would employ cheap Arab labor, so today's Israeli doves believe a democratic and overwhelmingly Jewish "Little Israel" is morally superior to "Greater Israel." The Arab minority in "Little Israel," about 17 percent of the population, is small enough to be included individually in the polity of a state that remains Zionist in its basic ethos. A large critical mass of Arabs inside Israel might well create more of a psychological proclivity for violent collective action, especially in response to urgings from the Arab states. The demographic structure of "Little Israel," and the fact that the Israeli Arabs have been acculturated to Israel for a generation, permits then an Israeli compromise between the claims of universalism and particularism: the members of the Arab minority are citizens in the polity but they cannot change the Zionist definition of the state.

This solution is clearly anathema to Chomsky:

> Israel will have to come to terms somehow with the fact that it is a Jewish state governing a society that is in part non-Jewish. This fact, rarely faced in a serious way, has always been the Achilles heel of political Zionism. If a state is Jewish in certain respects, then in these respects it is not democratic. That much is obvious. ... It has frequently been suggested that the Jewish state is to be Jewish only in the sense that France is French or England is English. This is patently impossible, however. An immigrant who receives French citizenship is French. If there is some form of institutional discrimination against him, if he is not "truly French" in the eyes of the law or administrative practice, this will be regarded as a departure from the democratic ideal. A citizen of the Jewish state, however, does not become Jewish. This is a matter of principle, not a departure from some ideal norm toward which the society strives. Since it is a matter of principle within a Jewish state, there will be no remedy through slow progress.

Two extreme answers suggest themselves. Israel might embark on a program of "Israelization" to prepare the Israeli Arabs for more complete citizenship. Or Israel might declare itself binational and give the Israeli Arabs constitutional parity as a separate nationality within the state. The first program is unacceptable to the Israeli Arabs, the second to the Israeli Jews. There can be no immediate resolution of Chomsky's dilemma; yet it does not follow necessarily, as Chomsky argues, that "there will be no remedy through slow progress." If one defines progress in "Little Israel" as a moderate process of adjustment in which Arab cultural autonomy is protected at the same time that many younger Israeli Arabs become more "Israelized," then one has described a course that is possible and not unlike the process of Americanization of ethnic groups in the United States. Critical to such an adjustment is that formal equality for Arabs under Israeli law be made real equality in legal practice. Peace and time may confound much of Chomsky's pessimism in this area.

In all of Palestine west of the Jordan, with the Arabs comprising over 40 percent of the population, the "Little Israel" solution disappears and one must choose among traditional colonialism, secular univeralism, and binationalism. To stand with Israeli doves and affirm "Little Israel" against these alternatives is not to declare the moral legitimacy of exclusivism in any or all historical situations. It is to argue simply that "Little Israel" is the solution that does the least harm to the vital interests of all parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict west of the Jordan River. It is also to say that the Israelis have a right to continue to express in security their particular variant of Jewish national identity. The fact that over half of the world's Jews have found a way to fuse Jewishness with national loyalty to such liberal nations as England, France, and the United States is a positive achievement that Zionism has no right to question or denigrate. But Israeli particularism emerges from a tragic Jewish experience, in a region far removed from either the full protections or the full obligations of liberal universalism. For Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, for Jewish refugees from persecution in Arab countries, and for Jews able to escape the Soviet Union, Israel is both a refuge and a source of renewed human dignity.

A moving passage in Albert Memmi's *The Liberation of the Jew* recognizes the inescapable tension in Zionism between the claims of

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particularistic Jewish liberation and the claims of universalism; yet Memmi, whose *The Colonizer and the Colonized* spoke for Arab liberation from French rule, speaks finally for Israel's legitimacy as a state:

> I do not underestimate any of the difficulties, imperfections or errors of this young state. The actions taken by its governments have often shocked me. I have never denied myself the right to question them or denounce them; regarding the status of the local Arabs, for instance, or the North African immigrants, or their excessive clerical indulgence. But I only criticize what exists and ought to function better; I never question the existence itself; just as no scandal, no error can make us doubt the necessity of decolonization. I will go even further: I know and recognize the objections to the very principle of Jewish liberation. I have not tracked down so many myths in order to straddle this one with my eyes closed. But over and above the mythicizing of the endeavor, its exaggerated claims, inherent in all liberations by the way, its excesses and its injustices, henceforth it possesses a definitive historical justification.

IV

Any consideration of the prospects for Israel's survival in the Middle East today inevitably involves some analysis of the realities of power.

Chomsky is concerned to see that Israel not be made legitimate and secure in a power balance sanctioned by international guarantees. He recognizes, and is quick to seek to undercut, the argument that the Israeli case is strong so long as the Arab-Israeli struggle is perceived as a conflict between a legitimate Israeli state and its Arab neighbor states:

> On this assumption, the Palestinians "are not a party to the conflict between Israel and the Arab states," as an Israeli court ruled in 1969. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, supposedly a dove, can thus insist that the Palestinians "have no role to play" in any peace settlement. This is a convenient position for Israelis to assume, since once it is adopted, moral issues vanish. In the context of a regional conflict with the Arab states, Israel's moral position is strong—apart from the issue of the occupied territories, and problems here could be attributed to the Arab refusal to negotiate. The problem of the Palestinians, on the other hand, is difficult to face honestly and openly. Better to put it out of mind, as is commonly done in the United States as well.

Note how quickly Chomsky moves away from the nation-state perspective. Israel is not to be let off easily with a negotiated settlement guaranteeing even the security won by "Little Israel" in 1948–49. Apparently Chomsky's definition of the just rights of the Palestinians demands that the clock be turned back to before the UN partition of 1947 and that Israel be denied the right of legitimate statehood. Having given up their right to use the collective power of their state in their self-defense, the Israelis, in Chomsky's view, should come to rely instead on a new consciousness of radical universalistic tolerance, a consciousness to sweep over all Palestine from a combined Arab and Jewish left. This new consciousness will presumably provide the psychological and the institutional basis for security of Israeli life, property, and culture in a new Palestine.

Chomsky clearly acknowledges the utopian quality of his hopes, but, regardless of the immediate impracticality of socialist binationalism, he is not willing anywhere in *Peace in the Middle East?* to sanction even the short-run use of Israeli state power as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

Chomsky argues that the exercise of Arab power is legitimate if its aim is limited to forcing an awareness in world opinion, and finally in Israel itself, of the folly and injustice of continued Israeli statehood:

> Israel asks only peace, normal relations with its neighbors, and its continued existence as a state. But when the Arab-Israeli conflict is posed in terms of national conflict, it is quite unlikely that these aims can be achieved. Israel can hardly hope to make peace on its terms with the Arab states for the simple reason that these terms do not make provision for the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, now largely in exile or under military occupation, as they see their rights. The Palestinian Arabs are increasingly becoming an organized force, certain to press their demands in conflict with the Arab states and with Israel as well. This force cannot be overlooked, nor can its claims be lightly dismissed.

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Chomsky clearly does not advocate waiting peacefully until that utopian day when Israeli and Arab men of the left voluntarily join hands. In the period before an internationalist left can succeed in transcending the nationalistic roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Chomsky apparently intends to be highly selective as to whose violence he will legitimate.

Chomsky's radical evenhandedness seems assured by his joint condemnation of the Jewish state and the Arab states as institutional embodiments of false consciousness, but this evenhandedness is merely rhetorical. In fact, the only existing nation-state whose legitimacy is being challenged, either in the Middle East, or in the pages of Chomsky's book, is Israel. It is true that Chomsky seeks to distinguish his program from that of the PLO. He attacks the PLO aim of destroying all Zionist institutions by cautioning the PLO to be aware that

> Israel is not Algeria. Its inhabitants will not be driven out or freely leave or abandon a high degree of self-government. Any policy directed to these ends will lead to a continued destruction, to a strengthening of the reactionary and repressive forces on all sides, and perhaps to a form of recolonization by the great powers.

But if Chomsky opposes PLO extremism, he does support the basic PLO goal of ending Israeli statehood. It would seem that Chomsky and the PLO disagree about *how* but not *if* Israel is to cease being an independent Jewish state.

I HAVE ARGUED that Chomsky criticizes Israeli policy on two levels simultaneously. There is, first, the attack on "Greater Israel" since 1967: expansive, repressive, militaristic and arrogant in Chomsky's eyes. There is, second, the attack on "Little Israel" before 1967: exclusive, particularistic, and discriminatory in Chomsky's eyes. But each of these lines of criticism of Israel is linked in Chomsky's analysis to a related tactic of American imperialism.

"Greater Israel" is seen by Chomsky as a willing adjunct to the American Empire. In the Middle East Chomsky argues that a *de facto* Jerusalem, Amman, Riyadh, and Teheran axis existed during the 1969–73 period, and he charges that "Greater Israel" played a critical role in efforts by America to assure antiradical stability and control over oil in the Persian Gulf. Chomsky claims that in the United States American Jewish hysteria over Israel has been used by conservatives to split the liberal community and to revitalize an American Cold War consensus lost in Vietnam.

But even "Little Israel" is alleged by Chomsky to be connected with American imperial machinations. Whenever the United States tries through the Rogers Plan or Kissinger's diplomacy to settle the immediate conflict by encouraging Israeli withdrawals in return for security guarantees, Chomsky sees only a more subtle form of American imperialism and anti-Palestinian intent at work. For Chomsky, the Rogers Plan and similar approaches represent American fallback positions to be used when it is clear that a hegemonic "Greater Israel" cannot protect America's regional interests:

> To establish the validity of the premise that was the foundation of its policy and American support for it, Israel had to win a quick and decisive victory. [In the 1973 Yom Kippur War] This it failed to do. The United States might therefore conclude that "Israel is no longer a suitable protector." One can imagine an imposed solution with a return of civil control to Egypt and perhaps Syria in occupied territories and a superpower guarantee of demilitarization, and perhaps a federation of parts of the West Bank (a "Palestinian entity") with Jordan, along the lines of Hussein's proposals. For the Palestinians, the most tragic victims of the endless conflict, such a solution offers little. But it has long been clear that the rights and interests of the Palestinians are the concern of none of the contestants, apart from some inconsequential rhetoric. ... The basic logic of the approach would be support for reaction throughout the Arab world and continued suppression of the Palestinians and other disruptive forces.

Note the radical disdain with which Chomsky describes, only to reject, the sole type of negotiated settlement that could conceivably bring peace to the Middle East in the forseeable future. If the Palestinian plea for justice

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can be answered only by the undoing of even "Little Israel," then so be it. But his attitude toward America is also crucial for understanding Chomsky's position here. Just as he is unwilling to join the Israeli doves, so he is unwilling to oppose an American policy of support for "Greater Israel" with an American policy of support for "Little Israel." Chomsky's rejection of Israeli statehood and of American power is so total that in neither case is he willing to make moral distinctions among the policies realistically open to either Israel or the United States.

At one point he delivers the following judgment of the basic motives behind American foreign policy in the Cold War era:

> The United States has a great need for an international enemy so that the population can be effectively mobilized, as in the past quarter-century, to support the use of American power throughout the world and the development of a form of highly militarized, highly centralized state capitalism at home. These policies naturally carry a severe social cost and require an acquiescent, passive, frightened population. Now that the cold-war consensus is eroding, American militarists welcome the threat to Israel.

With this brief polemic Chomsky joins those revisionist historians who believe that legitimate moral and security concerns have played no role in the exercise of American power over the past three decades.

Assuming that all American foreign policy behavior and motives can be described with reference to the Vietnam War, the radical revisionist looks backward from Vietnam to deny the connection between American power and the survival of democracy in Western Europe after World War II, and looks forward from Vietnam to deny the connection between American power in the Mediterranean and the survival of Israel's freedom. Chomsky correctly asks that American Jews give his views on Israel a fair hearing and he insists that Vietnam not be forgotten in a mood of pro-Israel hysteria. In return Chomsky can be asked not to tar all American foreign policy indiscriminately with the Vietnam brush. There are distinctions to be made among possible American policies in the world.

Only the United States after all has both the power and a sufficient backlog of trust, on both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide, to help and prod the Israelis to act in their own enlightened self-interest and make necessary territorial withdrawals in return for security guarantees. American Jews might help in this process, but they will certainly not be moved to do so by Chomsky's unrelenting assault on their commitment to Israel's very survival. Far from seeing any constructive role for American power, or for advocates of "Little Israel" among American Jews and Israeli doves, Chomsky moves instead to a vision of internationalist transcendence, which means that America, American Jews, and Israeli doves can do nothing for peace in 1975. In sum, Chomsky's anti-Israeli utopianism does not help us to solve the fundamental problem of reconciling the maximum of Palestinian Arab self-determination with the security of a "Little Israel." □

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Harry Fleischman

A Report from British Columbia

When Socialists win power, it is in one country at a time. And so we point to all the international and other complications involved to explain why socialists in power—in Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia or Israel—have not yet created a complete socialist society.

But if we can't get "socialism in one country," what then are the prospects for "socialism in one province"? Our northern neighbor, Canada, now has three provinces with avowedly socialist New Democratic Party governments, in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and British Columbia. The newest is British Columbia, where the NDP in 1972 won a stunning victory with 38 of the 55 seats in the provincial legislature, though amassing only 39 percent of the popular vote.

In a left-handed way, the United States can claim credit for creating British Columbia's socialist premier, David Barrett. After graduating from high school in Vancouver, Barrett attended Seattle University. Since he had to earn money for his education, he went to work in a pea cannery.

"It was my first taste of avarice and discrimination," he says. "The Mexicans slept in the fields while the whites were in the barracks. ... It was my Dante's Inferno. I pushed huge tubs of peas into pressure cookers. The wage was $1.16 an hour and we got no overtime until after 56 hours." The stores near the cannery sold 40c items for 70c "because we were marginal itinerant workers, and were there to be used. It was straight free-enterprise ripoff, no complications."

The experience marked him. He became a "confirmed democratic socialist." That was in the early '50s. Later, in 1957, Barrett became supervisor of social training at British Columbia's Haney Correctional Institute.

"It was a brand-new $5 million jail," he says, "and useless. All we were doing was teaching people how to live in the jail, instead of how to live when they got out." When Barrett said these things publicly, the attorney-general told him to shut up, that civil servants should be seen and not heard. He refused and was fired. That was in 1959.

A year later, he was elected to the provincial legislature. And now, under NDP rule, civil servants, long barred from unionizing and salary negotiating, have been given a free rein and free speech.

The NDP's victory rested on a solid basis of 40 years of education by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, an amalgam of socialist, farmer, and labor splinter parties throughout Canada. When the labor movement and the CCF joined in 1962 to create the New Democratic party, it broadened its appeal considerably. Before the 1972 victory, Barrett and Norman Levi (who was to become the Minister of Human Resources in the NDP cabinet) barnstormed for three years, speaking at every hamlet where fishermen, farmers, and cowboys appeared. In the campaign Barrett stressed that "We're democratic socialists in a world sense, and we feel a relationship with people like Willy Brandt in Germany and Olaf Palme in Sweden." He pledged to "take control of the land from the American mineral interests and the fast-buck real estate developers and give it back to the people."

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The highest compliment he has been paid, Barrett told me, was when *Newsweek* quipped: "The style may be Archie Bunker, but the substance is Norman Thomas—and the combination has revolutionized British Columbia."

WHAT'S THE NATURE of that "revolution"? Has the NDP government made British Columbia socialist? Not by a long shot. Yet, to Barrett and his party, "socialism is all about priorities," and he adds, "I firmly believe that the people can have power, and that it can be achieved democratically." The NDP has a vision of a society where the basic necessities of living need not be struggled for but are considered to be human rights, and where individuals are able to participate actively in the institutions of government and work. They have moved in that direction and have also adopted welfare measures far beyond what we have in the United States.

Fortunately for the New Democratic party, British Columbia is a rich province. Its gross national product in 1972 was estimated at $12 billion, a gain of 11.5 percent from 1971. Wages average 7 percent higher than in the rest of Canada. (Perhaps those high wages are related to the fact that the trade union movement in British Columbia has always been more militant and radical than in the rest of Canada.) The province has some of the world's richest timber stands, as well as copper, zinc, lead, oil, highly productive fisheries, and scenic mountains, valleys, and fjords that are becoming a lucrative tourist attraction. Another source is foreign trade through the port of Vancouver.

The NDP government has capitalized on that wealth to start returning some of it to the people. It created a government auto insurance industry, entered the property, casualty, and marine insurance fields and opened the door for a move into life insurance. The insurance industry has "been telling us for years how much money they were losing," Barrett says with a grin, "so we thought we'd do them a favor." What's more, says Barrett, "The free enterprisers have convinced us. They're against handouts and so are we. Big business gets no more grants, tax write-offs, concessions, or anything else. The giveaway game is over in British Columbia."

The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, which began operations in March 1974, is now the largest insurance company in Canada. No-fault insurance is now issued with the driver's license. Establishing a government insurance company not only enabled the government to lower the rates to B.C. consumers, but it also invests the company's capital in other government corporations, in new private-public investment ventures, and in other government securities. This multiplier effect gives the government added leverage in influencing economic affairs in the province.

Pensioners and welfare recipients have had their incomes increased to the maximum allowed under Canada's federal-provincial cost-sharing system. British Columbia has the highest minimum wage in the world, $2.50 an hour. Under its income plan, implemented by Human Resources Minister Norman Levi, every person over 60 is guaranteed an income of $222 a month, couples $444. The same applies to disabled people. The NDP government has instituted the first free "pharmacare" (free prescription drugs) anywhere in North America for retired persons over 65, improved hospital care (it costs $1.50 to have a baby in a British Columbia hospital), provided welfare benefits of up to $380 a month for a family of four.

The government has instituted a program of guaranteed employment in community-oriented jobs such as health clinics, day-care centers, and food co-ops, and has increased grants to nonprofit day-care centers while providing financial assistance to parents for child care. Barrett believes that "the major problem with poor people is they don't have enough money. We're going to deal with that first and get to the Freudian analysis later."

While perturbing business, Dave Barrett, according to the *New York Times*, has "endeared himself to professionals, the middle classes and the poor." Surprisingly, in view of the opposition of doctors in the United States to anything smacking of "socialized medicine," physicians in British Columbia, who have been part of a governmental health plan for 20 years and fought bitterly with Barrett's free enterprise predecessor, W. A. C. Bennett, "now delight in consultation and mutual trust of the new government." Teachers, who worked hard to defeat Bennett, have won more school-financing and are bringing progressive change to the system.

When I asked Dave Barrett about the dangers of corruption à la Watergate, he stressed that the NDP government is not run behind closed doors. To prove his good faith, Barrett gave the post of chief legislative and financial watchdog to the Opposition. "They can catch us," he said with a smile, "all they want." He added that he had fired one cabinet minister for not being candid with him.

Barrett set up a $25 million corporation with authority to buy equity in any firm. When Crown Zellerbach Co. decided to close its newsprint mills at Ocean Falls, the NDP government bought the

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entire town "and all it contains" in order to "save a community of 500 people from extinction." Crown Zellerbach had asked for $10 million, but Barrett reduced the price to $1 million. Nevertheless, the company issued a release praising the government for its "fairness."

Perhaps the NDP's most controversial bill to date has been its land act, which froze the sale of agricultural land in British Columbia. A five-person commission has power to zone areas for agriculture, greenbelts, parks and other public uses without compensating owners for lost profits that might have been realized by sale for speculation or development. The commission also has power to buy land to lease back to family farmers and to purchase land for residential construction. Real estate speculators fought the bill vigorously and mounted a demonstration by 3,000 so-called farmers on the steps of the legislature. During the debate is was revealed that a large segment of these "farmers" were, in fact, real estate men. Since the huge province contains only a small area of fertile earth, the NDP is determined to preserve it for food production.

The NDP government has set up a seven-person commission empowered to deal with aspects of the energy crisis—it can license gas stations and other businesses in the energy field, it can fix wholesale and retail gas prices and it can prohibit the use of trading stamps and marked-down merchandise as customer lures. Barrett insists that natural resources "belong to the people" and were not "put in the earth by God for Standard Oil, Exxon, or any others." He has urged the Canadian government, thus far unsuccessfully, to nationalize oil and gas. (This is a power not held by any province.) "These are nonrenewable resources," he says. "I don't know why there is such a big hangup on them when most renewable resources, like hydroelectric power, already are publicly owned, here and in the United States. . . ."

The province has paid $25.5 million for El Paso Natural Gas Co.'s 13.5 percent interest in Westcoast Transmission Co. Ltd. of Vancouver. In 1973, the government threatened to take over Westcoast, the province's principal gas pipeliner, but later changed its mind and purchased the 13.5 percent share when a U.S. federal court ordered El Paso to divest itself of its Westcoast shares. Barrett points out that Westcoast is, in effect, being repatriated with U.S. dollars—the government boosted the price of its natural gas 81 percent last November.

THE NDP GOVERNMENT KNOWS that it faces tremendous obstacles. The business establishment of downtown Vancouver, all of the province's newspapers, radio, and TV, and all of the other political parties inveigh ceaselessly against socialism. So the NDP must rely on the party organization to spread its message. It has a strong grassroots organization and is remarkably democratic. The NDP has 15,000 dues-paying members in the province, and young people are integrated into all party branches. "In that way," says Barrett, "the young people learn from the experiences of our old-timers while they bring their enthusiasm to our older members." He works with the left-wingers in the party but at the same time is very pragmatic. When in London for talks with British investors and tea with Queen Elizabeth, he made sure that reports of his meeting with the Queen went back to B.C. When left-wingers remonstrated, he reminded them that many B.C. voters were proud traditionalists, and so was he.

To make the government more responsive to the needs of the people, it is Barrett's desire to have cabinet ministers and senior officials in many departments spend some time each year working in the field. Barrett himself has spent time living and working with commercial fishermen sailing out of the tiny village of Port Renfrew, and just recently on the B.C. Railway, traveling in a caboose and working with a tie gang.

Although British Columbia has very few blacks, two are NDP members of the legislature. One is a former professional football-player from the United States, and the other is a feminist leader. Barrett adds that Americans who have moved to the province, both retirees and those opposed to the draft, have been a good influence politically.

The NDP is pushing hard to ensure that British Columbia's vast natural resources will no longer flow ceaselessly out of the province, and that they will serve the cause of economic democracy. Its Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources Robert Williams has stated: "We don't intend just to get into the game of state capitalism. We will have worker and community representatives on the boards of Crown corporations, and will also give workers some equity participation. . . ."

And Barrett adds that he is studying changing work relationships in other parts of the world—West Germany's co-determination, where workers and owners share control of management; Israel and its kibbutz approach; and Sweden with its team approaches to mass-production assembly lines. If British Columbia's NDP government succeeds in introducing more democratic work arrangements into Crown corporations (instead of government

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ownership aping private management) it will be of great importance—a step forward in the progress of democratic socialism. □

TV Comes to the Village

Some time ago, writing about India's population problem, I offered the suggestion—probably not original—that the introduction of television into the villages, aside from its potential educational value, might have the effect of reducing the birth rate in that the villagers could spend their evenings watching TV at the village center instead of ... Alas, things are more complicated and the reality is harsher. This report on the effects of introducing TV into the villages of India, taken from the *Economic and Political Weekly* (March 8, 1975), tells its own story:

> It [is] worthwhile to recount some of the experiences which my colleague and I had recently, in our quest to assess the informational "needs" of randomly selected villages in the Bombay-Poona television viewing area. The villages we visited were equipped with community viewing sets under a scheme worked by the Rural Broadcasting Department of the Government of Maharashtra.
>
> ... The *Panchayat,* the village council, is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the sets. In urban areas the working-class community sets are put under the care of Labor Welfare Centers. At the beginning of the scheme ... the sets were installed free of charge but now under a new scheme the local body has to pay an initial amount of 950 rupees [$135] and an annual fee of 200 rupees [$28] for the maintenance of the sets. Many villages found themselves unable to meet this financial requirement and had to withdraw from the scheme. A paradoxical situation has arisen, where the more backward and poorer villages—which theoretically, at least, are in greater need of developmental television—have thus lost their sets. Some villages have surrendered their sets voluntarily because they found themselves faced with problems of rowdyism every evening, or because parents began to complain that their children did not study or do homework because of television. Factionalism and fights in some villages have been on the increase because of the television set which is in the charge of the village council, which in its turn was controlled by one party as against another. In some villages, influentials belonging to the opposition have bought their own sets and opened them for public viewing. In most of the villages the "generation gap" seemed to have widened because of the introduction of television sets. In some villages the village elders, members of the village councils, were in favor of restricted viewing hours while the younger people wanted the television sets to be on for the whole evening. The most popular programs were those with the least "developmental" thrust. By all accounts, the largest audiences were for *Chayageet* (a potpourri of songs from Hindi feature films) on Thursdays followed by Hindi feature films on Sundays and regional language feature films on Saturdays.
>
> When asked about the special programs for farmers and workers, the answers from our respondents were evasive. They were described as good and useful programs, but which unfortunately not many people watched. Some of the informants candidly admitted that these programs were switched on only if somebody made a specific request for them. ...
>
> —S. P. □

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Jonathan Rieder

Politics and Authenticity

FALSE PROMISES, by Stanley Aronowitz. New York: McGraw-Hill. 465 pp. $10.

THE WORKING CLASS MAJORITY, by Andrew Levison. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan. 319 pp. $8.95.

In the wake of the fashionable "discovery" of working-class alienation and blue-collar blues in the late 1960s, academics and intellectuals have written a considerable amount of material on the worker. These two recent treatments of the American working class present conflicting versions, but both are responses to the legacy of the 1960s: the ascension of the political and cultural radicalism of the New Left and the counterculture; the influence of a transplanted Frankfurt School of neo-Marxism; the manifold failures of liberalism; the debates on postindustrial society; the deterioration of the living standards of the working class; and the tumultuous realignment of the Democratic party.

Levison is a Cassandra warning the left-liberals of their disastrous neglect of the working class; he wants to purge them of their attraction to the false myths and trendy romanticism of the 1960s. Aronowitz is pure late 1960s, inspired by the Frankfurt School witches' brew of Marx, Hegel, and Freud. He is excited by the France of May 1968 and by an esoteric concern with "eroticizing everyday life." Levison and Aronowitz meet in a slightly surreal intellectual arena streaked with political antinomies, in which Jerry Wurf and Jurgen Habermas, Meany and Marcuse mix together awkwardly. The tension between Aronowitz's demand for transcendence and Levison's pragmatic reformism embodies a recurrent dilemma for the American Left—such as it is.

The Working Class Majority is an unpretentious little book, written with clarity and common sense. Its point of departure is the 1972 desertion of blue-collar workers to Nixon. Levison's audience and the objects of his pique are those left-liberals who slighted worker discontent, glamorized blacks and youth, and persisted in a "destructive liberal confusion about social class." They entertained a variety of myths about the working class: its integration into the middle class, its affluence and its political conservatism. Levison proceeds to shatter these myths, fusing personal anecdote, statistical data, and trenchant argument. He stresses that the current defection of the workers is rooted not in repressive character structure, the dominating effects of mass culture, or *embourgeoisement*. It stems from a failure of liberal political vision, policy, and leadership.

The guts of *The Working Class Majority* is a debunking of the theorists of the obsolescent working class. Levison excoriates the theorists of the new class structure as statistical conjurers. They exclude service workers like shoeshine boys from the blue-collar category, place office-machine tenders in the clerical stratum, and rely on the legion of female, secondary wage-earners in clerical and sales positions married to manual workers. As for Daniel Bell's postindustrial society, Levison claims that the vaunted increase in the professional and technical sector boils down to a mere 3 million workers—hardly enough to speak of a structural transformation. Rather, Levison traces this scant increase to the growth of Cold War-related R & D and the expansion of education in response to the baby boom and Sputnik. Levison does some statistical juggling of his own. The result: 42.3 percent middle class, 57.7 percent working class and so, not surprisingly, a working-class majority.

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Other myths fall too. What affluent working class?, demands Levison. Median family income of $10,700 misses the census bureau's mark for an intermediate budget, and the heralded purchase of homes is secured only through debt-financing and overtime. Levison catalogues a multitude of inequities that afflict workers as a class, ranging from job insecurity to the unfair burdens of regressive taxation and inflation. And he decries the liberals' myopic view of blue-collar politics, which stereotypes workers as racist or reactionary. He draws from municipal referenda and Richard Hamilton's survey data to document his contention that workers are no more conservative than any other strata; and he insists that populist resentment rather than unalloyed racism accounts for Wallace support. Scores of workers voted for law and order because they were legitimately frightened of crime, and opposed social welfare programs because they sidestepped *their* problems. Levison heartily endorses Fred Harris's comment that the "blue-collar worker will be progressive as long as it is not progress for everyone but himself."

Finally, Levison takes on the myths of the unions. Unflinchingly accepting the verdict of "economism," autocracy, and corruption, he stresses that the unions "by and large" have "delivered on bread and butter issues." His accent is on the rich variation within a labor movement that includes not only Barkans but also unions that supported McGovern. And Meany's Cold War kinks aside, Levison insists on the "basically progressive role" of the AFL–CIO embodied in its record on civil rights, full employment, and national health insurance.

The Working Class Majority has its flaws. Levison never links his working-class analysis to the dynamics of corporate capitalism and the forms of public and private power. He rather facilely dismisses shifts in class structure and culture. And some might argue that his reformism is insufficiently visionary. And his solutions are unabashedly electoral. "There is only one major area where real efforts at coalition can occur, and that is ironically in the area where much of the current polarization was created, the realm of electoral politics."

But none of this should imply that Levison's measured politics are without vision. They rest on a refreshing faith in "ordinary people" and their "real and immediate needs." Behind his reasonable programs are some "highly arresting notions: .... the people who work an enterprise ... ought to have a voice in what is produced, the kind and amount of new investments, and all the other aspects of the industry that are social issues." But the starting point must still be the realm of the possible. Levison pleads for the authenticity of politics.

WHERE Levison is reformist, eloquent, and wary of model-building, Aronowitz is radical, ponderous, and conceptually ambitious. He seeks nothing less than a "multidimensional methodology" to explain the failure of Marx's crisis theory and the integration of the American working class. In the process he fabricates a sprawling and frustrating work that jumps all over the intellectual map from ethnic sociology to Chomsky on transformational grammar. There are even discerning insights into the practical problems of workers. But the dominant inspiration remains the cumbersome and romantic cultural neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School. It is critical theory's longing for transcendence that beguiles Aronowitz. The result is a wildly erratic attempt to blend cogent perceptions of the everyday realities of grievance procedure, barroom, and assembly line with conceptually ornate chapters filled with unwieldy jargon and abstruse visions of redemption. Aronowitz stands Levison on his head: the authenticity of politics yields to the politics of authenticity.

Aronowitz's central mission is to rectify the Marxian slight of the subjective factors that translate economic crisis into political consciousness. He wants to rescue the concept of culture to explain why ethnic workers remained divided from each other and why workers today accept economic inequalities. We have to look to character and socialization. "Contrary to the reflexive model posited by orthodox Marxism in which all institutions other than the economic base merely copy the requirements of that base, the family, school, mass culture, etc., are absolutely necessary for the reproduction of the economic institutions." Movies and childhood games prepare the child to become an "obedient adult," to relinquish naive delight, and later to accept False Promises of advancement and consumption.

Ironically, Aronowitz praises the bourgeois theorist Talcott Parsons as scientific because "he posits the effective socialization of individuals by their social orders." The Iron Cage—no longer rendered as bureaucracy but culture—cajoles and coerces pliable men and women. What becomes of transcendence? Aronowitz is no pessimist, for "daily life provides clues" for both "liberatory and authoritarian tendencies." It follows, then, that with culture as a conceptual lever, much of *False Promises* is devoted to a quest for these prefiguring signs of revolt.

The labor movement does not provide those

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clues. For where Levison was after a "progressive" tendency, Aronowitz wants something grander, "liberatory." In contrast to Levison, Aronowitz sees unions as *not only, but primarily* guilty of economism and autocracy. Trade unionism can only be a force for "integrating workers." Underlying this absolutist claim is a disenchantment with the workers who have sought a "share in the expansion of American capitalism, not its downfall." And so Aronowitz is forced to look elsewhere: the new generation of counter cultural workers who disparage work through their absenteeism and drug use. Aronowitz is a working-class Charlie Reich. "The infection of democratic ideology and the social legitimation of erotic needs by mass culture among this generation of young workers constitutes the permanent basis of the revolt." The revolutionary subject, no longer defined by its productive but its generational and cultural position, is a worker "qualitatively different from any in the history of capitalism." Somewhat apocalyptically he adds, "The old mediations are losing their force."

What becomes of politics in this scheme? Of course union activity and electoral politics are merely incremental—a word from Levison's pragmatic lexicon that is anathema to Aronowitz. Since the "old mediations" are still partially intact, Aronowitz calls for a therapeutic politics of liberation from false needs. "The first step in the reeducation of workers is to help them to become aware of their own biographies, that is, the ways in which they have been educated so that their character structure is harmonious with the structure of domination." The struggle is within the personality against the lure of the Irish Sweep Stakes, television and bowling, which "force workers to view themselves as objects of manipulation."

HOW do we compare this cultural radicalism to something so pedestrian as Levison's concern with full employment? Aronowitz's attempts to explore the "non-economic contradictions" of capitalism and to ground neo-Marxist theory in historical data are admirable. There are some compelling insights into labor history and union practice. But in the final analysis, *False Promises* never fulfills its own promise. Fantasies about radical youth—working-class or otherwise—were at best seductive phantoms in 1969, but in 1975 they are banal. If Levison sees absenteeism and drug use as signs of tangible discontent, Aronowitz transfigures them through his grandiose language into intimations of revolt. When he invokes distance from scarcity as a cause for the emergence of radical young workers, we can smile in this era of resource imbalance and stagflation. The young radicals of Lordstown are older now, worried about lay-offs and home payments.

Aronowitz partially recognizes much of this. When he examines his subject concretely, he is forced to admit that "it would be a mistake to exaggerate the degree to which young workers have liberated themselves from the institutions of socialization." And so, romantic longing disenchanted, he then reaches for the arsenal of cultural theory, weighty jargon, and systems analysis. If the workers are still enmeshed in "cultural hegemony," it is because they have been made "manipulable objects of the productions of mass culture." In tortuous language, he proposes a patronizing view of the worker, anthropomorphizes institutions so that they seem to have an indomitable will of their own, and denigrates ordinary politics in favor of redemptive consciousness-raising. But workers are not as malleable and stupid as this elitist cultural theory suggests. Levison's explanation seems more plausible:

> Much of what is parochial and limited in working class life comes out of this fact. Many workers ... lock themselves into a lifetime of debt when they buy a house and furniture. ... From then on, their freedom to travel or try a new job, or just engage in a range of activities outside work is taken from them by the structure of debt in which they are enmeshed.

Right now there are immediate problems facing the American public, ranging from economic contraction to national health insurance. They require a politics of decency, coalition building, and hard work. These politics will not heal the split between work and play, not minister to feelings of existential malaise, nor eroticize everyday life. And for the foreseeable future, an important home for these politics will have to be the left wing of the Democratic party. But, if informed by a larger vision, they can be one unglamorous answer to the false promises of transcendence. □

Dear Readers:

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David Bensman

American Socialism

FAILURE OF A DREAM?: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM, edited by John M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday. 754 pp. $5.95.

As I read this collection of articles, both new and familiar, my reactions were generally ambivalent. At some points I loathed the book enough to write: "If you attempt to mate a rabbit and mule, you do not get a hybrid animal of average fertility. This collaborative effort seems to have had a similar issue." At other times, I thought the book quite good as an overview of the problem. My ambivalence was, I now believe, a reflection of the editors' own ambivalence about the purpose of their collaboration.

Three distinct, albeit related, purposes appear to have motivated Lipset, the liberal American sociologist, and Laslett, an English New Left labor historian. Their inability to choose among the three purposes resulted in an uneven, seriously flawed book.

The first purpose is to debate whether or not socialism has a future in America, or more specifically, did the American New Left point out structural contradictions in American society sufficiently serious to make socialism a plausible goal in America? Although the editors' disagreement over this question moves through the entire book, the issue is confronted explicitly only in the second chapter, an interesting dialogue between them. Later in the book, James Weinstein and Staughton Lynd, two elder statesmen of what once was known as the New Left, discuss their visions of a viable socialist movement. Since there is no critical reply to their presentation, the discussion of socialism's future is hardly satisfactory. Moreover, the book's failure to present a perspective on socialism's prospects by someone like Michael Harrington makes this aspect the least satisfactory, indeed, very irritating.

As a "reader" on the subject "why socialism failed in America?" the book is better. Good short statements of the traditional answers are presented, followed by recent criticisms or reformulations. In some instances, the authors of the original formulation reply to critics.

All the familiar arguments are here—Louis Hartz on liberalism and feudalism, Daniel Bell on ideological and moral rigidity, Werner Sombart on prosperity, Stephan Thernstrom on social mobility, Martin Diamond on New Deal cooptation of socialist program, Marc Karson on Catholic antisocialism, Norman Thomas on the flexibility of the American party system, Bernard Johnpoll on internal factionalism, Gerald Friedberg on repression. If the book had been simply a reader containing these essays, it would have been worthwhile. But it is both more, because it contains replies, and less, because its purpose is confused and its execution uncertain.

The replies to these traditional reasons for socialism's failure generally amount to an accusation that they are overgeneralized, and not comparative in their perspective. Laslett argues effectively that Bell overemphasizes the ideological and moral intransigence of the Socialist party. Laslett and Weinstein demonstrate the flexibility of American socialists in the first two decades of this century. Kenneth McNaught brilliantly criticizes Louis Hartz for making liberalism so inclusive a term as to comprehend contradictory and hostile phenomena.

In general, both Lipset and Laslett agree that to explain the failure of American socialists, one must look primarily at those structural features of American society that placed severe restraints on their actions, rather than to the inadequacy of the socialists themselves. However, Lipset tends to agree with the traditional structural explanations that Laslett would like to revise. In this book at least, Lipset has the best of the argument, because the criticisms of Laslett and others are presented in a piecemeal, sketchy fashion.

The book's third purpose is to present a short history of American socialism. Accordingly, the organization is topical and chronological. No topic is given more than 50 pages, and some less; only readers with prior knowledge about "Radicalism and the Agrarian Tradition" or "Socialism after World War One" are likely to be able to follow the discussions profitably.

Underlying this organizational problem is a more basic one, for the editors, particularly Lipset, appear to believe that it is possible to construct general

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theories without first getting to know your data intimately and fully. Symptomatic of this conception are Lipset's two articles on social mobility and on the labor movement. In both, Lipset overgeneralizes from meagre and often highly unreliable data to an extent astounding for a historical sociologist of such high repute.

The book's lack of historical detail is frustrating, because it makes it impossible for all but the most knowledgeable reader to evaluate the perspectives presented. Perhaps a more serious fault is the editors' relative indifference to empirical detail. This has led them to omit many historical studies done in the last few years, mainly by radical young historians, which are (or ought to be) changing our understanding of the history of American socialism.

IN THE PAST, studies of American radicalism tended to focus on ideology, at least in part because they were based primarily on publications and official documents of the radical groups. At the same time, what American radicals did with their time and energy was often ignored. While we know much about the intra-socialist debates during the Depression, we know much less about the activity of socialists in organizing the Unemployed Councils and the AFL and CIO unions. No one has ever studied the career of Max Hayes, the leading socialist trade unionist of the pre-World War I era. Our historical accounts have also tended to be national in scope, ignoring the regional and local levels.

In the last five years, young historians have begun to fill these gaps, inspired partly by a desire to understand the failure of the New Left, and partly by a growing familiarity with the work of such European social historians as Eric Hobsbawm, George Rudé, Edward Thompson, and Georges Lefebvre. Sally Miller has studied Victor Berger and his Milwaukee machine, Arnold Kaltenick the socialist municipal administrations, Daniel Walkowitz radical Troy molders, Jon Kruchko the birth of UAW local 674. This book reflects little of such new research—although Laslett's piece on socialism and the trade unions is an exception.

Now Lipset and Laslett might argue that much of the recent research is so highly localized as to be ungeneralizable, and therefore not suitable for their book. I would reply that until we have enough such historical studies to warrant generalization, no comprehensive new attempt at explaining the failure of American socialism is possible. But even so, the book contains enough good old and new material to make it worthwhile. □

George Eckstein

All Over the Globe

GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, by Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller. New York: Simon and Schuster. 508 pp. $11.95.

Large industrial corporations with heavy investments abroad are nothing new. But they used to be concentrated mainly in extractive industries and the direction of their expansion was determined by the location of the mineral deposits in undeveloped areas that lacked the capital and/or the incentive to exploit their own resources.

Not until after World War II did the multinational corporation (MNC) develop in its present shape, a direct result of the dominant position of U.S. capital in a war-weakened world, and of the breakdown of the prewar cartels. Except for oil, the stress now was on manufacturing and distribution; and even in oil, the refining, manufacturing, and distribution end became ever more important. At the same time, investment shifted from the underdeveloped toward the industrial world; and within the Third World, too, the shift was toward manufacturing/distribution. In the process, the reach of the MNC, predominantly U.S.-owned, became truly global.

Richard Barnet, codirector of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, and Ronald Müller, economics professor at the American University in Washington, present a truly comprehensive study, addressed to a wider public, of what they call the Global Corporation. It is a severe indictment, almost too unrelieved to be fully convincing, although they steer clear of moralizing or ideological dogmatism, and furnish ample documentation, including results of interviews with MNCs executives. The authors focus on the U.S.-owned corporations, and while this is justified by the latters' predominance, it might have been interesting to find out whether and in what ways their attitudes differ from those of their European or Japanese counterparts, especially with regard to their operations in Third World countries. (And we could have done without yet another brief against ecological destruction, workers' alienation, and similar troubles not exactly specific to the multinational corporation.)

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In the Third World, of course, the discrepancies, and hence the abuses, of power are much more pronounced. Even so, the interpretation is so unremittingly negative that the arguments lose a little in credibility. When U.S. mining companies in Chile pay wages higher than the national level, they cause trouble for Allende; when they exploit the low wage level of Korea to transfer light industries, they contribute to the overcrowding of its cities; when natives prefer Coca-Cola to contaminated water, they succumb to brain-washing U.S.-advertising.

Barnet and Müller conceive of investment of U.S. global corporations in underdeveloped countries as a zero-sum activity—whatever they gain must be the natives' loss. But it ought at least to be explored whether, as in trade, there might not be profit for both sides, however inequitably distributed in some cases. The fact that the MNC are guided by the desire to maximize their *global* profits need not exclude the possibility that in the process they also aid the host-country's overall development. Moreover, what are the alternatives? The authors do not pose this question at all; but off-hand, Russian, Chinese, or self-created investments don't seem to have produced substantially better results or fewer problems.

More valid are some of the other complaints: that the MNC with their greater financial stability attract vital local capital away from local enterprise; that the repatriation of a large part of profits (over 80 percent in mining, but—as the authors neglect to emphasize—only half that in other industries) holds back general economic development in Latin America. Ironically, the trend toward rapid repatriation of profits is further enhanced by the social and political instability created by the growing opposition to foreign economic domination, as expressed in nationalization or kidnappings. On the other hand, as the book points out, the example of OPEC, the forms in which lately the Communist world obtains advanced technology from the West, and the new Japanese and European competition, all have shown ways and opened up opportunities for loosening the grip of U.S. companies. The Andean Common Market organization, notably, has tried to find ways to achieve eventual transfer of control without slowing the influx of needed capital and the development of a new indigenous managerial class.

The authors have very little to say about the activities of U.S. multinationals in Europe and the rest of the industrial world where they operate today under more nearly equal conditions of power, that is, in a neocapitalist climate with considerable social and political stability. In the 1950s and '60s, over two-thirds of U.S. foreign investments went into this part of the world—another trend the authors fail to explore in its full significance. They do detect a new turning point in the role of the global corporation some time in the mid- or late '60s. Of the 125 U.S. global firms responsible for 40 percent of U.S. investment in manufacturing operations overseas, they say:

> Between 1960 and 1966 [their] fixed overseas investment rose from 21 to only 25 percent of their fixed investment in the U.S. In the next four years it shot up to 41 percent. These were the years when America's biggest bankers also became confirmed globalists. In 1965, twenty U.S. banks had a total of 211 foreign locations. Seven years later, one could seek a friend overseas at the Chase or First National City Bank (and a few others) in any of their 627 offices across the planet.

Again, primarily concerned with the effect of this acceleration on the structure of the American economy, the authors fail to pinpoint its major geographical and industrial thrust.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION is, of course, only the most advanced form of the large modern corporation. It shares its characteristics, in particular the oligopolistic control of the market, and the replacement of economic efficiency with financial control and overall organization as the key factor of its success. The authors rightly point to the major role played in the global expansion by the dynamics of unlimited growth inherent in the modern capitalist-industrial system (and not altogether absent even in its Communist version). And they rightly emphasize the specific advantages of the global corporations in this respect. The mobility of capital, combined with the central direction of the international organization (in turn made possible by modern communication technology), provides them with almost unlimited possibilities for the manipulation of prices, wages, taxes. As they had done previously on a national scale, they can shift production to countries with low wages and weak ecological, financial, and sociopolitical controls; through manipulation of charges for internal sales, licenses, and credit they can accumulate the larger share of their profits in low-tax countries (and occasionally "launder" cash for bribing politicians ...).

Alone among today's institutions, the authors stress again and again, the modern global corporation is truly international. "For business purposes"—thus the president of IBM World Trade

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Corp. is quoted—"the boundaries that separate one nation from another are no more real than the equator." Against this global flexibility they discern today no really effective countervailing power.

Labor unions are essentially national organizations, handicapped in their international cooperation by differences in organizational structure and ideological orientation; by the differing strength of their legal, economic, and political positions; by the lack of means for the exchange of information. There have been some initiatives toward change in the U.S.A., Canada, and the EEC countries, notably in the automobile, chemical, metal, and food industries; but a purely national orientation often leads to shortsighted old-style protectionist programs.

There is no international authority in existence or in sight that could exercise a true countervailing power, so that, paradoxically, any hope for remedial action has to center on the nation-state. The authors recognize this essential fact in their modest suggestions. These lead in two directions: one, to force the MNCs' international transactions into the open for the information of government agencies and political institutions in the home- or host-countries; two, to mobilize local interest groups for direct action. The latter, much overrated in New Left thinking, is apt to be diffuse and contradictory, valuable primarily as a stimulant. The former could be supplemented by expanded international agreements on taxation and on controls over the movement of capital, as well as by closer international cooperation of labor. In clearly focusing the central problem as one of power and control, Barnet's and Müller's book, with all its shortcomings, performs an important service.

The multinationals in fact have become quite vulnerable targets abroad, witness the numerous forms in which in recent years countries as wide apart ideologically as Chile and Saudi Arabia have circumscribed their ownership and operations. The problem, basically, cannot be separated from that of controlling the Big Corporation on the national level. As long as the latter cannot be subjected to socially desirable goals established by public policy, it remains a threat at home or abroad. Here lies, paradoxically, danger as well as hope. Like its domestic Big Sister (often Siamese twin), the MNC may have overreached itself. As its economic efficiency becomes more doubtful, its financial strength undermined by deep recession, its social dysfunction ever more apparent, it will be increasingly pushed toward *political* interference at home and abroad—and thereby increasingly arouse political counterforces. □

Terry M. Perlin

Getting Justice

JUSTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE: THE WAY IT REALLY WORKS, edited by Howard Zinn. New York: William Morrow & Co. 367 pp. $10.00

Years ago a character in the Pogo comic strip proclaimed that "*all* freedom is academic." The same is true of justice, Howard Zinn would have us believe. The Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the "black-robed dignity of the Supreme Court," this book asserts, are abstractions that rarely reach the ordinary scenes of confrontation between individuals and governmental institutions. The justice under which we live from day to day is a sorry saga and all the hot air of *Gideon*'s trumpet will not change things.

With the aid of an odd assembly of witnesses and advocates—including students, prisoners, inmates, tenants, teachers, and a few felons—Zinn presents a catalogue of abuses of the criminal justice system. The cumulative effect is to force a unanimous judgment: "the Law," as it presently stands, must be condemned as inherently unjust.

The case studies presented for our outraged response are normal—and not so normal—tales of administrative abuse and governmental error. Students are arrested for distributing pamphlets in front of a high school; police break into an apartment and beat up an elderly couple; a judge repeatedly insults a defendant; a landlord who refuses to provide heat for his tenants succeeds in evicting them when they withhold rent; poor hospital patients are tricked into having unnecessary operations to provide experience for young doctors; a young man is arrested for uttering a vulgarity at a public meeting. All the instances cited in this book come from the Boston area but, Zinn claims, such stories can be found in any American city. When we put justice on trial, the verdict is always "guilty."

Recent upper-court decisions concerning defendants' rights, the invalidity of forced confessions, the guarantee of protection against search and seizure, and the extension of the rights of free expression are uniformly ignored by policemen on patrol. Freedom of the press is converted into assault and battery. In Harvard Square a young vendor of the

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Daily World was beaten by policemen after being told to "get the hell out of here." When a passing student intervened and asked the cop to identify himself, another arrest was made. The police alleged that the paper salesman had spat upon a cop and, after a series of court appearances, hearings, postponements, and two trials, the vendor became a felon.

This case would be known only to the immediate circle of participants—had not the witness who demanded the policeman's credentials been William Bunting, son of President Mary I. Bunting of Radcliffe College. The *Boston Globe* picked up the story; Phyllis Kachinsky, a student of Howard Zinn's, pursued the matter and, as a result, we can reexperience, in rather vivid detail, the story of one radical paper hawker's beating, arrest, and conviction.

Frequently, such a legal crackdown is less obvious. Vague charges such as disorderly conduct, loitering, failure to get a permit are used as pretexts to rid the streets of undesirable elements. In each case, the cop on the beat makes the decision. If the matter ever gets to court—a rare event, I suspect—the police officer has the presumption of honesty and experience on his side. "If a policeman or a judge, or some power in the community respected by the policeman or judge, doesn't like what is being said, what is being printed," Zinn says, "they can remove . . . freedom of expression if they wish."

Though this book suffers from considerable naiveté—some of Zinn's students seem literally surprised to discover that judges are brusque and landlords money-grubbing—it captures legal conflicts that are common to all city-dwellers. Who has not suffered the bureaucratic inanity of dealing with the division of motor vehicles? Who has escaped the frustration of trying to get the heat turned on by a recalcitrant superintendent during a cold spell? Are there any students (or parents) who have not been driven to outrage by an inconsistent public school administration? Many of Zinn's examples have a resonance for the middle-class audience that will read the book.

BUT *Justice in Everyday Life* is not intended to evoke nods of recognition from a comfortable readership. It charges that justice is a conspiracy against the poor, the ignorant, and the psychologically vulnerable. Cops and judges, wardens and hospital administrators, school principals and corporate executives exercise a power over the fate of individuals that is not only wicked but also usually illegal. The Constitution may be what the Supreme Court says it is, but on the streets of the city, power resides at the tip of the policeman's club. The professors of law and civil libertarian defenders interviewed in this book show a surprising lack of concern for clients' rights. Perhaps the issues involved are too minor and uninteresting. This, of course, is Zinn's central accusation: in everyday life the evils discharged by authority repeat themselves with unsurpassed banality. Like crime itself, unjust law enforcement is a routine event.

Unfortunately, Zinn presents no more than a depressing (though fascinating) laundry list of injustices. His suggestions for improvement are largely useless. He does not wish to make better cops or clean up the courts. He wants an end to it all: to close down the prisons, dismantle the judiciary, and let local communities police themselves. Aside from a lack of concreteness, these immodest proposals offer no guarantee of increasing the quantity or quality of justice. Are muggers undeterred by corrupt cops likely to repent at the sight of community patrols? Even Kropotkin, whose ethic informs this work, did not want to abolish prisons until after the revolution began.

Zinn tries to squeeze through the reformer-revolutionary dilemma by urging resistance to corrupt authority at every opportunity. This is an admirable demand and, like Zinn, some of my best friends are defiant. But the sum-total of rebellious acts is not a revolution and there is little to be gained in pretending otherwise. Finally, then, *Justice in Everyday Life* is a utopian tract, suffering from all the beauties and dangers of that format. It reminds us that the ideal of justice, as Thomas More knew, is to be found "nowhere." □

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Is Patriarchy Inevitable?

In our Spring 1975 issue we carried Devra Lee Davis's review of Steven Goldberg's recent book, The Inevitability of Patriarchy. *Below we print a comment Steven Goldberg has sent us on that review and Devra Lee Davis's response.* — EDS.

Steven Goldberg *Comments*:

I can understand that *Dissent* would greet with something less than enthusiasm a work that emphasizes the physiological roots of behavior—even I would prefer that a journal of the Left underrate, rather than exaggerate, the importance of physiological differentiation to behavior and institution.

But I do think that an author has the right to expect that a reviewer will at least provide the reader with a summary of the author's argument and attempt to counter that argument (rather than a series of silly assertions that the author never made). Devra Lee Davis, in her review of my *The Inevitability of Patriarchy,* does neither. I cannot, in this short space, review the argument presented in *Patriarchy* in sufficient detail to demonstrate all of Davis's confusions; I have done so in the March '75 *American Anthropologist.* I would, however, appreciate the opportunity to comment on a few of Davis's criticisms.

(A) Every one of the thousands of societies on which we have any sort of evidence has manifested three institutions. 1 (Patriarchy): Males attain the overwhelming numbers of positions in political hierarchies and all other hierarchies from which they are not excluded. 2 (Male Attainment): The nonmaternal roles given highest status—whichever they are in any given society—tend to be attained by males. Doctors receive high status in the U.S. and relatively lower status in the Soviet Union. In the U.S. doctors are men; in the Soviet Union doctors are women while engineers, who receive the status given doctors in the U.S., are men. 3 (Male Dominance): Male and female emotions, and the values and social expectations that reflect them, associate dominance in male-female relationships with males; the authority system is concordant with this.

(B) Though one would not know it from Davis's review, the *purpose* of *Patriarchy* is to offer a parsimonious explanation of these empirical facts. The usual explanations—such as those emphasizing physical strength, the maternal role, or technology and contraception—are disconcordant with the ethnographic evidence and ignore the physiological evidence mentioned below.

(C) Even if we had none of the physiological evidence, the anthropological evidence alone would be sufficient to force us to posit a physiologically rooted *motivational* differentiation, such that males are more strongly motivated toward whatever behavior is necessary for attainment of hierarchical position and status. The emotional-behavioral differentiation that is a result of the male-female physiological dimorphism can be conceptualized as either a greater male "drive" toward dominance in hierarchies and male-female relationships or as a greater male "need" for such dominance. Indeed, one can just as legitimately view this differentiation in terms of a male's having a "weaker ego" that needs

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shoring up by attainment and dominance. All that is important is that male physiology is such that the male is more strongly motivated, by the environmental presence of a hierarchy or member of the other sex, to sacrifice whatever must be sacrificed—time, pleasure, health, affection, relaxation, family—for attainment of the hierarchical positions and occupational roles for which there is the greatest competition, and for dominance in male-female relationships.

(D) While the anthropological evidence would force us to posit a physiological basis for this emotional-behavioral differentiation even if there were no direct physiological evidence, we need not merely posit this physiological differentiation on hypothetical grounds. The evidence provided by the role of hormones in human behavior and by controlled medical and scientific studies of other mammals conclusively demonstrates that the testicularly generated fetal hormonalization of the male CNS promotes earlier and more extensive maturation of the brain structures that mediate between male hormones and outward behavior, thereby rendering the male hypersensitive to the presence of the hormones that energize dominance behavior and sensitize for dominance response.

(E) The central fallacy of the sociological approach taken by Davis is the assumption that social values are to a great extent independent of—and can act as counterpoise to—the physiomotivational differentiation. Social values, socialization, and—ultimately—institutions conform to limits set by the behavioral differentiation that is rooted in the physiological differentiation. These realities are limited by a population's observations and the expectations that these observations generate. The members of every population base their expectations of male and female behavior on previous experience; every society's values rest on the assumption that males are more "aggressive" (i.e., manifest dominance behavior more readily and more strongly) because every society's children and adults observe that males *are* more "aggressive." The argument that males behave more "aggressively" merely because they have been conditioned or socialized to do so merely begs the question: *why* does every society have expectations that it is the *male* who is more "aggressive"?

(F) There is much in *Patriarchy* that it is not possible to discuss here; for example, the question of the ways in which social values exaggerate the importance of the physiological by making qualitative, discrete, and absolute that which is—on a physiological-behavioral level—quantitative, continuous, and statistical, and the argument that all stereotypes are "true" in that they reflect a reality (whatever the etiology of the reality). I might, however, mention the relevance of my general argument to modern society, since Davis refers to this without giving the reader even a hint of what the argument was.

To the extent that a society has any hierarchy at all, to the extent that it has any values of any kind, and to the extent that it does not segregate males and females, to this extent will it be unable to avoid the institutions I discuss. For these are the environmental cues that activate the physiologically rooted propensity. It is these—and not the content of values—that provide the cue and the channel for behavior by motivating the male more strongly to manifest *whatever behavior is necessary* to attain hierarchical position, status, and dominance—be that behavior fighting or kissing babies for votes. The point about modern society is that it is virtually *defined* by the hierarchy, division of labor, and differentiation of (achieved) status that are the necessary cues and channels. While even the most primitive societies (whatever the yardstick) have the institutions I discuss, one might argue that their rudimentary hierarchy, low division of labor and differentiation, and high status attached to the maternal role males cannot fill limit the importance of the physiomotivational differentiation by limiting the necessary environmental cues in a way that the very nature of modern society precludes.

NOW: Davis's response to the argument I present is to invoke irrelevancies, on the one hand, and incorrect assertions on the other. The former need not concern us here. Davis acknowledges that the anthropological and physiological evidence I present is "impressive," but then proceeds to attack the concept of "natural"—as if my argument were supported by nothing more than a metaphysical invocation of "naturalness" as explanation of behavior. She also suggests, correctly, that physical strength is no longer of great importance without mentioning that my argument does not rest on sex differences in strength, that the physiological evidence indicates it is hormonal masculinization, not strength, that is relevant to dominance, and that observation of human hierarchies indicates motivation is the crucial factor; when we refer to Abe Beame as "an 'aggres-

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sive' man who will get to the top'' we are not talking about physical strength.

More important are the incorrect assertions. To some of these—such as generalizations about physiology no longer being important to motivation—one can merely say, ''says who?'' To others—such as the inevitable attempt to subsume all analyses mentioning physiology under one heading and attacking all for the faults of the weakest—one can say only that he does not believe that man has a ''killer instinct.''

But one of Davis's points does have empirical implications. This is the assertion that technology and other modern economic considerations are of sufficient importance to motivation to override the physiological differentiation. The very point of *Patriarchy* is that the institutions discussed are present *regardless* of changes in any other technological, economic, or social variables. To which society does Dr. Davis refer when she claims the importance of technology? To the Soviet Union (with its 96.9 percent male Central Committee), to China (in which 67 of the 72 ministries are headed by males while the other five positions are vacant), to Israel (in which 93 percent of the Parliament is male), to the United States (which, for all the brave words and clenched fists, has fewer women in Congress than it did two decades ago), or to Sweden (whose 13 ministers are all male)?

I titled the book The *Inevitability* of Patriarchy because it behooves anyone proposing a theory that claims to be scientific to specify the conditions under which the theory would be shown to be incorrect. The title is meant to indicate that the development of a society that lacks patriarchy would be sufficient to demonstrate the incorrectness of the theory. This is what a theory is *supposed* to do.*

*Devra Lee Davis quotes some sentences out of context in order to imply that I make an argument for black-white differences equivalent to that one I make for male-female differences. My point in the quoted section was that arguments over black-white differences rest on evidence from *one* society in which blacks are a *minority*, that there is no direct physiological evidence for black-white differences equivalent to the hormonal evidence, and that even if black-white genetic differences relevant to social life do exist they concern capacity rather than motivation. I do not know whether genetic differences are relevant to racial IQ differences; the fact that I do not like the idea either is hardly much of an argument. But the only point in the discussion in *Patriarchy* was that—as even the genetic-IQ proponent would surely admit—the evidence for the sex differences I discuss is infinitely stronger. □

Devra Lee Davis *Replies*:

However admirable the attempted economizing of thought, the parsimony of an explanation does not guarantee its validity—even if elegant in formulation. The most serious problem for Steven Goldberg is that his parsimonious theory of the inevitability of patriarchy presupposes that no society exists or has existed without patriarchy. In fact, anthropologists have noted that male dominance and patriarchy are not culturally universal. Leacock's note in the *American Anthropologist,* March 1975, refers to two groups without male dominance and patriarchy: the Paliyans of India, where ''neither spouse can order the other, and neither, by virtue of sex, or age, is entitled to great voice in matters of mutual concern''; and the 17th-century Montagnais, where women ''in nearly every instance ... made the choice of plans, or undertakings, of journeys and winterings.'' A more intriguing refutation of Goldberg's hormonal determinism is offered by the ferocious castrati leaders from Chinese history of 91 B.C., described by the historian Schi Chi Chen. These castrated males, with necessarily lower levels of plasma testosterone, provided bloody aggressive leadership, according to the Japanese historian of biomedical science, Yoshikio Omura.

On its own terms, then, Goldberg's univeralistic theory is ''incorrect.'' The lack of universality of patriarchy and male dominance falsifies Goldberg's claims for a physiological *primum movens* for patriarchy, since these phenomena vary culturally.

Current studies of rocking of newborns in our society demonstrate unconscious parental differences in cuddling of female and male infants. Add to these unconscious forces the recognized critical role of language in self-development, and the best-intentioned reformer cannot transcend the patriarchal consciousness of every thought and utterance.

For the sake of soundly debunking Goldberg's mythologies disguised as science, let us assume that no evidence of a nonpatriarchal human or animal society has, in fact, been found. What then of the apparently ordered scientific objections that Goldberg offers? In a world where scientific facts are self-legitimating, Goldberg's discussion rests on a patina of scientism that crumbles at critical inspection. Arguing that both anthropological and endocrinological evidence demonstrate a physiological basis for male dominance, Goldberg commits sev-

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eral formal logical fallacies, as well as substantive scientific errors.

One of the curious logical contradictions is Goldberg's present contention that ethnological evidence supports the view that males dominate, *either* because of a weaker male ego that "needs" to dominate *or* a male "drive" to dominate. The contradiction here is quite flagrant—from weakness or else from strength comes an equally forceful dominance. Rather than invoking two contradictory "physiologically rooted" psychological states as the cause of dominance, it would seem logical (and also, empirically testable) to consider an unambiguous physiological source, for instance male hirsuteness or male height. With this revision of his book, where either weakness or strength explains dominance, Goldberg throws a sop to feminist critics but emerges more paradoxical than parsimonious.

An area where Goldberg commits errors in both logic and science is one that easily baffles the layperson. Without considerable background in developmental embryology, it is quite difficult to understand the current issues involved in the relationship between fetal hormonalization and adult dominance behavior. As numerous researchers in the field have noted, it is easy to misconstrue the mere *correlation* of plasma testosterone levels with dominance behavior in animals as grounds for some presumed *causal* relationship between the two. Experimental animal studies such as those of Rose and associates show significant shifts in level of plasma testosterone as the dominance position of male rhesus monkeys is manipulated experimentally.

The question of exact causality is unanswerable. Positing causality in Goldberg's assertive fashion hardly provides an answer to the question of causality, except insofar as it exemplifies the hazards of proof by assertion. Another problem area in this respect is provided by the natural observations of Esser and his colleagues of a group of gibbons (Hylobates lar) which exhibit coequal dominance between females and males (when dominance is measured in terms of who leads to the water, etc.). Most laboratory studies of dominance measure such male activities as who copulates (or "introjects") most, and do not even note female dominance activities, so that such activities effectively do not exist in these scientific studies. To generalize from either the laboratory or natural animal observations to humans is to commit a peculiar reverse anthropomorphism, one of which Goldberg is aware but which does not prevent him from trotting along when it serves his interests, so to speak in a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* gait.

Goldberg's scientific error in this field is a subtle one, also reflecting his tendency to cross species when convenient, in search of evidence for critical fetal hormonalization. No serious research in this field asserts categorically what Goldberg does, namely that fetal hormonalization is irreversible in the matter of male dominance. For the moment, researchers agree that fetal hormonalization occurs and does influence adult behavior, but the exact nature of this process is not determinable. For instance, there is no evidence that testosterone influences the area of thinking, namely the cortex. Rather it influences the subcortical, or limbic, systems, the area of emotions.

To argue that male/female differences in animal emotional behavior probably apply to human differences in emotional and other behavior is a further misconstruction of the scientific evidence on Goldberg's part. Moreover, leaders are not, as Goldberg notes, the physically strongest or most dominant (as measured by levels of plasma testosterone); if such were the case we would have a society led by under-20-year-old males in the mornings when their testosterone levels are the highest.

The strongest evidence that there are not "irreversible differences in the CNS," which Goldberg refers to in his book, is provided by the pioneering studies of Money and Ehrhardt who have worked with gender identity changes; they have been successful in surgically and chemically changing persons born with ambiguous genitalia into "normal" males and females. However, one of their most startling cases involved the sex reassignment of a normal male twin as a female, following a surgical mishap at the age of seven months that permanently damaged his penis. Money and Ehrhardt report that these twins, now one female and one male, exhibit "normal" gender identities. Despite such evidence, Goldberg claims that "the boy's socialization still flows from society's acknowledging biological reality," as though society socializes people according to some primordial need. This harps back to a naive functionalist legacy that values whatever exists, *sui generis,* and would bid us accept our destinies like good women and men playing out Strindberg.

THE ABOVE logical and scientific errors are by far not the most insidious aspect of Goldberg's analysis. He still does not understand that the decision to collect certain kinds of data itself reflects definite interests and assumptions about science. The very attempt to search for presumably immutable genetic

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characteristics (contemporary geneticists employ no concept of immutability) of any group of people is itself reflective of an ideological glorification of human nature. To term something human nature under this schema is but another way of pronouncing it unchangeable, with a Lysenkoist twist to be sure.

In the epilogue to his book Goldberg describes as an "insult to serious women scholars" the tendency to celebrate feminist insight and ignore feminist theoretical contradictions. Reciprocally, I would not want to insult serious men scholars by failing to note the lack of insight in Goldberg's argument, its theoretical contradictions, and its uncritical faith in scientific evidence.

Since Goldberg claims in his final footnote here that I quoted him out of context concerning some of his views, the section merits fuller excerpting:

> If one asks, "does that mean that if half the members of every society were white and half were black and all societies were ruled by whites (or all by blacks) then you would say that one race was superior at attaining power for biological reasons," the answer is, of course, yes. But even if all societies had populations evenly divided between the races and even if all societies were ruled by whites (or blacks), the evidence supporting the existence of relevant genetic differences would not be nearly as strong as it is for sexual differences. Because the evidence for important biological differences between the races would still be hypothetical (though very convincing).

Rose Laub Coser has warned us to be very suspicious about what people toss off as asides or trivia, for in such minimizing efforts they often betray major weaknesses. With his afterthought Goldberg discloses the serious link between physiological determinism of gender and that of race, however that is conceived. In his footnote Goldberg adds that the notion of black/white genetic differences as relevant to social life is not an "idea" he likes; however, presumably when convincing scientific data on this point are presented Goldberg would acknowledge their validity, much as he would now have us accept the evidence that he presents for female/male genetic differences.

In fact, not long ago social scientists produced just such scientific data and policy recommendations on genetic inferiority for the sundry groups then regarded as scientifically distinguishable races. E. A. Ross (1906) said that owing to their deficiencies in character and intelligence, the Irish represented a tremendous burden, demonstrating financial irresponsibility of Irish families comparable to that of Bedouins. Lewis M. Terman (1916) had similar views, reporting consistent racial differences between Indians, Mexicans, and Negroes; he predicted that these differencies could not be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture. In 1940 Edward L. Thorndike, one of the founders of psychological testing, noted that about the only service the inferior and vicious could perform was not to beget children.[1]

WHILE it is no longer chic to look for irreversible, immutable, genetic determinants of social inequalities between groups, Goldberg would have us acknowledge such determinants of gender differences, conceding, as he puts it in his book, that "we are what we are, and there is not the slightest shred of evidence that our most basic elements, the biologically based emotions that flow from our male and female physiologies and that guide our behavior, have changed singificantly since man first walked the earth."

Goldberg fails to appreciate that asking questions about irreducible, natural bases of social phenomena presumes the epistemological possibility of knowing the roots of these phenomena. That would mean attempting to explain what is basic in terms of what is based on it. Such a muddled attempt underlies positings of the natural superiority of women or men. Thus, when Ashley Montagu observes that women are healthier than men he is describing the expressions and not the causes or bases of gender differences. Likewise when the Kerner Commission reported the mortality rate of black infants as five times that of white infants, it expressed not the causes of racial oppression but the manifestations of it.

One part of the crisis of social theory relates quite directly to its failures to attack the mythic scientific respect of science for science. A critical understanding of science and its functions in society comes into its own only when it rejects the false absolute and blind domination of naive faith in science, as exemplified by Steven Goldberg's quixotic work. □

[1] In a forthcoming special issue of the *International Journal of Mental Health* (III:4), these early scientific analyses of racial differences are discussed by Milton Schwebel, "The Inevitability of Ideology in Psychological Theory."

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LETTERS

On Facts and Figures

Editors:

The article ["Is Equality a Necessity?"] by Herman Miller in the Winter 1975 issue of *Dissent* is disturbing. By far the largest part is devoted to telling us that income and wealth are unequally and unfairly divided in this country. To some of the older people among us, this will not come as news; but as new generations are born and grow up, it is doubtless important that these secrets be imparted to them, and it is surely better for them to learn it from such a magazine as ours, than to have to pick it up on the streets. The figures and facts, however, are sufficiently convincing so that no extra weighting is necessary.

Mr. Miller tells us that there was a rise in the number of millionaires in the country, from about 53,000 in 1960 to 200,000 in 1970. He adds, "This is a fourfold increase." Not content to let the figures speak for themselves, and perhaps fearful that the reader may do the arithmetic himself, he has added this false statement to show his own horror and perhaps instill it in the reader. The latter, however, wanting to do his own figuring, and not influenced by Mr. Miller's credentials as head of the population division of the government, will say, "147/53 increase is not fourfold, but 2.78-fold." He will then consider the fact that the population of the country increased by some tens of millions during the decade, adding a certain proportion to its millionaires; and if he takes note of some other figures in the article, he may see that the value of the dollar went down a good deal in those ten years, so that a millionaire at the end of the decade would be considerably less wealthy then one at its beginning. Not that Mr. Miller has told us just what a millionaire is—Webster says it is someone who is worth a million in dollars, pounds, francs, etc., or "a very rich man." Clearly when one thinks in terms of the "new dollar" (sugar at 60c, apricots at $3, "reasonable" rent at $350, postcards at 8c), we are speaking in terms different from those of a dozen years ago, just as a millionaire in Italy now has no standing at all. In any case, when all the variables are taken into consideration, the proportionate rise in the category will be seen to be nearer to a one- or one-and-a-half-fold increase than to a fourfold one. In any case, just what is Mr. Miller's point? That the more "millionaires" there are, the worse the state of the country? Would he say the same if we had 50 million millionaires? 5 million? One of the early tenets of Marxism was that the rich always get richer and the poor poorer. When this turned out not to be the case (actually the rich got richer, and the poor got richer too), the new Marxism-Leninism modified the tenet to say that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer *in proportion to the fortunes of the rich*. Mr. Miller has apparently recently discovered this rereading.

One more typical case of distortion in the article may be seen on page 45. Here Mr. Miller has drawn a fine piece of pie, showing a segment of the pie marked "5 percent of income." But he has made this segment not a 5 percent but a 17 percent segment, i.e., 60 degrees of the whole circle, not 18 degrees. He helps us, again as before, by explaining, "The diagram below shows this quite clearly." What this does show quite clearly is that the writer is willing to distort both figures and diagrams to make his point. The purpose of such graphic pie-making should be to clarify, not to obscure or propagandize.

WALTER GOLDWATER
New York City □

Haldeman, Law, and Integrity

Editors:

Martin E. Spencer states erroneously in "Political Technicians, Corrupters of Democracy," *Dissent*, Spring 1975, that Watergate wrong-doer Haldeman is a lawyer (p. 192). Fortunately (we have sufficient problems of credibility and prestige), Haldeman never studied law; he was not admitted to the Bar. More important, however, a respect for the law—as a moral "science"—is *de hors* one's status as an attorney. Simple honesty and respect for institutional standards cannot be learned in school, especially between the ages of 21 and 24. Certainly, sociologist Spencer must enjoy this cognizance.

ELLIOT A. COHEN
Pomona, New York □

Proposals for Recovery

Editors:

I want to call attention to a serious omission in Michael Harrington's article on "Some Proposals for the Economic Crisis," in the Spring 1975 issue of *Dissent*. He says nothing whatever about one of America's most vital needs—the elimination of the $60 billion or $70 billion in tax loopholes benefiting big business and the upper and upper-middle income-tax brackets. The democratic Left should advocate a simplified income-tax structure along the lines proposed in Philip M. Stern's book, *The Rape of the Taxpayer*, but not necessarily using the same rates. The rates should be fixed in such a manner that they accomplish the following objectives:

(1) A permanent reduction of income tax for people in the lower and lower-middle tax brackets.

(2) Revenues for the 1 million public service jobs proposed by Mr. Harrington and for additional social, environmental, and energy needs now not provided for.

Let's face it. Unless offset by deflationary factors in the economy, deficit financing *is* inflationary. It is another part of the conventional wisdom of the now ancient New Deal that needs to be discarded. Financing social needs by eliminating tax loopholes would not be inflationary. It would build some real distribution of wealth into the economy, which deficit financing cannot do, with its interest payments to banks and others holding government securities. In addition, the program I have proposed would have the political advantage of putting all varieties of conservatives on the defensive. It is safe to say that they don't hate deficit financing so much that they are willing to stop it by eliminating tax loopholes.

FRANK E. DOHERTY
Chicago □

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A quick quiz on American socialism:

What is the DSOC?

☐ **A.** A dynamic new group dedicated to rebuilding a socialist presence in American life, led by Michael Harrington and including in its membership: Ralph Helstein, Victor Reuther, Alice Rossi, Irving Howe, Cynthia Epstein, and Sanford Gottlieb.

☐ **B.** A socialist organization which works within the existing liberal-Left, with trade unionists, feminists, black activists and other reformers fighting to win victories right now. A group, unlike other past and present socialist organizations, which works within the Democratic Party's left wing.

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